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THE CHANGING CuLTURE OF AMERICAN 
LAND UsE REGULATION: PAYING FoR 
GROWTH WITH IMPACT FEES 
Ronald H. Rosenberg* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A MERICA, over the last century, has been a society of change-a dynamic, growing society. This dynamism has been reflected in a nation characterized by expansion of every kind-demo-
graphic, educational, economic, and geographic. Throughout much of the 
twentieth century, the concept of growth was regarded by some as the 
fundamental American destiny, as a natural outcome of a prosperous ec-
onomic system, and as an indicator of the superiority of the American 
political system. Under this ideology, in a general sense, growth was 
"good" and it was to be facilitated by public policy and public subsidies as 
well as by private investment. The physical growth of our living commu-
nities possessed organic connotations reflecting social progress and the 
nation's economic vitality. Following this view, a century ago even the 
adverse impacts of industrialization such as air pollution could be consid-
ered to be the inevitable and necessary costs of prosperity.1 The Ameri-
can growth ideal associated general economic expansion with greater 
personal opportunity and higher individual real incomes which would, in 
turn, lead to a superior quality of life. This growth concept also suggested 
greater personal freedom and choice in the selection of the form and lo-
cation of one's residence. To fulfill this desire, throughout the last cen-
tury and into the present, most Americans have aspired to achieve the 
twin goals of owning their own homes2 and living in suburban areas 
* 2005. Ronald H. Rosenberg 
1. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, was 
called the "smokey city." This nickname was considered a positive identification since it 
signified the economic prosperity associated with industrial facilities. In fact, coal dealer 
William P. Rend spoke before the Union City Club of Chicago in 1892 and he said 
"[s]moke is the incense burning on the alters of industry. It is beautiful to me." Smoke 
Prevention: Report of the Special Committee on Prevention of Smoke, Presented to Engi-
neers' Club of St. Louis, J. Ass'N ENG'G Soc'vs 11 (1892) (quoted in DAVID STRADLING, 
SMOKESTACKS AND PROGRESSIVES: ENVIRONMENTALISTS, ENGINEERS AND AIR QuALITY 
IN AMERICA, 1881-1951, at 43-44 (1999)). 
2. The social goal of home ownership is particularly strong in the United States and it 
is accurate to say that Americans are a nation of homeowners. As of 2003, overall home 
ownership rates reached 68.3% of all American families regardless of income. However, 
there are significant disparities between demographic subgroups depending upon race, age, 
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outside of the central city.3 
Growth in America cannot to be measured solely by the numbers-
that is, the expanding population4 or the general increase in families or 
individual incomes.5 The idea of growth has a physical and a spatial di-
mension to it. As the nation's population has grown over the last century, 
the form and distribution of living patterns has changed as well. Today, 
America can best be described as a suburban nation with over 80% of its 
total population concentrated in metropolitan areas6 and, overwhelm-
ingly, they are living in single family, detached homes? The nation has 
transformed itself over the last century so that the location of homes and 
jobs have drastically shifted from cities to suburbs8 and there is little evi-
and state. See U.S. CENsus BuREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 
2004-2005 (124th ed. 2004) [hereinafter 2004-2005 CENsus]. 
3. This suburban migration reflects what Anthony Downs terms the "dominant vi-
sion" of metropolitan growth which reflect residential norms for the last fifty years. Downs 
sees this "dominant vision" as possessing five components: 1) ownership of detached sin-
gle-family homes on spacious building lots; 2) ownership of automobiles; 3) working in 
low-rise workplaces in park-like settings; 4) residence in small communities with strong 
local governments; and 5) environments free from the signs of poverty. See ANTHONY 
DOWNS, NEW VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA 5-6 (1994). Following the incentives 
of "consumer sovereignty," developers have provided the market with suburban environ-
ments that people demand. See, e.g., Peter Gordon & Harry W. Richardson, Prove It: The 
Costs and Benefits of Sprawl, BROOKINGS REv. 23 (Fall 1998) ("it is hard to avoid conclud-
ing that 'sprawl' is most people's preferred lifestyle"). 
4. American population has consistently grown during the twentieth century. By July, 
2003, the Census Bureau estimated the nation's population to be just over 291 million 
people. This should be compared to the population in 1900 which was approximately 76 
million-nearly a quadrupling of population in a century. 2004-2005 CENsus, supra note 2, 
at 7 tbls. 1&2. During the period from 1970 to 2000, American overall population grew by 
over 32%. This population increase resulted from both increased numbers of American 
citizens and higher numbers of immigrants. In fact, in the decade of the nineties the immi-
grant population growth rate grew faster (3.4% per year) than in any decade other than 
1900 to 1910, 1910 to 1920 and 1920 to 1930. /d. at 8 tbl. 5. 
5. Nominal incomes for all American households measured in constant 2002 dollars, 
have risen approximately 16% over the past twenty-two years, growing from $36,608 in 
1980 to $42,409 in 2002. 2004-2005 CENSUS, supra note 2, at 443 tbl. 666. The real shift over 
this period occurred in the distribution of income with the trend over the last two decades 
being the concentration of income in the top 5% of the population with this segment in-
creasing its share of income total from 14.6% in 1980 to 20.8% in 2002, measuring in con-
stant 2002 dollars. /d. at 447 tbl. 672. During this same period, the lowest fifth of the 
population experienced a nearly 20% drop in the distribution of aggregate income demon-
strating that the rich did get richer and the poor got poorer. 
6. In fact, the percentage of the American population living in metropolitan areas has 
increased from 68.6% to 80.3% during the last two decades, with the amount of land area 
occupied by this growing metropolitan populace also expanding from 10.9% to 20% of the 
nation's land base. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 31 tbJ. 29 (122d ed. 
2002) [hereinafter 2002 CENsus]. 
7. Statistics indicate that, during the nineties, the single family unit was by far the 
most common form of new residential construction. In 2003, single family structures repre-
sented approximately 80% of the new housing construction starts. See 2004-2005 CENsus, 
supra note 2, at 599 tbl. 928. 
8. Immediately following World War II, approximately 70% of metropolitan re-
sidents lived in cities. By 1990, this percentage had declined to nearly 40% of such re-
sidents. See DA vm RusK, CITIES WITHOUT SuBURBS 5 (2d ed. 1995). Not only have cities 
become relatively less populous. their remaining residents have become disproportionately 
poor. In 1990, 50% of all poor people lived in cities, while in 1960 only 33% of the poor 
lived there. See F. KAID BENFIELD ET. AL., ONcE THERE WERE GREENFIELDS 123 (1999). 
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dence to suggest that a reversal of this pattern will be forthcoming any-
time soon.9 
Suburban American growth also reflects a greater affluence of Ameri-
can families with house size and housing amenities now common features 
in new housing.10 However, the suburban lifestyle is described by more 
than just house size and the number of bathrooms, garages and other 
amenities. It is also defined by a wide array of site-specific, neighbor-
hood and community-wide public services enhancing the quality of life; 
for example, sidewalks, curbs and gutters, internal subdivision streets, li-
braries, emergency medical, and social services, as well as public schools, 
recreational facilities, and fire stations. While some of these services may 
be provided by private corporate suppliers, the bulk are the responsibility 
of units of local government. Therefore, the construction of a single 
home cannot be considered as an isolated event, but rather as part of a 
continuum of connected public responses linking new residents to the 
broad range of community improvements and services. Funding these 
growth-related capital costs has become one of the most controversial 
contemporary policy questions and one which has been initially deter-
mined in the many chambers of local government and ultimately, when 
contested, resolved in the state courts and the legislatures. 
For most growing communities today, meeting this fiscal demand 
presents a formidable financial challenge. Most growing communities are 
under tremendous fiscal pressure to fund community services expected by 
While the poor have become concentrated in cities, job growth has located primarily in 
suburban areas. See Anne Gearan, Clinton to Help Needy Own Car, ATLANTA CaNsT., 
Feb. 24, 2000, at C1 (stating two-thirds of all new jobs are created in the suburbs). 
9. Sociologist J. John Palen suggests that suburbanization is likely to continue for the 
immediate future and he writes that a suggested "back-to-the-city" movement was largely 
the creation of the popular media. J. JoHN PALEN, THE SuBURBS 226 (1995). However, 
the pursuit of the suburban ideal has actually had mixed results in terms of the suburban-
ite's level of satisfaction. While America has become a suburban nation, its "low density, 
dispersed, single-use, automobile-dependent new development" have been critically 
termed "sprawl." See Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth: The Promise, Politics, and Po-
tential Pitfalls of Emerging Growth Management Strategies, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 247,248 n.2 
(2000). Sprawl development patterns have been associated with a number of serious 
problems including air and water pollution and the loss of open space, agricultural land, 
and natural areas, as well as serious traffic congestion. This has occurred in spite of plan-
ning, zoning and land use control efforts. See generally Lee R. Epstein, Where Yards Are 
Wide: Have Land Use Planning and Law Gone Astray?, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & 
PoL'Y REv. 345 (1997). But see Steven Hayward, Suburban Legends, NAT'L REv., Mar. 22, 
1999, at 35, 38 (suggesting that anti-sprawl forces think that "commuting suburbanites are 
making unenlightened lifestyle choices because they lack the expert supervision that only 
their betters in government can provide"). 
10. Census data has indicated that the average new home size has increased to 2,330 
square feet as of 2003, which constitutes a jump of nearly 50% from the average new home 
in 1970. 2004-2005 CENsus, supra note 2, at 600 tbl. 930. Beyond size, new American 
homes are much more likely to be two or more stories, to have four or more bedrooms, 2.5 
or more bathrooms, have central air conditioning, fireplaces, and garages than they did in 
1970. See 2004-2005 CENsus, supra note 2, at 600 tbl. 930. In fact, features such as central 
air conditioning have become so commonplace that they are not even considered to be 
amenities, but rather standard features, in 88% of new homes. !d. 
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residents and often required by state and federal government.11 Public 
debate in many communities often focuses upon the question of how to 
supply needed public improvements without increasing the general taxes 
on existing residents.12 This local funding problem has been exacerbated 
over the last twenty years by at least two factors: 1) significant reductions 
in intergovernmental funding transfers from both state and federal gov-
ernment and 2) the imposition of voter-mandated limitations on the abil-
ity of the locality to generate tax revenues from community-wide taxation 
sources.13 In this atmosphere of fiscal conservatism, even the local fund-
ing of public services for existing residents becomes a controversial and 
disputed public issue. Not surprisingly, there is often little support for 
using scarce local tax revenues to pay for the capital needs caused by the 
influx of future community residents. Often the public discourse repeats 
the mantra that new growth "should pay its own way." Frequently, the 
issue of funding infrastructure needs for new growth has emerged as an 
extremely significant growth management question as well. In many lo-
cales, land development is characterized as being "out of control" and 
causing a problem termed "sprawl."14 No community wishes to subsidize 
11. Minimum service levels are specified and required by state and, occasionally, fed-
eral law. This has become known as the unfunded mandate problem that has engendered 
such strong hostile reaction from local governments. State legislatures have responded, 
and at least seventeen states have adopted statutes requiring state government to reim-
burse local governments for complying with the costs of new mandates and this has re-
sulted in litigation. See, e.g., City of Sacramento v. State, 785 P.2d 522 (Cal. 1990); County 
of Los Angeles v. State, 729 P.2d 202 (Cal. 1987); Schmidt v. Dep't of Educ., 490 N.W.2d 
584 (Mich. 1992). 
12. Localities, constrained in their ability to raise sufficient revenues for needed public 
services, have resorted to a range of techniques to enhance their economic well-being. See, 
e.g., Jennifer Lenhart, Leesburg Revives Growth Debate, WASH. PosT, Feb. 11, 2002, at B1 
(discussing town's annexation of 7,000 acres of county land for commercial purposes to 
improve the town's tax base). Some jurisdictions have imposed a direct real estate sales tax 
on each sale transaction. In England, the Department of Inland Revenue has imposed a 
"stamp duty" or property transaction tax of up to 4% depending on the value of the prop-
erty being sold. See Anthea Masey, Stealthy Way to Avoid Tax, EvENING STANDARD, June 
5, 2002, at 7. 
13. The most famous example of this kind of property tax revolt was the 1978 Califor-
nia statewide initiative known as Proposition 13, which served to amend the California 
Constitution to impose strict limits on the rate at which real property was to be taxed and 
upon the rate at which realty assessments were to be increased from year to year. 
Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 1 (1992). The United States Supreme Court sustained this 
method of preferential tax assessment against a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection 
challenge finding at least two constitutionally satisfying justifications for the system in 
Nordlinger v. Hahn. Id. at 15. 
14. Nearly thirty years ago, with the beginning of the environmental movement in 
America, commentators began to critique the prior assumptions about the desirability of 
endless economic growth. One writer, employing rhetoric reminiscent of the National En-
vironmental Policy Act of 1969 or NEPA, expressed thoughtful doubts about this premise 
and described a nascent attitude challenging the short-term thinking of growth advocates. 
He wrote, 
Once, citizens automatically accepted the idea that growth-in numbers of 
people, in jobs, in industries-would ease the public burden by increasing the 
tax rolls and spreading per capita costs. Now they have doubts. They seem to 
be expressing the belief that larger size reflects not only lesser quality but 
also higher costs. Pressed by inflation, they listen carefully arguments about 
the hidden costs of growth. 
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the sprawl that afflicts it. 
While much has been written about the environmental, energy, and so-
cial consequences of sprawling suburban development;15 far less attention 
has been given to the issue of how new development costs are funded. 
American local government law and civic culture has increasingly priva-
tized development costs that had previously been carried as general soci-
etal expenses. Growth now occurs as local governments attempt to shift 
development costs away from themselves.16 Increasingly, local govern-
ments combine their traditional land use regulatory powers with their au-
thority to impose land development conditions. This practice has become 
known as requiring "exactions" as a condition of land use approval,n 
often demanding an array of developer on-site and off-site improve-
ments, land dedications, and cash payments made to the locality. These 
up-front costs, reaching $20,000 or more per residential unit,18 are allo-
cated to one or more participants in the development process rather than 
The new mood reflects a burgeoning sophistication on the part of citizens 
about the overall, long-term economic impact of development. Immediate 
economic gains from job creation, land purchases, and the construction of 
new facilities are being set against the public costs of schools, roads, water 
treatment plants, sewers, and the services new residents require. 
WILLIAM K. REILLY, THE UsE oF LAND 33-34 (1973). 
15. See Robert W. Burchell & Naveed A. Shad, The Evolution of the Sprawl Debate in 
the United States, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & PoL'Y 137, 141 (1999) (describing the 
consumption of exurban agricultural and other lands); William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, 
Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexity, 68 FoRDHAM L. REv. 57, 72-75 
(1999) (describing air pollution, water pollution and other environmental impacts of 
sprawl); Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., A Century of Air Pollution Control Law: What's Worked; 
What Failed; What Might Work, 21 ENVTL. L. 1549, 1572 (1991) (sprawl commuting pat-
terns increase traffic and auto air pollution). Sprawl development patterns and the reliance 
on automobiles for home to work commuting have been blamed for the steadily growing 
commuting times experienced by suburban residents. One recent study concluded that 
Washington, D.C. drivers traveling at rush hour lost 84 hours being stuck in traffic in 2000. 
This was up from 24 hours per year in 1982. Katherine Shaver, Wasting Time to Save Time, 
WASH. PosT, June 21, 2002, at Bl. The economic implication of road congestion and delay 
are substantial. According to a study prepared by the Texas Transportation Institute, the 
Washington, D.C. region lost $2.3 billion a year in lost time and other expenses due to 
traffic congestion. See Neil Irwin, Clogged Roads Cost Area Firms Billions, WASH. PosT, 
June 21, 2002, at Al. 
16. There is more than a small degree of hypocrisy in the insistence of existing re-
sidents demand that newcomers "pay their own way" when previous infrastructure costs 
had been paid by the community as a whole through debt financing repaid with general tax 
revenues. Describing this inconsistency Professor Jonathan C. Levine has written that, 
[W]hen existing residents are called upon to pay for infrastructure that bene-
fits newcomers principally, they rebel- despite the fact that their own infra-
structure had been financed in precisely the same fashion. In this context [of 
higher property tax increases to service debt], the impact fee is viewed as an 
alternative financing mechanism that comes to resolve any inequities in the 
burdens that may be generated by such property tax hikes. 
Jonathan C. Levine, Equity in Infrastructure Finance: When are Impact Fees Justified?, 70 
LAND EcoN. 210, 221 (1994). 
17. See generally ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JosE A. GoMEZ-IBANEZ, REGULATION FOR 
REVENUE: THE PoLITICAL EcoNoMY oF LAND UsE EXACTIONS (1993). 
18. A 1999 statewide study undertaken in California found that residential develop-
ment fees alone ranged from a low of $4,000 to a high of more than $60,000 per unit. See 
DEP'T OF HousiNG & CMTY. DEv., PAY TO PLAY-RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT FEES IN 
CALIFORNIA CmEs AND CouNTIES, 1999, at 1 (2001). 
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being absorbed by the community. Consequently, one of the most signifi-
cant public policy questions confronting localities today is "who will pay 
the initial infrastructure and capital costs necessitated by new population 
growth?"19 
Using the rhetoric of financial impact analysis,2° local governments 
have required that builders, land developers, and, ultimately, home buy-
ers pay development cash impact fees to fund a wide array of public costs 
attributable to new land development. Past funding patterns have 
changed as society and the courts have grown to accept the idea that new 
growth should absorb its own fiscal impacts. Not surprisingly, this emerg-
ing impact fee practice has been exceedingly popular with local govern-
ments and current residents, and it has dramatically accelerated over the 
last twenty years. On the other hand, the practice has also been strongly 
criticized by landowners, developers, and affordable housing advocates as 
unfairly increasing the cost of new construction, imposing an unfair "tax" 
and raising housing prices. Some have suggested that such fees actually 
constitute de facto growth controls with exclusionary implications.21 Fur-
ther, the construction industry has argued without significant success that 
emerging federal constitutional "Takings Clause" principles should 
strictly limit this rapidly-spreading exaction practice. The underlying so-
cial and. legal attitudes have shifted to a point where existing suburban 
residents believe that impact fees are a legitimate means of assigning de-
velopment costs. The culture of having communities collectively bear 
19. It has been asserted that the "costs of growth are little known, poorly understood 
and typically understated." Eben V. Fodor, The Real Cost of Growth in Oregon, 18 Popu. 
LATION & ENv'T 373, 387 (1997). Fodor's analysis of seven public infrastructure costs asso-
ciated with the construction of a typical single-family house in Eugene, Oregon in 1995-
schools, sewer, storm drainage, roads, water service, parks and recreation and fire protec-
tion-set them at $24,502. In 1995, the system development charges imposed in Eugene 
were only $2,054, leaving the public to assume public costs of $22,448 per house and total-
ing $24.6 million for residential construction in that year alone. !d. at 386. The argument is 
that even when impact fees are charged to developers, they only capture a fraction of the 
public infrastructure costs associated with residential growth and do not account for other 
environmental and quality of life impacts. EBEN FoDOR, BETTER NoT BIGGER 87 fig.5-5 
(1999) [hereinafter FoDoR, BETTER NoT BIGGER]. 
20. Some have drawn the analogy between the emerging land development exactions 
and the use of environmental impact analysis in environmental impact statements required 
by the National Environmental Policy Act and numerous state laws. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4370e (2005). 
21. As growth controls become more prevalent in a metropolitan area, they cause 
population growth to be diverted to other less expensive and less exclusionary areas, often 
farther away from the city center. Professor William Fischel has argued that these prac-
tices exacerhate sprawl development patterns. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, Do GROWTH 
CoNTRoLS MATTER? 55 (1990). Growth retarding policies have also been identified as 
having beneficial economic impacts for existing homeowners when local governments ei-
ther limit the supply of new housing or raise the entry costs or both. See Nicole Stelle 
Garnett, Trouble Preserving Paradise?, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 158, 177 (2001) ("existing 
owners can charge prospective homeowners the premium that they gain when the govern-
ment limits new development"). But see VICKI BEEN, IMPACT FEES AND HousiNG AF-
FORDABILITY 35 (HUD Report, 2004) (evidencing of disproportionate effects on low and 
moderate income consumers or racial minorities is "thin" due to limited research). 
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public capital expenses has given way to a view of individual 
responsibility. 
It is the increasing use of development impact fees which is the subject 
of this article. Part I will focus on the general subject of municipal fi-
nance with an analysis of the changing pattern of the sources of local 
government tax and non-tax revenue. Special consideration will then be 
given to the wide range of methods that local governments could use to 
finance capital improvements necessary for community development. 
This part will conclude that by mixing a number of different techniques, 
increasingly municipalities have shifted the costs of accommodating new 
development to the land development industry, land owners, and home 
purchasers. Operating out of financial necessity, this process has resulted 
in the integration of local government's land use planning and zoning ef-
forts with municipal financial planning goals resulting in a system that 
can be said to "regulate for revenue."22 In Part II, the evolution of the 
American land use exaction tradition will be examined. This part will 
conclude that rather than a recent innovation, exactions have existed in 
some form for over a century with impact fees being the most recent ex-
ample of this tradition. Part III will analyze the characteristics, policy 
rationale and development implications of development impact fees. 
Available empirical research related to the device will be analyzed. This 
part will conclude that despite the widespread use of the impact fee, little 
empirical analysis has been published but that which exists confirms com-
mon sense assumptions about the economic impact of the fees. Part IV 
will examine the oversight given by both federal and state courts to rap-
idly expanding local government impact fees. This critique will analyze 
this litigation in three phases: the pre-Nollan period (pre-1987), the Nol-
lan/Dolan era (1987-1994), and the post-Dolan (post-1994) time frame. 
This part will draw two main conclusions: 1) that impact fee policy has 
been influenced more directly by state legislative action and state court 
supervision than by federal constitutional rulings and 2) that as the legal 
and political culture has evolved, state courts have generally accepted im-
pact fees as the expression of social attitudes on a fundamental question 
of public responsibility. This history concludes that development impact 
fees are truly products of the state law compromises balancing the com-
peting interests in distributing development-related costs and increasing 
localities have deflected public responsibilities. 
PART I-LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE AND THE 
FUNDING OF NEW MUNICIPAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
A. FuNDING THE CosTs OF NEw DEVELOPMENT-
"WHo PAID FOR THE NEw ELEMENTARY ScHooL?" 
Public services, such as school buildings and fire stations, are most 
often provided by units of local government. However, in our daily lives, 
22. See generally ALTSHULER & GoMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 17. 
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most citizens only have the vaguest idea of who provides their local pub-
lic services and who pays for them. Bricks and mortar cost money, but it 
is not always clear who actually funds them. When a new school, road, or 
police station is built; most residents generally believe that these develop-
ments are paid for by "the government" with "tax money." But which 
government and what money? Who is actually footing the bill? Conceiva-
bly, the federal government could fund the construction of local public 
facilities. In reality, however, this does not happen since most of these 
expenses are borne by local communities, sometimes with state assis-
tance. In addition, it is often not clear to residents which unit of the local 
government is providing the service. This is due to the fact that the struc-
ture of local government often is not transparent to residents since it is 
composed of several entities operating within the same geographic area 
such as special service districts (that is, school, sewerage, water, and rec-
reation) as well as general purpose local government units (that is, cities, 
counties, towns and villages). More significantly, few citizens compre-
hend the basic funding patterns of local government infrastructure and 
service provisions. Roads, schools, and fire stations mysteriously appear 
from time to time, with most people assuming that they were built, fur-
nished and staffed by some level of "government," yet with no clear con-
cept of who actually paid for the expenses land, materials, and labor. 
The details of local government fiscal questions, both in terms of taxing 
and spending, are vaguely understood by most residents, with most citi-
zens merely hoping that someone else actually pays the cost. Ordinary 
local government budgeting matters are only the concern of the most in-
tensely-interested citizen's organizations or groups dedicated to govern-
ment economy or policies of tax reduction. In most cases, such interest 
focuses on local government fiscal issues in a general, non-specific way. 
The frequently-heard call is for "tax relief," and it is usually made in sup-
port of a reduction in the local real property taxes which have signifi-
cantly increased in many areas due to rising property values. Even if an 
interested, anti-tax local resident knew that a particular new school or 
fire station was being budgeted by their local government, it would be 
very difficult for them to associate one planned construction project to 
their general real estate or sales tax burden. That is not to say that fo-
cused opposition cannot exist, but rather, it is not easy for citizens to 
disaggregate the costs of one school or library from their total tax burden. 
An exception to this can arise, however, when a specific project or cate-
gory of projects requires explicit citizen approval as in the case of the 
issuance of bonds or an increase in local taxes dedicated to individual 
construction projects.23 In these instances, citizens can and do mobilize 
around the specific construction project to either support or defeat it. 
23. The creation of state taxation policy can also be controversial and, on occasion, 
lead to serious political and functional paralysis. See Manuel Roig-Franzia, A Tennessee 
Tangle Brings State to Halt-Deal to Raise Sales Tax Ends Tense Shutdown, WAsH. PosT, 
July 4, 2002, at Al. Due to legislative inaction, the Tennessee state government was shut 
down for three days resulting in nearly half of its 45,000 state employees not coming to 
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B. WHERE Do LocAL GovERNMENTS OBTAIN FuNDS FOR 
THEIR SPENDING OR "How Dm WE PAY FOR 
THE NEw ELEMENTARY ScHooL?" 
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In the nineteenth century, local governments were commonly referred 
to as "municipal corporations," with the intended analogy being made to 
the private corporation. As mentioned above, the municipality's func-
tions were set out in a governmental charter or were specified, either di-
rectly or indirectly, by state enabling legislation. Cities and counties 
initially defined their public functions in a way that balanced the ex-
pressed desires of their residents with the legal limitations inherent in 
their authorities. However, the descriptive analogy to the private corpo-
ration only shared a degree of parallelism. While the private firm could 
freely decide to raise or lower prices, drop unprofitable lines of business, 
embark on new business opportunities, lay off unneeded workers, and 
raise new funds for expansion in the capital markets, their municipal 
counterparts found themselves highly circumscribed by state law obligat-
ing them to provide certain public services and giving them carefully 
specified fiscal powers that could be employed to generate necessary rev-
enues to fund its activities.24 Political considerations associated with ex-
pected levels of public services also placed pressures on municipal 
corporations that were not experienced by private companies. Further-
more, municipal budgeting priorities could also be skewed by state and 
federal policies imposing "unfunded mandates" which demand that local-
ities assume costs associated with programmatic preferences required by 
the "superior" level of government.25 
Local governments are not like their state or federal counterparts: they 
have extremely limited freedom in developing their own fiscal policies. 
work, state universities canceling summer school classes, and dozens of motor vehicle re-
gistration offices being closed. 
24. See generally David Gelfand, Seeking Local Government Financial Integrity 
Through Debt Ceilings, Tax Limitations, and Expenditure Limits: The New York City Fiscal 
Crisis, the Taxpayers' Revolt, and Beyond, 63 MINN. L. REv. 545 (1979) (describing the 
history of state law limiting or reducing real estate tax rates, imposing maximum levy or tax 
revenue limits, and expenditure increase limits). 
25. The term "mandates" has been more broadly defined to include several different 
techniques used by the federal government to regulate states and localities. This list in-
cludes: direct orders to carry out federal policy, grant conditions, cross cutting require-
ments or linked compliance requirements, and partial and total preemptions of local 
action. See PAuLL. PosNER, THE PoLITics OF UNFUNDED MANDATES 4 (1998). This uni-
directional federalism has been more graphically described in the academic literature as 
"shift and shaft federalism." See Stephen D. Gold & Sarah Ritchie, State Policies Affecting 
Cities and Counties in 1991: Shifting Federalism, PuBLIC BuDGETING AND FINANCE 23-46 
(Winter 1992). The "unfunded mandate" problem also adversely affects state governments 
which must respond to federal mandates such as Medicare. It has been estimated that 
Medicaid, a federal health care program, has costs which have been growing at a double-
digit rate and now account for 20% of the average state budget. See Dan Balz, States' 
Budget Outlook Remains Bleak-Even Tougher Measures May Be Needed to Make Up for 
Revenue Shortfalls, WASH. PosT, July 16, 2002, at AS. State government also imposes 
these mandates on localities. DAVID R. BERMAN, STATE-LocAL RELATIONs: AuTHORITY, 
FINANCES, CooPERATION 49-50 (Int'l City Mgmt. Ass'n, Mun. Yearbook 2002) [hereinaf-
ter BERMAN 2002]. 
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Under the legal theory prevalent in many jurisdictions, local governments 
either derive their authority to act upon delegation from the state or find 
limits to their authority in statutory or constitutional provisions. Al-
though the political and social traditions of different states result in vary-
ing levels of local autonomy, in general, state statutory and constitutional 
law imposes substantial restrictions upon local government financial man-
agement, including property assessment, taxation, debt-issuance, budget-
ing, accounting, auditing, and fiscal reporting.26 As a result of this 
tradition, the power of local governments to tax is one of the most care-
fully circumscribed authorities.27 Unlike a private corporation, local gov-
ernments cannot freely raise "prices" of their general governmental 
services in response to higher costs. They must raise taxes or find stable 
intergovernment transfers to pay these expenses. More specifically, a 
county or city usually may not raise its sales or real estate tax rate or 
borrow money unless it closely follows state law procedures and substan-
tive policies.28 Often such a tax policy change or borrowing decision must 
26. Traditionally, state government has carefully overseen the taxing and debt issuance 
powers of local governments as an aspect of state supervision of local affairs. See OsBORNE 
M. REYNOLDS, JR., LocAL GovERNMENT LAw 354-59, 369-70 (2d ed. 2001). However, 
following the high number of local government financial defaults and other failures during 
the Great Depression of the thirties, state legislatures imposed an impressive array of fi-
nancial controls on localities and in some states reserved the power to review and approve 
local budgets. More recently, important voter initiated "lid laws" have been adopted which 
impose property tax rate and revenue limits, limits on property assessment practices, and 
revenue rollbacks. See DONALD AXELROD, BUDGETING FOR MODERN GOVERNMENT 181-
82 (1995). 
27. Florida is an example of a state whose constitution strictly governs the power of 
the state and local governments to levy taxes. Article VII, § 1(a) of the Florida Constitu-
tion provides: 
No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law. No state ad valorem taxes 
shall be levied upon real estate or tangible personal property. All other forms 
of taxation shall be preempted to the state except as provided by genera/law. 
(emphasis added). 
This section emphasizes the centralized control of local taxing power that the Florida Con-
stitution vests in the state's legislature. Another section of Article VII-§ 9(a)-specifi-
cally mandates that counties, school districts, and municipalities be legislatively authorized 
to levy ad valorem or property taxes. All other forms of taxation are preempted and re-
served to the state unless authorized by general law, that is, state statute. The Florida 
courts have rigorously enforced this strict reading of legislative supremacy and the lack of 
implied local powers of taxation. See, e.g. Collier County v. State, 733 So. 2d 1012, 1014 
(Fla. 1999) (holding if an "interim governmental services fee" is a "tax," it is unconstitu-
tional as unauthorized). 
28. State legislatures control nearly every aspect of local government financial man-
agement including assessment practices, taxation forms, debt issuance, budgetary methods, 
accounting and auditing rules, and reporting to the state government. Some states have 
"truth-in-taxation" statutes demanding public disclosure of proposed tax increases. Most 
notably, state law often limits or prohibits tax rates and assessment increases. In some 
states, the total amount of tax revenue that can be lawfully collected is correlated to 
growth measures such as income, inflation or population. See BERMAN 2002, supra note 25, 
at 66. In addition, state taxation policy often restricts local government in defining its real 
estate tax base by granting exemptions to certain categories of land owners which has the 
effect of shrinking the local property tax base. In some municipalities, 60% or more of the 
potential property tax base has been exempted by state law. See John P. Thomas, Financing 
County Government: An Overview, INTERGOVERNMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 12 (Winter 1991). 
Major owners of local, tax exempt realty include governments, schools, charitable organi-
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be preceded by public referenda-occasionally requiring favorable super-
majorities-as a precondition of such a financial shift. Citizens, in the 
current era, have been particularly skeptical of proposed tax increases. 
This state-mandated legal structure has restricted the raising of conven-
tional tax revenues and, as a result, has hindered the ability of local gov-
ernment units to acquire the tax-based funds needed to build new public 
facilities. Therefore, local governments have the worst of both worlds; 
the obligation to provide public services combined with the absence of 
lawful and effective means of raising needed revenues. 
Since local government is the unit of government "closest" to most 
people and the one which provides the most extensive array of direct 
public services affecting the average citizen's day-to-day life,29 the various 
means that local governments employ to raise revenue must be identified. 
In general, the locality's revenue stream is composed of three parts: 1) 
local taxes and other charges (general revenues); 2) local utility and other 
revenues;30 and 3) intergovernmental transfers from the federal and state 
governments. In terms of national averages, in 2002 these three catego-
ries of revenue provided 55.1 %, 8.4%, and 36.8% respectively of local 
government revenues.31 Contrary to common opinion, most local govern-
ment revenue is derived from sources within the locality itself-64.3% or 
nearly two-thirds of the total. This locally-generated, two-thirds propor-
tion has been stable-virtually unchanged-since 1970.32 Intergovern-
mental aid to local governments-the other one-third-has been a 
substantial and similarly-stable portion of local revenue. It is composed 
of two elements: 1) transfers from the state government and 2) transfers 
from the federal government. On average, state aid constitutes 30% of 
local revenues while federal assistance contributes a bit over 3%.33 While 
zations, hospitals, and religious groups, but veterans and senior citizens also benefit from 
preferential exemptions. 
29. Nationally, categories of local government spending has remained remarkably con-
sistent over the twenty-two year period from 1979-2002 with municipal budgets being spent 
in the following proportions in 2002: public education (38.0% ), highways (3.9% ), welfare 
(3.5% ), health and hospitals (7% ), police and fire protection (7.1% ), administration 
(4.6%), insurance trust (2%), utilities (10.5%), and others (23.5%). TAX FouNDATION, 
FAcrs AND FIGURES oN GoVERNMENT FINANCE 263 tbl. F-5 (38th ed. 2004) [hereinafter 
FAcrS AND FIGURES]. 
30. In 2002, this category generated 8.4% of total local government revenue. FACTS 
AND FIGURES, supra note 29, at 268 tbl. F-8. A large number of states help to assist local 
government revenue needs with funds from a variety of sources including legalized gam-
bling and lotteries, state-run liquor sales, and government electric and other utility busi-
nesses. As of 2004, forty states had lotteries, and in that year, Pennsylvania approved up to 
61,000 slot machines to help raise revenue. See DAVID R. BERMAN, STATE-LocAL RELA-
TIONs: AuTHORITY, FINANCES, CooPERATION 53 (Int'l City Mgmt. Ass'n, Mun. Yearbook 
2005). 
31. FAcrs AND FIGUREs, supra note 29, at 268 tbl. F-8. 
32. !d. 
33. 2002 CENsus, supra note 6, at 286 tbl. 431. The federal government's share has 
varied significantly over the twentieth century from a low of 0.1% in 1927, to a high of 
9.0% of local government revenues in 1978, leveling off to 4% in 2002. FAcrs AND 
FIGURES, supra note 29, at 268. However, much of the money granted by states to local 
governments originated in the federal government and merely "passes through" the states. 
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the total intergovernmental contribution is substantial, it is overwhelm-
ingly from state sources and not the federal government with a ten to one 
ratio. This degree of state support to localities varies greatly from juris-
diction to jurisdiction.34 
Nationally, the largest component of the local government revenue 
stream (55.1% in 2002) is found in local general revenue sources-from 
both tax and non-tax "charge" sources. Taxes comprise the larger part of 
this category with ad valorem or real property taxes constituting nearly 
75% of local government's tax revenues.35 As high as this percentage may 
appear to be, over the past fifty years this form of local tax has fallen in 
importance as income and sales taxes have grown to comprise a larger 
percentage of the municipal tax revenue base.36 Even more striking is the 
significant decline in the relative importance of taxes, of any kind, in rela-
tion to governmental "charges and miscellaneous" sources of local gov-
ernment revenue. For example, in 1960, local taxes represented nearly 
43.6% of locally-generated government revenue while by 2002 this per-
centage had dropped to 34.1 %_37 This phenomena may be attributable to 
state and local government taxation and expenditure limitations such as 
California's Proposition 13, Missouri's Hancock Amendment, and Michi-
gan's Headlee Amendment which all required voter approval of taxes 
above specified levels.3s 
These intergovernmental transfers take the form of 1) categorical grants; 2) general fiscal 
assistance; 3) cost reimbursement; and 4) block grants. 
34. Intergovernmental revenue transfers range widely throughout the nation account-
ing for a small part of local government revenues in New Hampshire (14.7% ), Hawaii 
(18.4% ), and Nebraska (19.5%) while representing a substantial component of local gov-
ernment revenue in New Mexico (52.8), West Virginia (44%), Wisconsin (44%), Michigan 
(42.1 %), Idaho (41.4%), and Arkansas (40%). In the latter list of states having high per-
centages of intergovernmental transfer, the greater percentage is usually due to greater 
state government support, not federal aid. FAcrs AND FIGURES, supra note 29, at 287 
tbl.F-25. 
35. There is a great deal of regional variation in the significance of real property taxes 
as the main component of local government tax revenues. For instance, in 1991, it consti-
tuted 98.2% of local taxes in New England while only 70.8% in the Far West. See GLENN 
W. FISHER, THE WORST TAX? A HISTORY OF PROPERTY TAX IN AMERICA 204 tbl. 11.2 
(1996). One thing is certain; the property tax exists as one of the most controversial and 
unpopular taxes in the United States. See Richard L. Cole & John Kincaid, Public Opinion 
and American Federalism: Perspectives on Taxes, Spending and Trust-An ACIR Update, 30 
PUBLIUS 189, 189-201 (2000). 
36. FAcrs AND FIGURES, supra note 29, at 270 tbl. F-10. As high as real property taxes' 
72.9% share of local taxes may seem, it represents one of the lowest percentage relied on 
by local governments in nearly a century. For instance, during the twenties, real estate 
taxes constituted as much as 97.3% of local taxes. This decline in real property taxation 
can be traced to the tax revolts of the Economic Depression of the early thirties when 
many property owners could not pay their taxes. Tax ut:iinquency was as high as 26.3% in 
cities in 1933, and between 1932 and 1933, sixteen states and many localities enacted prop-
erty tax limits. States compensated for the loss of real property revenue by passing law 
imposing sales and income taxes. See ARTHUR O'SuLLIVAN ET AL., PRoPERTY TAXES AND 
TAX REVOLTS-THE LEGACY OF PROPOSITION 13-3 (1995). 
37. FACTS & FIGUREs, supra note 29, at 268 tbl.F-8. 
38. DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., STATE AND LocAL GoVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL 
SYSTEM 347-56 (2002). 
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As taxes have fallen as a portion of municipal revenue, the "charges 
and miscellaneous" category of revenues has steadily risen. This should 
not be surprising since the "hard" costs of capital infrastructure provision 
must be paid by someone (the construction crew does not work for free!). 
The changing financial statistical pattern reveals that an important, yet 
gradual transformation in local government financial affairs has occurred 
over the last thirty years including: 1) a movement away from the earlier 
dependence on real property taxation; 2) a decrease in revenue-raising by 
way of measures termed "taxes;" and 3) an increased reliance on "non-
tax" devices, such as development exactions, to fund public needs. Ad-
vancing this third theme, localities have re-characterized municipal costs 
as various forms of user charges and direct benefit assessments. At the 
same time, they have shifted an increasing range of building-related ex-
penses to land developers by imposing a wide array of land use exactions. 
The undeniable trend is that development impact costs have been in-
creasingly "privitized." 
c. WHAT ARE THE AvAILABLE TECHNIQUES FOR FINANCING 
THE INITIAL CAPITAL CosTs OF GROWTH? 
WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS? 
When the new elementary school building appears in the community, 
its construction must be paid for in some way. The locality will build and 
operate this new structure in order to provide a required level of educa-
tional service to the residents in the vicinity of the school. Often this 
construction will be undertaken to meet service demands imposed by 
state, federal, or accreditation bodies. Not infrequently, it will be done so 
that the locality can successfully compete with other communities for new 
residents and to maintain an existing reputation for having "good or ex-
cellent schools" and thereby reinforce high real estate values.39 The same 
is true with regard to other public services such as sewer and water treat-
ment, roads, storm water management, streets, curbs, sidewalks, street-
lights, recreation, public safety and fire, and solid waste disposal. The 
challenge for most local governments is to assemble and implement a 
lawful and politically-palatable assortment of revenue-raising techniques 
that will permit them to build and operate such facilities.40 The mix of 
the funding options used by the community will vary over time according 
to the locality's revenue needs, the legally-authorized fiscal tools of the 
39. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. PoL. EcoN. 
416, 416-24 (1956) (serving as the origin of the "Tiebout Hypothesis"). 
40. Localities owning visible and marketable structures such as sports facilities have 
begun to sell the naming rights to a range of corporate entities. Such "naming rights" can 
generate significant municipal revenues. The rights for the new stadium in Denver, Colo-
rado, were valued at $89 million but their sale-and the resulting name change away from 
the Mile High Stadium- has been considered a controversial and undesirable step. Michael 
Janofsky, What's in a Stadium Name-Tradition or Money?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000, at 
A14. 
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local government, the political will of the elected leadership and, ulti-
mately, the support of the local citizenry. 
The range of potential capital funding mechanisms available to local 
governments under state law may actually be quite extensive. Local gov-
ernments have been extremely creative in designing funding techniques, 
within available authority, for a wide range of capital improvements. 
These techniques have developed into municipal fiscal traditions over the 
years which offer a number of different approaches for funding public 
projects. Funds for local capital projects could be collected from one or 
more of the following list: 1) intergovernmental transfers from the federal 
and/or state government-grants, revenue sharing, and subsidies; 2) gifts 
from private corporate, foundation, or individual benefactors; 3) taxes-
property, sales, income, special purpose, gasoline, excise, and real estate 
transfer or recording; 4) bonds-general obligation or revenue; 5) special 
assessments; 6) user charges; 7) special taxing districts revenues; and 8) 
land use exactions, including development impact fees. This mix of fund-
ing techniques represents an exhaustive listing, but not a realistic por-
trayal, of the actual alternative funding approaches in each locality. 
Rather than being provided with limitless possibilities of these devices, 
localities actually face a much more constrained range of funding options. 
There are a number of explanations for this fact. For example, 1) state 
law may not allow the local government to exercise the technique; 2) the 
method-such as gifts and transfers-may only be available in theory but 
not in fact; 3) the device may only be permitted as a funding method for 
certain kinds of public improvements but not others; 4) the particular 
technique may not be a "traditional" revenue-raising activity in the spe-
cific locality; or 5) there might be no political support or in fact, strong 
opposition to its adoption.41 Therefore, the locality's fiscal choices are 
influenced by authority, familiarity, and necessity. 
Currently, localities fund the capital costs of responding to the impacts 
of new community growth with a blend of financial resources; sometimes 
relying upon the local government's general revenues for certain commu-
nity-wide improvements in combination with intergovernmental grants, 
user charges, special assessments, excise taxes,42 on-site subdivision im-
provements, dedications, and in-lieu of payments, as well as cash develop-
41. Some analysts of the current system of the local government regulation of commu· 
nity growth and development have criticized government for promoting and subsidizing 
growth and have not actually sought to recover the costs imposed by new growth. See 
FoDOR, BElTER NoT BIGGER, supra note 19, at 108-09 fig. 6-2. 
42. In some states, local governments are authorized to charge a development excise 
tax on "the business of subdividing land or developing property." See Eric J. Strauss & 
Martin L. Leitner, Financing Public Facilities With Development Excise Taxes: An Alterna· 
tive to Exactions and Impact Fees, 11 ZoNING & PLANNING L. REP. 17, 19 (1988). Although 
this practice appears similar to impact fees in their police power, regulatory effect, they are 
considered purely revenue-raising tax measures. As tax measures, they are liberated from 
the demanding constitutional law requirements of proportionality of effect and earmarking 
and, as a consequence, these funds may be added to a community's general fund with all of 
the other tax revenue. See William H. Ethier & Howard J. Weiss, Development Excise 
Taxes: An Exercise in Cleverness and Imagination, LAND UsE LAw 3 (Feb. 1990). 
2006] Paying for Growth With Impact Fees 191 
ment impact fees.43 As the statistical data have shown, the unmistakable 
trend in local government capital financing has been gradually moving 
towards a system of local government "non-financing" through increased 
reliance on cost-shifting to the developer and, indirectly, to the raw land 
owner and the construction consumer. When viewed in its totality, the 
current era of land development regulation actually is a period of shared, 
public/private partnership with the private sector assuming an ever-grow-
ing role providing land, physical improvements, and cash to offset the 
impacts of new growth. This development is consistent with a larger 
trend towards the increased privatization of other community services 
and functions in private homeowners associations and restricted access or 
gated communities.44 
During the last two decades, the rhetoric and analytical techniques of 
environmental impact analysis have been adapted and applied to devel-
opment exactions in two significant ways: 1) to analyze and identify the 
community capital improvement needs "caused" by new land develop-
ment and 2) to assess a reasonable, proportionate share of developer re-
sponsibility for the costs associated with those needs. This pattern of cost 
shifting has a long standing twentieth century tradition. During this time, 
localities have steadily accelerated the integration of financial, cost-shift-
ing objectives with their traditional police power regulatory goals in land 
use control. The evolution in American land use exactions culminating in 
the recent, cash development impact fee is the subject of the next section. 
PART II-USING REGULATORY CONDITIONS ON LAND 
DEVELOPMENT TO FUND COMMUNITY SERVICES: 
AN AMERICAN TRADITION 
Modern American land use regulation was first adopted during the first 
quarter of the twentieth century. Authorized under the local govern-
ment's "police power" to regulate for the common good, zoning became 
commonplace following the U.S. Supreme Court's 1926 decision in Vil-
lage of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 45 sustaining the practice against a 
facial constitutional attack. Zoning became a fundamental regulatory 
function of local government and one which shaped the future physical 
character and quality of life of the community. However, even at this 
43. In some cities, the development impact fee technique has been imposed as a condi-
tion for the construction of new office buildings under the name of "linkage" programs. 
These fees- arising in California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Connecticut and Florida-
have been charged to compensate for the loss of low income housing and to provide for 
public transportation, job training programs, and child care facilities. See generally Jane E. 
Schukoske, Housing Linkage: Regulating Development Impact on Housing Costs, 76 IowA 
L. REV. 1011 (1991). 
44. In 2005, the Community Associations Institute (CAl) estimated there were 
274,000 association-governed communities containing 54.6 million people and that 1.25 
million people serve on association boards. See CoMMUNITY AssociATIONS INSTITUTE, 
DATA ON U.S. CoMMUNITY AssociATIONS, http://www.caionline.org/about/facts.cfm (last 
visited Dec. 19, 2005). 
45. 272 u.s. 365 (1926). 
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early point another tradition was being formed, one which combined the 
local government's regulatory powers with its duty to provide public ser-
vices. Termed "regulation for revenue" by modern observers,46 this 
methodology blended land use regulation with revenue-enhancing or 
cost-shifting objectives to establish a local governmental practice known 
as imposing "development exactions." This hybrid regulatory practice is 
now common and often is used to mitigate an extensive list of develop-
ment effects. This land use exaction practice, rather than being a recent 
local government creation, has a long and well-supported tradition at the 
state and local level of government. 
A. THE TRADITIONAL NATURE oF CoMMUNITY LAND UsE CoNTROL 
AND EARLy AMERICAN EXACTION PRACTICES 
The American tradition of governmental control over land use is an old 
one beginning in the early seventeenth century with the establishment of 
colonial towns. The social interest in having an orderly division of large 
parcels of land into smaller units has even more ancient antecedents.47 
Municipal land use controls have developed from this early colonial pe-
riod to the present, culminating with modern zoning, subdivision regula-
tion, and comprehensive planning, as well as environmental controls. 
Twentieth century land use control has also witnessed a parallel develop-
ment of another aspect of land use control: a steady growth in the use of 
land development exactions to impose specific costs on land developers. 
This trend has accelerated in the last two decades and has resulted in the 
widespread use of subdivision land improvement and dedication require-
ments, impact fees, and linkage programs all having the effect of shifting 
development-related expenses from the community to the land 
developer. 
Land use control has a lengthy history in America. Colonial communi-
ties, from the earliest times,48 considered the locality's land base to be an 
important natural resource and one which should be carefully managed 
by town authorities. These colonial communities exercised regulatory 
46. See generally ALTSHULER & GoMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 17. 
47. Land subdivision practices have been considered an important topic of social regu-
lation for thousands of years. 
The Egyptians, as well as the Greeks, maintained orderly systems for the 
division of land and the development of communities. The Roman grid plan 
for laying out communities, borrowed from earlier systems, was adopted and 
used by other European communities, and it remains the underlying spacial 
framework for a number of cities in Europe. Variations of the rectangular 
survey were brought to the United States by Spanish, English and French 
settlers, and the grid patterns ubservabie in the street plans of Manhattan 
and old Philadelphia. 
RoBERT ANDERSON, 4 AM. LAw oF ZoNING 3o 263 (1986). This penchant for order in land 
subdivision was also reflected in large scale Jeffersonian rectangular survey methods em-
ployed to measure and divide large portions of the America west of the original thirteen 
colonies. 
48. See DAVID L. CALLIES ET AL., CAsEs AND MATERIALS oN LAND UsE 2-3 (3d ed. 
1999) (explaining English ordinances from the Elizabethan period regulating minimum res-
idential building lot size, building height and window size). 
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control in a number of ways including regulating the location of dwell-
ings, specifying the nature of permissible land use, prohibiting construc-
tion with unsafe and flammable materials, imposing uniform building 
height restrictions, requiring the fencing of agricultural parcels, and set-
ting forth the timing of land development.49 Rather than recognizing 
land ownership as an absolute individual right, colonial rules governed 
many aspects of development choice. In fact, some early town controls 
appear extremely modern foreshadowing anti-sprawl, infill policies.50 
Significantly, historical evidence exists indicating that colonial ordinances 
and royal directives during this early period demanded that land develop-
ers provide a number of physical improvements as a pre-condition for 
permission to build on a parcel of land.51 This historical reference pro-
vides a lineage for modern land use exactions reaching back to colonial 
times. 
Through the period leading up to the early twentieth century, Ameri-
can local governments were authorized to exercise broad police powers 
to protect the public health, safety, morals, and general welfare. They 
also employed their public nuisance authorities to abate the more serious 
threats to health and safety. Acting under their police power authority, 
local governments adopted a wide range of individual laws regulating a 
variety of specific land use problems including the separation of incom-
patible uses52 and building bulk, height, and location restrictions.53 This 
problem-specific system of land use control was gradually replaced by 
comprehensive zoning ordinances which were upheld in Village of Euclid 
v. Ambler Realty Co. 54 By the time of the Euclid decision, the zoning 
technique had spread rapidly across the nation with 654 cities and towns 
49. See generally John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Mod-
ern Takings Doctrine, 109 HARV. L. REv. 1252 (1996). 
50. See JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. RoBERTS, LAND UsE PLANNING 
AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAw 44 (2003) (discussing 1632 Cambridge Massachu-
setts law prohibiting construction of structures in remote areas before development of 
closer vacant parcels). 
51. See Jerry T. Ferguson & Carol D. Rasnic, Judicial Limitations on Mandatory Sub-
division Dedications, 13 REAL EsT. L.J. 250, 252 (1984). Colonial ordinances required the 
compulsory drainage of wetlands and often demanded the sharing of costs of these projects 
with neighbors. Further site improvements such as barberry removal, compelled develop-
ment of urban land and mines, and fencing requirements were imposed by colonial govern-
ments. See Hart, supra note 49, at 1263-80. 
52. Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hope, 248 U.S. 498, 499-500 (1919) (upholding ordinance ex-
cluding oil storage closer than three hundred feet from residences); Hadacheck v. Sebas-
tian, 239 U.S. 394, 414 (1915) (upholding Los Angeles ordinance excluding existing 
brickyards from a residential area of the city); Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 180 
(1915) (upholding ordinance excluding stables from a commercial district); L'Hote v. New 
Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 600 (1900) (upholding New Orleans ordinance establishing areas of 
the city for prostitution). 
53. See Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91, 107 (1909) (upholding Boston's building height 
limitations); see also Eubank v. Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 145 (1912) (invalidating neighbor 
consent provision to establish building setback lines). 
54. 272 u.s. 365 (1926). 
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having adopted a zoning ordinance.55 This rapid adoption of zoning was 
facilitated by the preparation of a model state zoning enabling act by the 
United States Department of Commerce, which by 1926 had been en-
acted in forty-three states.56 After the Euclid decision, zoning spread 
even faster and was considered to be an indispensable component of a 
modern locality's techniques necessary for the creation of a pleasant and 
harmonious community. The decades following Euclid saw an institu-
tionalizing of zoning as the premier regulatory device to control commu-
nity development. 
B. PRECURSORS OF MoDERN LAND UsE ExACTIONs 
Zoning, by itself, initially imposed restrictions such as use and dimen-
sional rules on land owners, and in so doing, it limited the land devel-
oper's discretion in selecting the size, use and form of new land 
development projects. With zoning, questions of building density, place-
ment of structures in relation to roads, and the mixture of land uses 
would be determined by municipal ordinance and regulation. The design-
ers of the early zoning systems made a crucial choice by making the pro-
cess of building permit review the principal method for assuring 
compliance with substantive zoning rules. Now, the construction of new 
buildings would be unlawful without a building permit and this certificate 
would not be issued until it was determined that the proposed structure 
complied with all zoning rules. Permit-based pre-construction review 
gave localities the means of assuring compliance with mandatory setback, 
height limit, and use restrictions. In addition, it would serve as the point 
of certifying that other municipal demands-such as the contribution of 
development exactions-had been satisfied. 
While zoning might restrict the range of land uses of a desired develop-
ment, it did not force the landowner to contribute money, land, or im-
provements as a condition of obtaining zoning permission to proceed 
with a proposed project. These exactions were first implemented in con-
junction with the twentieth century device of residential subdivision regu-
lation and its precursors-official map acts57 and benefit assessment 
55. Comprehensive zoning containing specified uses in designated city-wide zones was 
first adopted in New York City in 1916 and upheld by New York courts four years later in 
Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Building Corp., 128 N.E. 209, 209 (1920). 
56. JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 24 n.l. 
57. Official map acts permitted local government to provide for the exact location of 
future streets, parks, and other public facilities. Once streets were mapped, future land 
development would have to conform to the lay out of the streets. The siting of streets was 
considered so important during the early twentieth century that statutes were necessary to 
reserve precise road locations and for the installation of utilities and other services. Land-
owners were sometimes required to dedicate the land and, occasionally, improve the 
streets established by the official map. See JAMES KusHNER, SuBDIVISION LAw AND 
GRowrH MANAGEMENT §1.04[1] (1999 and 2005 Supp.); Joseph Kucirek & J.H. Beuscher, 
Wisconsin's Official Map Law, 1957 Wis. L. REv. 176 (1957). These statutes had a mixed 
record of surviving constitutional takings scrutiny. See e.g., Urbanizadora Versalles, Inc. v. 
Rivera Rios, 701 F.2d 993 (1st Cir. 1983) (fourteen-year highway reservation); Lomarch 
Corp. v. Mayor & Common Council, 51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (N.J. 1968) (one-year park 
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districts.58 Residential land subdivision concerned local governments 
from the beginning. From the 1880s through the 1920s to respond to land 
development "booms," many localities adopted land platting laws which 
were primarily concerned with making subdivided land sales more effi-
cient.59 These early platting laws only required that, prior to selling any 
building lots, the land developer file a development plat which would spe-
cifically describe individually numbered building lots as well as any appli-
cable real covenants, easements, or other significant features of the 
development.60 Once subdivision plats were filed with the locality, lots 
could be lawfully conveyed to individual purchasers describing them by 
way of lot numbers rather than by way of a conventional metes and 
bounds land description. This residential subdivision platting and regis-
tration practice simplified land description and title recording making the 
marketing of building lots less costly and easier to accomplish.61 
This land subdivision method accomplished another significant pur-
pose-it legally justified the imposition of development conditions. 
Under the reasoning of the day, the public recording of a subdivision plat 
became a legal requirement for the "privilege" of selling lots in a subdivi-
reservation); Miller v. Beaver Falls, 82 A.2d 34, 37 (Pa. 1951) (three year park reservation). 
Where variance provisions are included to relieve hardship situations, courts are more sup-
portive. See Palm Beach County v. Wright, 612 So. 2d 709 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993). 
58. Benefit or special assessment districts have a long tradition in the United States 
extending as far back as 1690. Dean J. Misczynski, Special Assessments, in WINDFALLS FOR 
WIPEouTs: LAND VALUE CAPTURE AND CoMPENSATION 311 (Donald G. Hagman & Dean 
J. Misczynski eds. 1978). Special assessments are widely used and have been applied to 
finance a wide range of public improvements ranging from sidewalks, curbs and gutters, 
fire and medical rescue services, business improvements, security, street lights and paving, 
and sewers. These charges, although similar to impact fees, differ in that they are imposed 
only on existing landowners in a defined benefit zone, who often request the specific im-
provement and usually enjoy the benefits associated with the improvement directly. They 
are often assessed in proportion to a quantitative measure such as front footage, acreage or 
lot area. See generally EuGENE McQuiLLIN, THE LAw OF MuNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS (3d 
rev. ed. 1987 & 2005 Supp.). 
59. Not infrequently, "boom" time subdivisions were more illusory than real. See 
DANIEL J. BOORSTIN, THE AMERICANS-THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE 280 (1973). 
60. Earlier subdivision regulation statutes passed in the late nineteenth century as 
"map or plat acts" required the public recordation of subdivision plats. The intent was to 
make the conveyancing of individual numbered and identified parcels more efficient and 
not reliant upon the traditional metes and bounds land descriptions. Land speculation in 
the twenties resulted in the platting of numerous subdivisions many of which had small lots 
and lacked or had incomplete streets and utilities. Many of these projects were abandoned 
by their developers and in the twenties and thirties became the responsibility of the locali-
ties through developer default. See generally JuERGENSMEYER & RoBERTS, supra note 50, 
at 264-65. 
61. The desire to simplify land records and to prevent confusion in land description 
was an initial objective of subdivision regulation and one which continued as an important 
factor in later court decisions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated with regard to the 
practice of plat registration that, 
[T]he legislature was attempting to provide for orderly urban development 
and to insure accurate and easy descriptions of land in the offices of the reg-
isters of deeds. One main purpose of such regulations was to avoid cluttering 
the books of the registers of deeds with metes and bounds descriptions of 
small tracts of land. 
Alan Realty Co. v. Fair Deal Inv. Co., 73 N.W.2d 517, 520 (Wis. 1955). 
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sion. Under this "right/privilege" distinction, since the land developer 
had voluntarily elected to employ the subdivision procedure, they were 
prevented from challenging a wide range of conditions which might be 
applied to the request.62 Later, through this "privilege" rationale, munici-
palities would demand subdivision exactions including land dedication for 
streets as a condition for the "privilege" to subdividing residential land. 
The "privilege" characterization had another consequence-it allowed lo-
cal governments broad discretion in approving or denying subdivision 
proposals. In this early time period, the residential subdivider was not 
responsible for providing any of the subdivision infrastructure such as 
streets, sidewalks, curbs, gutters, and drainage facilities.63 Infrastructure 
requirements would be provided by the local government or funded by 
the lot purchasers themselves through lot special assessment schemes. 
Ironically, the community's assumption of these subdivision infrastruc-
ture costs in the thirties, and the catastrophic economic consequences it 
later caused, would lead to the imposition of expanded subdivision land 
exactions just a few years later. 
C. LESSONS FROM THE ECONOMIC DEPRESSION OF THE 1930s 
During the twenties, the suburban areas of the nation were under in-
tense development pressure and huge land speculation was occurring. 
The rapid growth of Los Angeles County, California in this decade pro-
vides one vivid example. During the twenties alone, the net immigration 
into the county increasing 136% (from 936,000 to 2,208,000) which was 
greater than the total county immigration in the prior seventy years from 
1850 to 1920.64 Such an enormous influx of population, attracted by the 
reputation for an excellent climate and ample job opportunities, triggered 
an explosion in residential land subdivision farther into remote areas of 
the county.65 Land development standards and the existing road system 
proved to be grossly inadequate to accommodate the huge influx. This 
extreme population growth pressure in Los Angeles, and in other parts of 
the nation, led to speculative land development which proved to be un-
sustainable. The drive to create even more residential communities led to 
the platting of thousands of residential subdivisions on the outer edge of 
existing American cities. These developments contained millions of lots 
62. See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council, 207 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1949); Ridgefield Land Co. v. 
City of Detroit, 217 N.W. 58, 58-60 (Mich. 1928). 
63. Even as late as the forties, some local governments continued the practice of subsi-
dizing land subdividers by installing public improvements. A 1944 edition of the newsletter 
of the Municipal Finance Officers Association warned that, 
[T]hese land merchandisers, in effed subsidized by the taxpayers, would then 
sell lots to people of moderate or small incomes at relatively high prices, and 
if the economy should go into a tailspin, soon or later there would be defaults 
on payments, mounting tax delinquencies, and more financial troubles such 
as municipalities experienced from 1929 to 1935. 
MEL Scorr, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING SINCE 1890, at 452 (1969). 
64. /d. at 208. 
65. In 1921, subdividers filed approximately 350 subdivision maps with the Los Ange-
les County Recorder. By 1923, the number of filings had grown to 1,434. /d. at 207. 
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many of which were small and of a largely unusable size often with inade-
quate or non-existent streets and utilities. Much of this prematurely sub-
divided land remained vacant and tax delinquent for many years after its 
platting thereby imposing huge municipal tax losses.66 
Local government policy of not requiring the pre-funding of basic sub-
division improvements during the first quarter of the twentieth century 
had several serious negative impacts that led to the imposition of devel-
opment exactions. As mentioned previously, this municipal practice en-
couraged the premature subdivision of land that resulting in many 
suburban building lot markets being overfilled with surplus lots in excess 
of reasonable market demands. Without any effective regional growth 
policy, subdivided parcels would spring up farther and farther from the 
metropolitan center thereby causing early examples of suburban sprawl. 
Oversupply of platted, yet not improved, subdivision lots resulted in nu-
merous failed projects which frequently became blighted areas causing 
new development to leapfrog over "these unusable, close-in subdivisions 
... leaving 'slums' of vacant lands."67 Community development would 
thereafter occur in a disorderly, non-contiguous fashion that was often 
inconsistent with municipal or regional planning goals. 
There were two significant adverse financial effects of the early twenti-
eth century subdivision policy that would affect the future. First, devel-
opers often abandoned the under-sold, under-developed and under-
improved subdivisions after an initial period of marketing success. This 
resulted in many real estate tax delinquencies with the ultimate owner-
ship of the parcels reverting to local governments through tax foreclo-
sure. Secondly, municipal bonds issued to secure financing for 
subdivision improvements often went into default during the thirties due 
to devastating economic effect of the Great Depression. Bond interest 
and principal repayments were set based on the assumption of the new 
homeowner's regular payment of special assessments tied to subdivision 
improvements. With the collapse of the suburban real estate market dur-
ing the Depression, residential building lots did not sell resulting in the 
non-payment of the existing assessments, leading to substantial defaults 
66. The huge negative impact of "dead" subdivisions on their surrounding communi-
ties is demonstrated by the following description of the situation in Chicago and Cook 
County, Illinois. 
In the southern portion of Cook County, lots subdivided in the 1890's were 
vacant still [by the 1940's], and many were tax delinquent. Twenty-two per-
cent of the subdivision parcels in Chicago in 1945 had been delinquent for 10 
years. In suburban Cook County, 40 percent of the parcels were chronically 
delinquent. The Chicago situation was not unique. Cleveland, in 1929, had 
175,000 vacant lots in its registered total of 375,000 lots. 
RoBERT ANDERSON, 4 AM. LAw oF ZoNING 264-65 (3d ed. 1986). 
67. JuERGENSMEYER & RoBERTs, supra note 50, at 264. To eliminate these empty 
spaces, eminent domain or condemnation authority was sometimes used to assemble land 
for construction. See People ex rei. Gutknecht v. City of Chicago, 111 N.E.2d 626 (Ill. 
1953). 
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on municipal bonds.68 The major bond defaults of the thirties adversely 
effected municipal debt financing for many years thereafter. Most impor-
tantly, they influenced the post-World War II local government develop-
ment policies requiring land developers themselves to construct on-site 
infrastructure improvements as a condition of subdivision approval. They 
also led to the imposition of bonding and surety conditions to back up the 
construction promises made by the developers.69 
D. SuBDIVISION REGULATION's DESIGN STANDARDS 
With the issuance of the Department of Commerce's 1928 model Stan-
dard City Planning Enabling Act,70 most states passed enabling acts au-
thorizing localities to impose subdivision controls.71 After the adoption of 
these statutes, municipal subdivision approval began to incorporate mu-
nicipal planning goals into the physical development of the subdivided 
parcels. No longer would subdivision control be principally concerned 
with the efficiency needs of residential land mass marketing, but rather 
localities began to require that subdivisions be designed with the commu-
nity's functional and practical concerns in mind. The emphasis was now 
on the creation of design standards which would guide residential land 
development and would result in well-planned areas where the streets 
would be sufficient to carry the projected traffic and where other infra-
structure and land would be provided. For example, § 14 of the model 
Standard City Planning statute provided, 
68. R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community 
Benefit Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exac-
tions, LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoss. 5-6 (Winter 1987). 
69. Land improvements such as roads, sidewalks, curbs and gutters, and drainage facil-
ities are often required as part of the regulation of residential subdivisions. However, these 
physical improvements are costly, and a developer might wish to begin selling lots in one 
part of a subdivision project prior to the completion of all the necessary site improvements 
in other parts. Assurance that the land developer will actually complete the required im-
provements-and not default on these required exactions-has led to the use of a number 
of guarantee devices providing the local government with financial security that the work 
be completed in the event of developer default. Surety bonds, cash or property escrows, 
letters of credit and subdivision improvement agreements are the most common examples 
of these devices. See PATRICK J. RoHAN, ZoNING AND LAND UsE CoNTROLS§ 45.03[4], at 
8 (2003). 
70. STANDARD STATE PLANNING ENABLING Acr, U.S. Dep't of Commerce (1928), 
included in the ALI MoDEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CoDE, app. B (Tentative Draft No. 1, 
1988). This model act was produced as a companion to the Standard State Zoning Enabling 
Act, however there were competing model subdivision laws which were adopted by a num-
ber of states. See MoDEL SUBDIVISION REGULATION Acr (A.E. Bettman); MuNICIPAL 
PLANNING ENABLING ACT (Bassett and Williams). 
71. See RoBERT M. ANDERSON & BRUCE B. RoswiG, PLANNING, ZONING, SuBDIVi-
SION: A SUMMARY OF STATUTORY LAW IN THE 50 STATES 228, chart 13 (1966). ln some 
jurisdictions the authority to regulate subdivisions and impose conditions is implied as a 
power of local planning and land use regulation under the powers delegated by the stan-
dard zoning enabling act. See generally Flanders Lumber & Bldg. Supply Co. v. Town of 
Milton, 258 A.2d 804 (Vt. 1969); Y.D. Dugout Inc. v. Bd. of Appeals, 255 N.E.2d 732 
(Mass. 1970); Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 131 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1957); Homebuilders 
Ass'n v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45 (N.C. 1994). 
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for the arrangement of streets in relation to other existing or planned 
streets and to the master plan, for adequate and convenient open 
spaces of traffic, utilities, access of fire fighting apparatus, recreation, 
light and air, and for avoidance of congestion of population, includ-
ing minimum width and area of lots.72 
Central to the subdivision regulation concept at this time was that this 
form of land development would be arranged so as to ensure adequate 
access to homes while also providing the residents with a safe and attrac-
tive living environment. The belief was that suburban, single-family de-
tached housing would be the future choice of housing consumers who 
would increasingly rely on the automobile for transportation. Subdivi-
sions would have to be planned and would have to provide the kinds 
facilities and services likely to be demanded by these single family hous-
ing purchasers. History has borne out these early assumptions regarding 
the housing preferences of successive generations of Americans. 
Besides providing design standards for subdivision development, the 
early subdivision regulations of the late twenties through forties also be-
gan to incorporate land dedication requirements for public improvements 
within the residential subdivision itself. Under these rules, land develop-
ers were required to dedicate land to the local government for a range of 
purposes. However, the Standard Planning Act did not authorize the im-
position of dedications of land or cash in-lieu of fees, and this omission 
led to uncertainty about their lawfulness.73 Today, this mandatory prac-
tice requiring such land dedication is a form of development exaction. 
The early exactions were dedications for internal roads and sidewalks, 
usually necessary to provide access to the homes being constructed in the 
subdivision. These demands proved to be relatively uncontroversial due 
to their functional necessity and also because they benefited the subdivi-
sion lots and made them more salable.74 It was also yet another device 
used to transfer the subdivision improvement costs to land developers 
and, by extension, to new home purchasers. 75 Through the pre-construc-
tion review process, land dedication requirements were then imposed as a 
condition of subdivision plat approval by the local government.76 Al-
72. STANDARD CrTY PLANNING ENABLING Acr, U.S. Dep't of Commerce (1928). 
73. In some states, the absence of specific enabling authority to impose land dedica-
tion and fee-in-lieu of requirements on the approval of proposed residential subdivisions 
led to state courts finding no implied authority to undertake the practice. See, e.g., Hylton 
Enters. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 258 S.E.2d 577 (Va. 1979) (narrow construction of local gov-
ernment authority in strict Dillon's Rule state). The practice of charging monetary fees-in-
lieu of land dedication also fell subject to the same legal challenge as not being authorized 
by state enabling legislation. See, e.g., City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So. 
2d 363 (Ala. 1978) (no specific authority to require cash-in-lieu of payment for parkland); 
Enchanting Homes, Inc. v. Rapanos, 143 N.W.2d 618 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966) (lack of statu-
tory authority); Haugen v. Gleeson, 359 P.2d 108 (Or. 1961) (unauthorized tax). 
74. OsBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LocAL GovERNMENT LAw 484 n.9 (2d ed. 2001). 
75. See Thomas M. Pavelko, Note, Subdivision Exactions: A Review of Judicial Stan-
dards, 25 WAsH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 269, 272 (1983). 
76. Julian C. Juergensmeyer & Robert M. Blake, Impact Fees: An Answer to Local 
Governments' Capital Funding Dilemma, 9 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 415, 418 (1981). 
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though resisted at first, the subdivision land dedication rules were largely 
upheld in the courts, and they have become a standard feature of most 
communities' subdivision regulations.77 
Significantly, the model act also specifically required a land developer 
to provide physical infrastructure such as streets, water mains, sewer 
lines, and other utilities within the boundaries of the subdivision as a con-
dition of regulatory approval.78 This statutory innovation created the 
precedent for developer-funded site improvements which would later 
translate into a wide range of land dedication and site improvements 
within the residential subdivision. Land developers were not only re-
quired to dedicate land for these features, but they also had to construct 
the improvements themselves. Due to the direct benefit these on-site im-
provements gave in response to a need generated by the new subdivision, 
challenges to these on-site land and physical improvement exactions were 
generally unsuccessful and the practice was upheld in the state courts.79 
After World War II, suburban localities experienced a surge in the de-
mand for land suitable for development into new residential communi-
ties. The pent-up housing demand caused by World War II created 
immense pressures on these communities to provide for the educational 
and recreational needs of their new populations. In response, many local-
ities, acting under their state subdivision regulation enabling legislation, 
added the requirement that residential developers dedicate land within 
their developments for these two purposes.80 By this time, the idea had 
been firmly accepted that land developers could legally be required to 
provide for the infrastructure needs of the new residents being attracted 
to the new subdivisions and the extension of the subdivision regulation 
principle to the new purposes was not difficult for courts to accept.81 
77. See Brous v. Smith, 106 N.E.2d 503, 507 (N.Y. 1952). See generally, Michael M. 
Shultz & Richard Kelley, Subdivision Improvement Requirements and Guarantees: A Pri-
mer, 28 WAsH. U. J. URB & CoNTEMP. L. 3, 68 (1985). 
78. THOMAS P. SNYDER & MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, PAYING FOR GRowrn: UsiNG IM-
PAcr FEES TO FINANCE INFRASTRUGruRE 22 (1986). 
79. See, e.g., Petterson v. City of Naperville, 137 N.E.2d 371 (Ill. 1956) (curbs and 
gutters requirement); Ridgefield Land Co. v. Detroit, 217 N.W. 58 (Mich. 1928) (upholding 
mandatory land dedication for subdivision streets); Allen v. Stockwell, 178 N.W. 27 (Mich. 
1920) (sidewalks); Blevens v. City of Manchester, 170 A.2d 121 (N.H. 1961); Medine v. 
Burns, 208 N.Y.S.2d 12 (N.Y. Special Term 1960) (sewers); Brous, 106 N.E.2d at 503 (up-
holding dedication of roads within the subdivision); Zastrow v. Viii. of Brown Deer, 100 
N.W.2d 359 (Wis. 1960) (water mains). 
80. See Juergensmeyer & Blake, supra note 76, at 416-18. The first case upholding the 
practice of requiring the dedication of subdivision land for park purposes was the New 
York case of In re Lake Secor Development Co., 252 N.Y.S. 809 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1931). See 
also Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. City of Cranston. 264 A.2d 910 (R.I. 1970) (stating that a natu-
ral result of residential subdivision is the increased need for recreation space). However, 
some courts found school site dedication requirements to be unauthorized by enabling 
statute and void as ultra vires municipal acts. See, e.g., Kelber v. City of Upland, 318 P.2d 
561 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957); West Park Ave. v. Twp. of Ocean, 224 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1966). See also 
James P. Karp, Subdivision Exactions for Park and Open Space Needs, 16 AM. Bus. L.J. 
277 (1979). 
81. In Jordan v. Menomonee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965), the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court upheld an ordinance which required the land developer to dedicate land for 
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The land dedication requirements for residential growth continued to 
multiply-extending to the land nearby or adjacent to the actual lots being 
developed. The earlier success of local governments in obtaining exac-
tions for on-site subdivision land or improvements led to the extension of 
the concept to off-site improvements. For rapidly-growing municipalities, 
the logic of developer responsibility for these off-site impacts of residen-
tial development impact seemed clear. During the period spanning from 
1965 through the end of the eighties, local government subdivision exac-
tion practices requiring the construction of improvements on bordering, 
adjacent, or physically separate land met with a varied responses. For 
instance, when these off-site land exactions were designed to reduce the 
additional traffic burden caused by the new residential development, they 
were generally upheld.82 However, if the land developer was charged for 
a disproportionate share of a community wide system upgrade, the de-
mand could be found to be confiscatory and invalid.83 In the early eight-
ies, state courts began to fashion the legal rules that would govern the 
expanding exaction practices, at least until state legislatures would later 
enter the fray with statutes regulating the practice. With this, the seeds 
were sown for modern development impact analysis to consider a 
broader range of local needs affected by the construction of new housing 
and to convert these impacts into cash payments. 
E. TRANSLATING LAND AND PHYSICAL IMPROVEMENTS 
INTO CASH pAYMENTS 
Up to this point, municipal development exaction policy was literal in 
its approach: it required either the dedication of land or physical im-
provements to facilitate the new land development. Gradually, a trans-
formation of exaction practice from the literal to the symbolic began to 
occur in the post-World War II era. Exaction practice began to convert 
school or park purposes or to pay a set sum of money in lieu of the land dedication. It 
reached this result by reasoning that, 
The municipality by approval of a proposed subdivision plat enables the sub-
divider to profit financially by selling the subdivision lots as home building 
sites aud thus realizing a greater price than could have been obtained if he 
had sold his property as unplatted lands. In return for this benefit the munici-
pality may require him to dedicate part of his platted land to meet a demand 
to which the municipality would have been put but for the influx of people 
into the community to occupy the subdivision lots. 
/d. at 448. 
82. The California courts have long sustained off-site road improvements as a condi-
tion of developmental approval. See, e.g., Ayres v. City Council, 207 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1949) 
(ten-foot strip to widen an abutting highway); Briar West, Inc. v. City of Lincoln, 291 
N.W.2d 730 (Neb. 1980) (seventeen-foot strip for widening of abutting street). The Ayres 
case led to a series of state decisions upholding exactions when there was a "reasonable 
relationship" to the needs created by the new development. This test of "nexus" was later 
specifically rejected by the United States Supreme Court in the case of Dolan v. City of 
Tigard, 512 U.S. 314 (1994), where it was found not to satisfy the demands of the Fifth 
Amendment's Takings Clause. 
83. See Lake Intervale Homes v. Twp. of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 147 A.2d 28 (N.J. 
1957). 
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existing land dedication requirements into "in lieu of" cash payments 
made to the locality. Money began to be substituted for land and im-
provements.84 "In lieu of" payments were invented to replace or substi-
tute for the developer's obligation to dedicate subdivision land when the 
land to be given would be situated inconveniently, would be too small to 
serve the intended purpose, or for some other reason could not fulfill the 
need created by the subdivision.s5 These "in lieu of" payments were the 
first form of financial, conditional regulation on suburban growth and 
they constituted the forerunner of the cash impact fee common today. 
This financial substitution policy is noteworthy since it represents an 
initial attempt to extract cash from developers for public improvements 
that would be constructed beyond the physical limits of the new subdivi-
sion itself. The "in-lieu of" fee idea begins the practice of charging new 
development, in financial terms, for its contribution for off-site commu-
nity facilities when the need for the new facility is related to the popula-
tion occupying the new residential subdivision.86 Importantly, after 
several negative outcomes based upon the municipality's lack of dele-
gated authority to impose "in lieu of" fees,87 this technique was approved 
84. A curious analogy exists in the transformation of services required by feudal land 
tenures in Medieval England which underwent a similar change from specific performance 
of personal obligations into money rents. One example of this shift can be found in the 
military tenure that required that the land tenant annually provide the king a specified 
number of days of "knights service" each year. It has been reported that, 
[W]ithin a hundred years after the Conquest, with England pacified, the king 
had begun to take money payment (scutage or shield money) in its stead and 
to employ mercenaries to fight foreign wars. At this point tenants by knight 
service lost their military function and were slowly transformed into country 
gentlemen. 
JEssE DuKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 199 (5th ed. 2002). 
85. An example of the in lieu of payment is provided in the following quotation: 
Payment in lieu is employed when actual dedication or provision of land or 
improvements is not practical or feasible. For example, under a requirement 
to set aside 5 percent of a development's land area as open space, a five-acre 
subdivision would reserve one-quarter of an acre. Such a site might prove to 
be totally impractical for both the subdivision and the community. The alter-
natives were either to exempt smaller subdivisions from such requirements 
or to allow a payment to be made in lieu of dedication. This resulted in local 
governments requiring money in lieu of land dedication. The money exacted 
was to equal the value of the land that would have been dedicated. 
JAMEs C. NICHOLAS, ARTHUR C. NELSON & JuLIAN C. JuERGENSMEYER, A PRAcri-
TIONER's GUIDE TO DEVELOPMENT IMPAcr FEES 11 (1991). See a/so DAVID L. CALLIES, 
RoBERT H. FREILICH & THOMAS E. RoBERTS, CAsEs AND MATERIALS ON LAND UsE 200 
n.7 (2d ed. 1994); Fred Jacobsen & Jeff Redding, Making Development Pay Its Way, 55 N.C. 
L. REv. 407 (1977). 
86. See Associated Home Builders v. Walnut Creek, Inc., 484 P.2d 606 (Cal. 1971) (in 
lieu of fee for open space and recreation); Jenad, Inc. v. Viii. of Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 
(N.Y. 1966) (in lieu of fee for recreational purposes). See also THOMAS P. SNYDER & 
MICHAEL A. STEGMAN, PAYING FOR GROWTH: USING DEVELOPMENT FEES TO FINANCE 
INFRASTRUcrURE 10, 17-18 (1986). 
87. See generally Kelber v. City of Upland, 318 P.2d 561 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961); Rosen v. 
Village of Downers Grove, 167 N.E.2d 230 (Ill. 1960); Coronado Dev. Co. v. City of Mc-
Pherson, 368 P.2d 51 (Kan. 1962); Haugen v. Gleason, 359 P.2d 108 (Or. 1961). A few more 
recent decisions also have invalidated the in-lieu of practice by characterizing it as an unau-
thorized tax. See generally City of Montgomery v. Crossroads Land Co., 355 So. 2d 363 
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in judicial tests because of its "equivalence" to other mandatory subdivi-
sion requirements.88 They have also been authorized by more recent state 
enabling legislation.89 Today, these fees are commonly used to fund the 
acquisition and construction of off-site schools and park facilities and in 
some jurisdictions, street improvements, flood control, public resource 
access, and other public facilities. 90 The "in lieu of" fee concept, being 
adopted in the post-World War II decades, can be considered as one form 
of monetary exaction and setting the stage for future developer cash pay-
ments to localities as part of the land use regulatory process: an antece-
dent of modern impact fee practice.91 In Canada, during the fifties, 
Ontario municipalities developed the concept of "development charges" 
as a means of requiring developer financial contributions for off-site capi-
tal facilities.92 
Modern American land regulation has consistently and increasingly re-
lied on land developers to build or fund basic improvements and infra-
structure within property subdivisions they initiate, as well as requiring 
that they contribute to off-site capital improvements necessitated by their 
developments. While the practice began in a physical, literal way with 
on-site improvements and land interest dedications, it has now evolved to 
add cash payments, including development impact fees, to the long and 
complex list of local government infrastructure financing techniques. Lo-
cal government-imposed land development exactions have existed as long 
as localities have used zoning and subdivision regulation practices. This 
essential technique is not new, but rather represents a continuing effort to 
shift the capital costs of providing needed public facilities to land devel-
(Ala. 1978); Town of Longboat Key v. Lands End Ltd., 433 So. 2d 574 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1983); see also Sanchez v. City of Santa Fe, 481 P.2d 401 (N.M. 1971). 
88. See, e.g. Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 484 P.2d 606, 613-14 
(Cal. 1971); Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 54 N.E.2d 489 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976), affd, 369 
N.E.2d 892 (Ill. 1977); Jenad, Inc., 218 N.E.2d at 673; Call v. City of West Jordan, 606 P.2d 
217 (Utah 1979); Jordan v. Viii. of Menomenee Falls, 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965). 
89. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 30-28-133(4)(a) (authorizing park and school sites or 
fees reasonably necessary to serve the subdivision). 
90. See JAMES A. KusHNER, 1 SuBDIVISION LAw AND GRoWTH MANAGEMENT§ 6:30 
(2d ed. 2005). 
91. See Ira M. Heymann & Thomas K. Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing In-
creased Community Costs on New Suburban Residents through Subdivision Exactions, 73 
YALE L.J. 1119, 1121-22 (1964). 
92. David P. Amborski, Impact Fees Canadian Style: The Use of Development Charges 
in Ontario, in DEVELOPMENT IMPAcr FEES-POLICY RATIONALE, PRAGriCE, THEORY AND 
IssuEs 52 (Arthur C. Nelson ed., 1988). In describing this early Canadian practice, Profes-
sor Amborski summarized some of the salient features of the Ontario Municipal Act in the 
following terms, 
[W]hen municipalities received contributions in relation to expenses antici-
pated due to the subdivision of lands, those funds should be used for expend-
itures that benefit the occupants of the land within the subdivision. It further 
stated that contributions received in this manner should be placed in a re-
serve account that is subject to the regulations placed in the act on those 
accounts. Basically, these regulations attempt to ensure accountability by 
having the funds earmarked so that they will be spent in the manner speci-
fied above. 
/d. at 53-54. 
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opers and new residents.93 It is the extension of this practice to develop-
ment impact fees that will be the subject of the remaining analysis of this 
article. 
PART III-THE LAND DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEE-
THE MODERN FORM OF EXACTION 
A. DEFINING THE IMPACT FEE 
American municipal land use regulation has had a longstanding tradi-
tion of tying governmental approval of development projects with regula-
tory conditions imposing an increasing array of site improvements, land 
dedications, and financial charges. Interestingly, this history has assessed 
these development charges as an aspect of local government police power 
regulation and not as a direct form of business or consumer taxation. 
While this progression may be explained under a theory of regulatory 
"incrementalism," it has had significant effects on the design of modern 
exaction programs, most notably land development impact fees. These 
fees, with their police power rather than tax-based lineage, are subjected 
to a series of constitutional and common law qualifying tests when they 
undergo judicial review.94 This is an area where labels matter and the 
judicial categorization of a financial charge placed on land development 
as a tax, a special assessment, or a development impact fee can be deter-
minative in determining lawfulness. In a particular state context, one of 
these devices may be authorized and available to the locality, while an-
other technique may not.95 Not surprisingly, local governments will fre-
93. The application of municipal land use exactions has rapidly increased with the 
changing local government fiscal landscape and the shifting public attitudes regarding gov-
ernment and general taxation. David R. Berman wrote that, 
[N]ationwide, the number of exactions (required improvements, property 
set-asides, fees and taxes) imposed on developers has increased greatly in the 
past two decades. To some extent, this increase reflects the notion that 
growth must pay for itself. In part, however, it has also stemmed from the 
financial difficulties of many localities. Just as the federal and state govern-
ments tried to cope with their economic problems by passing costs on to local 
governments, local governments have attempted to ease their economic diffi-
culties-and the burden on current taxpayers-by passing costs on to devel-
opers. That developers have not offered more resistance may be attributable 
to the fact that they can, in turn, pass the costs on to residential or commer-
cial buyers. 
INT'L CITY MGMT. Ass'N, State-Local Relations: Authority, Finances, Cooperation, in THE 
MUNICIPAL YEARBOOK 2002, at 53 (2002). 
94. Ironically, constitutional law imposes minimal constitutional constraints upon tax-
ation devices-minimal due process or equal protection scrutiny-and no need to prove 
any semblance of rough proportionality as required in Dolan v. City of Tigard. See 
Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2u 1281, 
1292 (Cal. 1978). 
95. The power of taxation is distributed to local governments across the nation in non-
uniform ways. In some states such as Maryland, certain large jurisdictions such as Mont-
gomery County are accorded broad power of taxation equal to that of the state. When the 
county's impact fee policy was invalidated by the Maryland Court of Appeals as a revenue 
raising measure disguised as a regulatory fee, ample authority existed for the program to 
be reconstituted as an "excise tax." See E. Diversified v. Montgomery County, 570 A.2d 
850, 855 (Md. 1990). Such an excise tax was imposed on the act of developing property and 
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quently attempt to employ the label most likely to survive judicial 
scrutiny. However, they do not always use consistent terminology, and 
therefore, cash payments related to land development have been called 
many things.96 Sometimes, localities will adopt a fee policy using one de-
scriptive label, and later, they will redefine the technique in what they 
believe is a legally-defensible term when challenged in court. This ploy is 
met with mixed success since courts feel free to take a fresh look at the 
device under attack and to characterize it as they see fit. As always, the 
courts have the final say. 
A development impact fee is the assessment by local government of 
financial charges upon the owner of new land development projects 
needed to offset capital expenditures made by the local government on 
infrastructure required to serve or made necessary by the new building.97 
Nelson and Moody have described it more succinctly as "really nothing 
more than an intervention by local officials to solve the problem of pro-
viding infrastructure to sustain development in rapidly growing areas."98 
Most often, this fee is charged one time only, based upon a set schedule 
of administratively or legislatively-adopted rates and, usually, at the mo-
ment of development approval rather than later in the building process.99 
The range of impact fee purposes is potentially as broad as the range of 
public services accorded to new development and fees have been im-
posed for an ever-expanding range of purposes.100 However, many juris-
dictions limit their impact fee programs to cost categories for which they 
have specific authority and proportionate cost data sufficient to justify 
imposition of the fee. Impact fees are uniformly dedicated to the purpose 
of funding or capitalizing on the construction of new infrastructure sys-
tems or the expansion of existing ones and not for their operational or 
maintenance (O&M) expenses-101such O&M expenses being regarded 
was sustained in Waters Land Ltd. P'ship v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 712, 716 (Md. 
1994). 
96. See, e.g. Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz., 930 P. 2d 993, 994 (Ariz. 1997) (water 
resource development fee); San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 104 
(Cal. 2002) (housing replacement fee); Country Joe, Inc. v. City of Eagan, 548 N.W.2d 281 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1996) (road unit connection charge); City of N. Las Vegas v. Pardee Con-
str. Co., 21 P.3d 8, 8 (Nev. 2001) (water connection charge). 
97. NICHOLAS, NELSON & JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 85, at 1. 
98. ARTHUR C. NELSON & MITCH MooDY, PAYING FOR PROSPERITY: IMPACT FEES 
AND JoB GRoWTH 16 (Discussion Paper, Brookings Institution Center On Urban and Met-
ropolitan Policy 2003). 
99. Arthur C. Nelson, Development Impact Fees, 54 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 3 (1988) ("sin-
gle payments required to be made by builders or developers at the time of developmental 
approval and calculated to be the proportionate share of the capital cost of providing ma-
jor facilities to that development"). 
100. If appropriate enabling authority and local political will existed, impact fees could 
be imposed to provide for water treatment and supply, sewage collection and treatment, 
solid and/or hazardous waste treatment and storage, roads, bridges, mass transit, flood con-
trol, pollution control, schools, libraries, parks, open space and recreational facilities, side-
walks, affordable housing, and artwork. See JAMEs A. KusHNER, SuBDIVISION LAw AND 
GROWTH MANAGEMENT at 1 § 6:31, at 1 (2d ed. 2005). 
101. It has been uniformly stated by analysts, courts, and legislatures that on-going op-
eration and maintenance expenses are not to be paid for by impact fees and that the fees 
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as the proper subject of tax or user fee support. 
These fees (unlike traditional, on-site development exactions) fund 
capital improvements made necessary by the new building which are 
physically situated off-site, that is, some distance from the new residen-
tial, and sometimes, industrial or commercial construction.l02 Nelson has 
described development impact fees as "scheduled charges applied to new 
development to generate revenue for the construction or expansion of 
capital facilities located outside the boundaries of the new development 
(off-site) that benefit the contributing development."103 One way to con-
ceptualize the difference between traditional development exactions and 
development impact fees is to consider exactions as being tied to the spe-
cific site under development (project charges) while the impact fees are 
related to more system-wide service provision or infrastructure (system 
charges). A "project charge" might impose the cost of installing curbs 
and gutters within a residential subdivision while a "system charge" 
would provide the local government with funds to expand the treatment 
capacity of the municipal sewage treatment plant. It is this detachment 
from the actual location of land development that makes impact fees so 
controversial and so often subject to legal attack. Other, more compre-
hensive definitions of impact fees do exist.104 
B. WHY IMPACT FEES ARE RAPIDLY BEING ADOPTED 
THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES 
Attitudes regarding the desirability of community growth have 
changed significantly in the post-World War II period. Where once 
growth would be heralded as evidence of the health and the desirability 
of the community, now the approval of new single and multi-family de-
velopments is met with skepticism and concern about the deterioration of 
the locality's financial well-being and its general quality of life. In some 
are only to provide funding for capital improvement costs necessitated by development. 
This view apparently stems from the view that the funding of operation and maintenance 
should come from generally- derived tax revenues as a general operating cost of govern-
ment. Implicit in this outlook is the idea that such a general community expense should not 
be charged to a limited segment of the locality's population through a focused impact fee 
on new development. See JuERGENSMEYER & RoBERTs, supra note 50, at 328-32. 
102. It is also noteworthy that development impact fees are most frequently applied to 
residential or home construction. However, some systems of fee collection also impose 
these charges on other forms of land development-that is, commercial, industrial, and 
institutional- and therefore, attempt to consistently tax all forms of development which are 
causally related to new community infrastructure charges. See generally Fred Bosselman & 
Nancy Stroud, Pariah to Paragon: Developer Exactions in Florida 1975-1985, 14 STETSON L. 
REv. 528 (1985). 
103. See NICHOLAS, NELSON & JuERGENSMEYER. suvra note 85. at 1-2. 
104. Blaesser and Kentopp have defined impact fees as a land use exaction: 1) in the 
form of a predetermined money payment; 2) assessed as a condition to the issuance of a 
building permit, an occupancy permit or plat approval; 3) pursuant to local government 
powers to regulate new growth and development and provide for adequate public facilities 
and services; 4) levied to fund large-scale. off-site public facilities, and services necessary to 
serve new development; and 5) in an amount which is proportionate to the need for public 
facilities generated by new development. See Brian Blaesser & Christine M. Kentopp, Im-
pact Fees: The Second Generation, 38 WAsH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. LAw 55, 64 (1990). 
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locations, this concern has been expressed in more extreme terms with 
calls for building and utility connection moratoria. In an increasing num-
ber of locales, the impact fee device is being adopted by local govern-
ments. In 2000, the General Accounting Office (GAO) surveyed local 
governments and discovered high rates of impact fees use. The study 
found 59.4% or 564 cities with populations in excess of 25,000 and 39% or 
238 metropolitan area counties employed impact fees.105 Indirect evi-
dence (from state enabling legislation in twenty-five states, numerous 
newspaper reports of municipal controversies, website postings of interest 
groups and reported litigation) confirms this report and suggests that im-
pact fees are prevalent and that their use is growing.l06 But why is this 
trend currently accelerating and why didn't the pre-existing funding pat-
terns continue? Several distinct justifications for the modern adoption of 
development impact fee can be identified. 
1. Using Conventional Legal Theory-The Police Power "Harm 
Avoidance" Justification for Impact Fees 
Development impact fees have been imposed under the authority of a 
locality's police power. This broad, traditional source of authority en-
compasses a wide range of municipal functions that can be generally said 
to further public health, safety or the general welfare. As general as po-
lice power goals may sound, they authorize a wide variety of protective 
and programmatic action to further the well-being of the community. 
Not surprisingly, most local government land use regulation is legally jus-
tified under this harm-prevention rationale. When new land develop-
ment is proposed, it presents a variety of "harms" as potential impacts. 
Unmitigated, these development effects could present serious adverse 
consequences for the locality. For instance, a new housing subdivision, by 
itself, could increase site runoff and increase loads on existing drainage 
105. U.S. GENERAL AccouNTING OFFICE, LocAL GRowrn IssuEs-FEDERAL 0PPOR· 
TUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 43 & 62 (2000). A Florida SUrvey published in 1991 indicated 
that 52% of Florida's counties employed impact fees. FLORIDA ADVISORY CouNCIL oN 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, 1991 FLORIDA IMPAcr FEE REPORT. 
106. In 1986, there were only three states-Arizona, California, and New Jersey-with 
state impact fee enabling legislation. By 1993, the number had grown to twenty jurisdic-
tions with general state-wide law. Two others, Maryland and Tennessee, enacted law giving 
impact fee authority to enumerated counties. See Martin L. Leitner & Susan P. Schoettle, 
A Survey of State Impact Fee Enabling Legislation, 25 URB. LAw. 491, 492 nn.6-7 (1993). 
Finally, in 2002, the total had grown to twenty-four states. This total undoubtedly under-
states the prevalence of the practice since some states justify local impact fee practice 
under home rule or general planning and zoning authority. /d. at 507. In fact, Florida has a 
long litigation history of challenges to impact fees in the absence of specific enabling au-
thority. See, e.g., Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 
1976). Alternatively, impact fees-often by other names-are imposed by way of negoti-
ated land use approval practices. For instance, in Virginia, the land rezoning process is used 
as the vehicle for charging cash exactions offsetting the costs of new development. Under 
this practice, the land developer can offer "voluntary" cash "proffers" to the local govern-
ment to support its rezoning request. As long as these proffers are "voluntary," the Vir-
ginia courts have allowed the practice to continue. The Virginia General Assembly has 
restricted the availability of this technique to certain "high growth" localities. See VA. 
CoDE ANN. § 15.2-2298 et seq. 
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structures, thereby overwhelming the capacity to properly handle the 
storm water generated by the subdivision. Numerous other examples of 
development impacts imposing community burdens exist. Requiring im-
pact fees which fund the capital costs of public facilities needed to avoid 
or abate the adverse effects of new development can be viewed as a po-
lice power "harm" minimizing policy. By ensuring that there is adequate 
infrastructure in place to offset or avoid these negative development im-
pacts, impact fees serve the main police power goal of maintaining com-
munity health, safety, and general welfare. In this way, the traditional 
police power harm minimizing rationale can be used to support impact 
fees. 
2. Achieving Economic Objectives at a Low Political Cost 
Throughout history, devising a revenue-raising policy has proved con-
troversial and intensely political-sometimes spawning violent revolts.107 
In its most visible context, setting national tax policy in the United States 
consistently engenders strong political debate over the eternal questions 
of what conduct should be taxed, who should pay taxes, and in what 
amounts? At this level, setting tax policy involves highly charged political 
values. As with these national tax issues, local government tax policy for 
the funding of public investments such as roads, schools, and parks has 
also been a contested public issue in recent years, as evidenced by Cali-
fornia's Proposition 13 in 1978. In the last decade, local tax policy has 
raised significant and controversial political questions when it concerns 
the financing of public facilities necessitated by new community growth. 
In earlier times, communities paid for growth-related costs with annu-
ally-generated general tax revenues and general obligation debt financ-
ing. The political landscape in the last two decades has significantly 
changed. With the reductions in intergovernmental subsidies of local 
government and the increasingly popular resistance to raising real prop-
erty taxes and approving bond referenda, local governments have found 
it necessary to develop alternative methods of financing the capital costs 
of growth. Such methods must meet the three-part test of being 1) finan-
cially adequate; 2) legally defensible; and 3) acceptable to the local elec-
torate as a political matter. Development impact fees, as they have 
evolved over the past two decades, fit this description. By adopting ordi-
nances embracing development impact fee regimes, local governments si-
107. In 1792, following Alexander Hamilton's plan for building a strong federal govern-
ment possessing significant revenue raising powers, Congress enacted an excise tax to be 
imposed on strong alcoholic beverages. This action triggered what became to be known as 
the "Whiskey Rebellion," and this tax was especially offensive to farmers in western Penn-
sylvania who converted their grain to whiskey for sale since it imposed a tax equal to one-
third the price of whiskey. See GLENN W. FISHER, THE WoRsT TAx? A HISTORY OF THE 
PROPERTY TAX IN AMERICA 35-36 (1996). The flames of the rebellion were fanned at 
protest meetings, the tarring and feathering of tax collectors, a mob attack on the house of 
a federal inspector and a march on Pittsburgh by up to 5,000 men. Id. In response, Presi-
dent George Washington called up 13,000 militiamen (triple the number at Valley Forge) 
and the rebellion was put down by the troops. Id. at 37. 
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multaneously achieve a series of attractive political objectives, and they 
do so without having to consider any potential objections from interest 
groups unrepresented in the existing voting populace. The major argu-
ments in favor of the adoption of impact fees can be stated in the follow-
ing terms. 
3. Pragmatic Considerations Underlying Impact Fees 
A variety of practical factors make the increasing modern reliance on 
impact fees understandable. First, by adopting development impact fees, 
the locality assures itself that there will be a continuing stream of capital-
funding revenues that will permit the planning and building of needed 
infrastructure in a timely fashion correlated with the arrival of new popu-
lation to the community. By obtaining this flow of impact fees, the local 
government can avoid the common problem of having new residential 
growth overload or "congest" existing public facilities such as public 
schools, libraries, and parks. With a steady supply of impact fee reve-
nues, public facilities can be constructed in a more synchronized fashion 
with the demands of new residents, minimizing the need for the commu-
nity to "play catch-up" after falling behind those growing needs. Second, 
localities will have less need to access the capital markets in order to bor-
row funds for this capital construction, thereby conserving their limited 
borrowing authority and reducing the future budgetary strain of debt ser-
vice that would have been incurred to finance the improvements. Third, 
impact fees provide a dedicated source for funding public improvements 
that were not provided by conventional land use exactions. The expan-
sion of a fire station or a drinking water treatment plant miles away from 
new development provides an example of this principle. The impact fee 
can provide funding for this kind of system-wide improvement necessi-
tated by new growth. Fourth, these new fees can, in theory, be applied to 
all forms of new development-not just residential single-family home 
subdivisions. Impact fee programs could be designed for all categories of 
land uses and also for different forms of uses within the same category or 
group.l08 Such a well-constructed impact fee program would more accu-
rately connect the fiscal impacts of development to its social costs, 
thereby avoiding imprecise average cost pricing problems.109 Fifth, the 
timing of the collection of impact fees can be set at a point closer to the 
108. A case study from Rochester, Illinois, imposes a development impact fee for water 
and sewer capital costs on residential, educational and commercial land uses depending on 
the number of "interior plumbed fixtures" regardless of the land use category. See Brad-
ford Townsend, Development Impact Fees: A Fair Share Formula for Success, 78 PuB. 
MGMT. 10 (1996). Other impact fee systems impose charges adjusted for future expected 
fiscal impact on the community. See Roger K. Dahlstrom, Development Impact Fees: A 
Review of Contemporary Techniques for Calculation, Data Collection, and Documentation, 
15 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 557 (1995) (describing the Elgin, Illinois Fiscal Impact Land Use 
Model which generates fees that are demand, cost, and revenue sensitive). 
109. See R. Marlin Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements, to Community 
Benefit Assessments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAw & CoNTEMP. 
PROBS. 5, 15 (1987). 
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developer's actual sale of the finished residential unit, making the fee less 
onerous to the builder. Impact fee systems could be structured to impose 
the fee at the point of building permit issuance or even later, thereby 
relieving the land developer's need to finance the impact fee expense dur-
ing construction. This timing advantage for the land developer could 
make the fee more palatable to developers. Sixth, impact fees may also 
constitute desirable policy because they represent a more efficient use of 
public infrastructure. If impact fees are carefully designed to reflect the 
cost of actually providing public services to new development, they may 
serve to impose the true marginal costs of using public facilities upon new 
growth. Further, by integrating these expenses into the cost of new hous-
ing, the housing market will tend to maximize overall social utility be-
cause the price of homes will more accurately reflect all of the positive 
and negative effects that residential growth brings to the community. 
Seventh, an impact fee program may actually make new growth possible 
when infrastructure capacity limits have been reached and a community 
has adopted a real or de facto development moratorium. By providing 
for a stable source of infrastructure capital, impact fees may actually elim-
inate a serious objection to new residential growth and serve as a growth-
accommodating policy. In this way, they could also be viewed as develop-
ment timing devises. 
C. AssESSING THE EcoNOMIC 1M PLICA noNs OF 
DEVELOPMENT IMPACT FEES 
Academic and professional studies have examined the general topic of 
the fiscal impacts of different forms of modern suburban growth.11° Con-
siderably less comprehensive analysis exists regarding the use and effects 
of the development impact fees. Some fundamental questions concerning 
the general economic effects concerning the use of impact fees remain 
largely unanswered. For example, do fees expand or contract the supply 
of developable land?111 Are fees consistent with higher or lower levels of 
110. The most comprehensive assessment of the cost savings afforded by planned devel-
opment considered the New Jersey State Development and Redevelopment Plan. The 1992 
report concluded that New Jersey could save $1.3 billion in infrastructure costs for roads, 
utilities and schools over a twenty year period if a state managed growth plan were fol-
lowed rather than developing in the traditional sprawl form of land development. See RoB. 
ERT W. BuRCHELL ET AL., IMPACT AssESSMENT oF THE NEw JERSEY INTERIM STATE 
DEVELOPMENT AND REDEVELOPMENT PLAN, REPORT II: RESEARCH FINDINGS (1992). 
However, increased housing costs have been observed with growth controls. See William 
A. Fischel, Do Growth Controls Matter: A Review of Empirical Evidence on the Effective-
ness and Efficiency of Local Government Land Use Regulation, in LINCOLN INST. FOR 
LAND PoL'Y (1990); Jane H. Lillydahl & Larry D. Dingell, The Effects of Growth Manage-
ment on the Housing Market: A Review of Theoretical and Empirical Evidence, 9 J. URB. 
AFF. 63 (1987). 
111. Impact fees may actually increase the supply of developable land in a community 
and, as a consequence, enable more residential growth. The impact fees can provide the 
needed capital to fund infrastructure needs required by "adequate public facilities" plan-
ning. See VICKI BEEN, IMPACT FEES AND HousiNG AFFORDABILITY 8 (HUD Report 
2004). 
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local employment in areas where they are used?112 Perhaps the absence 
of this economic research reflects both the difficulty of data collection 
and the isolation of the effects and incidence of the fees. In recent years, 
however, the academic literature has just begun to examine seriously this 
technique both in theoretical terms and case study analyses. The empha-
sis of these studies has been in economic focus with considerable effort 
expended to the application of statistical methods to discern precise em-
pirical patterns to explain the real world impact of these fees. These stud-
ies, drawn from localized data sets, have considered three interrelated 
questions: 1) what are the price effects of impact fees on new and existing 
home prices; 2) what is the incidence of the impact fees or who actually 
pays the additional cost imposed by the impact fee; and 3) does the use of 
local government impact fees result in greater economic efficiency in pat-
terns of suburban growth? 
1. Housing Cost Price Effect Data 
Intuitively, one might assume that the imposition of development im-
pact fees would result in developers attempting to pass the additional cost 
along to the housing consumer in the form of higher prices for new con-
struction. The impact fee would merely represent an additional cost com-
ponent. However, such pricing power would seemingly depend upon the 
competitiveness and profitability of an area's housing market, the availa-
bility of new homes in communities that do not impose impact fees (or 
have lower fee levels) and the ability of developers to force land sellers to 
capitalize or deduct all or some of the fee from the cost of the raw land 
sales price. Each of these factors could result in a diffusion of the impact 
fee with each of the market participants-the housing consumer, devel-
oper, and land owner-each absorbing part of the new additional cost. 
Research has provided limited insight into the potential effect that impact 
fees might have on housing price and supply. 
The few empirical studies undertaken seem to indicate that fees are 
largely passed on to the consumer of new housing and often in excess of 
the actual amount of the impact fee itself. This phenomenon is referred 
to as "overshifting," where the developer receives a bonus in excess of 
the cost of the development fee.U 3 One study undertaken in the mid-
nineties by Brett Braden, Don Coursey, and Jeannine Kannegiesser ex-
amined the price effects of impact fees in eight Chicago suburbs and 
found that new house prices rose more than the cost of the impact fee in 
112. One recent regression analysis of data from thirty-four Florida counties from 1993 
to 1999 concerning the relationship of numerous factors on local economic development 
found "a significant positive association between impact fees collected per building permit 
in one year and job growth over the next two years." NELSON & MoooY, supra note 98, at 
15. 
113. John Yinger, The Incidence of Development Fees and Special Assessments, 51 
NAT'L TAX J. 23, 35 (1998). 
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six out of eight localities.114 The range of price increases spanned from 
70% to 210% of the actual cost of the impact fee.l 15 The explanation of 
why developers are able to pass on the impact fee cost plus an additional 
increment appears to rest upon consumer willingness to pay for estab-
lished, in-place services that will benefit them immediately in a predict-
able way. The price effect of impact fees on existing housing has also 
been studied, and it has been found that impact fees also had a positive 
effect on existing houses-not subject to the impact fees-increasing 
their value by at least the amount of the impact fees being charged to new 
home development. This price phenomenon reflected the fact that ex-
isting homes represented a potential substitute for newly-constructed 
homes and that rising prices would increase their prices as well. Some 
theorists have suggested that the existing house price increase might also 
reflect the market's perception that, with impact fees, the likelihood of 
future real estate tax rate increases will be reduced. It is hardly surprising 
that current property owners have an incentive to support the imposition 
of impact fees on new construction for the usual stated reasons and the 
desire to enjoy windfall capital gains. 
Other studies reinforce these findings. For instance, in 1990, Singell 
and Lillydahl analyzed similar price impacts during 1983-85 in Loveland, 
Colorado, and found that an impact fee of $1,182 was related to a new 
house price increase of $3,800-over three times the cost of the fee.l 16 
They concluded that "the results imply that the buyers of new homes in 
Loveland, rather than land owners or developers, bear the burden of the 
impact fees."117 These results suggest developers "overshifting" as de-
scribed above resulting in a tripling of the return on their "investment" in 
impact fees. Even more striking are the results of the analysis related to 
the price effects on existing housing in Loveland, Colorado during the 
period under study. Singell and Lillydahl found that the price of old or 
existing housing increased an average of $7,000 when impact fees were 
imposed on new housing.118 These findings indicate that existing home-
owners derived significant indirect benefits from the assessment of impact 
fees on new construction.l19 In fact, existing housing prices rose $7,000, 
114. BRETr M. BADEN, DoN L. CouRSEY & JEANNINE M. KANNEGIESSER, [THE 
HEARTLAND INSTITUTE], EFFECTS OF IMPACT FEES ON THE SUBURBAN CHICAGO Hous. 
ING MARKET 36 (1999) (finding that in the period from 1995 to 1997 single family home 
impact fees in the eight Chicago communities ranged from $2,223 to $8,942.) 
115. /d. At the low end of this range-70% cost increase-the builder must absorb the 
missing 30% or force the landowner's selling land for development to reduce their asking 
prices in order to capitalize the cost of the impact fees. The large price effects-210%-
were not attributed to price gouging or strong market conditions, but were rather "proba-
bly due to the imposition of fees causing substantial uncertainty and delay costs, as well as 
other fee and regulatory costs .... " /d. 
116. Larry D. Singell & Jane H. Lillydahl, An Empirical Examination of the Effects of 
Impact Fees on the Housing Markets, 66 LAND EcoN. 82, 89 (1990). 
117. /d. 
118. /d. 
119. /d. at 89. Theoretical research has confirmed this price effect increasing the value 
of developed land when impact fees are adopted. See Jan K. Brueckner, Infrastructure, 
Financing and Urban Development: The Economics of Impact Fees, 66 J. Pus. EcoN. 383, 
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while new house prices increased by $3,800 in the study.120 Other empiri-
cal studies have reinforced the point that housing prices rise at least on 
par with the cost of the impact fee. 121 If these research findings are cor-
rect as a general matter, it is not hard to understand why existing re-
sidents support the imposition of impact fees on new development: they 
are beneficial by raising the capital value of the existing housing stock. 
There is also evidence that fees may also slow the rate of residential con-
struction, thereby limiting the addition of new housing supply to the mar-
ket.122 These results support the idea that impact fees raise the cost of 
new housing construction to the consumer and indirectly increase the 
value of existing homes in a simultaneous fashion. 123 
2. Who Actually Pays Impact Fees the Question of Incidence 
The incidence of a tax indicates who actually pays it and this issue has 
been the subject of research within the context of development impact 
fees. 124 The studies done in this area have focused on the price effects or 
trends for new and existing housing in jurisdictions imposing impact fees. 
The initial question posed by this research has been a determination of 
whether a local government's imposition of an impact fee affects the price 
of new and used housing in an area. Certainly, since the impact fee is 
imposed upon the land developer at some point in the development ap-
proval process, it can be said that the fee is nominally or literally paid by 
the developer. Also, since the development fee is an "up-front charge" in 
the building process, it represents an additional cost element in the con-
struction of a unit of housing. However, once imposed, the impact fee 
may not stay where it is first charged. That is, the land developer may 
first attempt to shift the development fee "backwards" to the raw land 
seller through lower prices paid for land. In the alternative, the devel-
405 (1997). Consequently, it is not difficult to comprehend yet another reason why devel-
opment impact fees have become so widespread throughout the United States during the 
last two decades. They also raise the market value of homes owned by existing property 
owners in the locality. 
120. Singell & Lillydahl, supra note 116, at 89. 
121. Charles J. Delaney & Marc T. Smith, Impact Fees and the Price of New Housing: 
An Empirical Study, 17 J. AM. REAL EsT. & URB. EcoN. Ass'N 41,54 (1989) (impact fees 
in Dunedin, Florida rose relative to other cities in Peinellas County, Florida); Andrejas 
Sakburskis & Mohammad Qadeer, An Empirical Estimation of the Price Effects of Devel-
opment Impact Fees, 29 URB. STUD. 653, 667 (1992) ($1.00 in impact fees caused lot prices 
to rise $1.88 in Toronto, Canada). But see Marla Dresch & Steven M. Sheffrin, Who Pays 
For Development Fees and Exactions?, PuB. PoL'Y INST. oF CAL. (1997) (inconsistent find-
ings some showing no overshift). 
122. Mark Skidmore & Michael Peddle, Do Development Impact Fees Reduce the Rate 
of Residential Development?, GRoWTH AND CHANGE 383-400 (Fall 1998) (reducing the 
rate of residential construction between 29% and 31% from 1977 through 1992 in DuPage 
County, Illinois). But see Christopher J. Mayer & C. Tsuriel Somerville, Land Use Regula-
tion and New Construction, 30 REG. Sc1. & URB. EcoN. 639 (2000) (little effect found on 
construction). 
123. Charles J. Delaney & Marc T. Smith, Pricing Implications of Development Exac-
tions on Existing Housing Stock, GROWTH AND CHANGE 12 (Fall 1989). 
124. See, e.g., Forrest E. Huffman et al., Who Bears the Burden of Development Impact 
Fees? 54 J. AM. PLAN. Ass'N 49, 49-55 (1988). 
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oper might attempt to transfer all or part of the impact fee "forward" to 
the housing consumer through higher prices that must be paid for a com-
pleted home. Studies have revealed that impact fee costs are shifted in 
both directions. 
Research by John Yinger has rigorously analyzed the incidence issue 
and has concluded that development impact fees actually shift approxi-
mately a quarter of the burden of these fees onto the owners of undevel-
oped land with the size of this effect estimated to be varied.125 
Backward-shifting of the fees has proved controversial and has been dis-
cussed in other studies.126 At the same time, the imposition of impact fees 
confers a small capital gain on existing homeowners. 127 This seems to be 
consistent with the conclusions of the Singell and Lillydahl study and ear-
lier research.128 Not surprisingly, new home purchasers will bear the rest 
of the impact fee burden in higher purchase prices, but they will be re-
warded for shouldering this cost with a higher level of infrastructure serv-
ing their new homes and, potentially, higher resale values.l29 Finally, 
Yinger concludes that in a competitive housing construction market the 
fees do not impose any burden on the land developer. 130 The collective 
conclusion of this research indicates that fees are shared by all of the 
participants in the land development process but that the process of 
"shifting" is not well understood, necessitating more study.131 
3. Impact Fees as a Way to "Efficient Growth" 
Earlier community development practices have been criticized as being 
economically inefficient in that builders add housing to a locality without 
absorbing all, or even a majority, of the capital and other costs imposed 
125. See genearlly Yinger, supra note 113. This phenomenon has been observed. 
126. Keith R. Ihlanfeldt & Timothy M. Shaughnessy, An Empirical Investigation of the 
Effects of Impact Fees on Housing and Land Markets, 2 & 15 (Lincoln Institute of Land 
Policy Working Paper No. CP02A13 2002) (stating that undeveloped land values decline if 
the increase in the price of housing is insufficient to guarantee developers of new housing a 
competitive rate of return); see also William A. Fischel, The Economics of Land Use Exac-
tions: A Property Rights Analysis, 50 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs. 101 (1987); Andrew R. 
Watkins, Impacts of Land Development Charges, 75 LAND EcoN. 415-424 (1999). 
127. Yinger, supra note 113, at 37. If the existing homeowners also receive benefits 
from the infrastructure funded by impact fees paid by new home owners, the windfall to 
these existing residents would be even greater. In this research, Professor Yinger also con-
cluded that special assessment, rather than development impact fees, appeared to be the 
fairer financing mechanism for infrastructure, and he notes that "special assessments are 
the most neutral policy: The burden fall entirely on new owners who receive all the benefit 
from the infrastructure." !d. at 33. 
128. See Huffman et al., supra note 124, at 52 ("if housing prices ... rise because of 
impact fees, the price of existing homes that are close substitutes for new homes will also 
rise. That results in a windfall profit to owners of existing homes.") 
129. The Ihlanfeldt & Shaughnessy study estimated that this increase in the price of 
housing equals "the present value of the property tax savings expected by homeowners 
from the shift from property tax finance to the use of impact fees to pay for new public 
capital services." Ihlanfeldt & Shaughnessy, supra note 126, at 16. This view assumes a 
remarkable and unrealistic degree of housing consumer awareness of future taxes and the 
ability to discount these future savings to present value. 
130. Yinger, supra note 113, at 37. 
131. See generally Watkins, supra note 126. 
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on the community by the new construction. In this view, builders, as eco-
nomic actors, force negative economic externalities upon localities by re-
quiring that the general community respond with general tax revenues to 
finance the infrastructure and the other adverse effects of new growth. 
Following this theory, it is assumed that, in economic terms, the act of 
land development is inefficient if it shifts negative effects or costs away to 
be borne by others who have not agreed to bear them. By avoiding these 
costs, land developers have benefited themselves and, in the short run, 
housing consumers by supplying the housing market with additional units 
at a sales price not fully reflecting their economic impact on the local 
community. The result of this phenomenon of not internalizing these 
costs is to provide housing to consumers at an artificially low price or to 
provide unjustified profits to builders or a little of both. 
Land development may be considered "efficient" when the cost of in-
frastructure is included in the price charged to the consumer. Viewed in 
this light, it has been argued that development impact fees are justified as 
a method of properly assigning the costs of growth to those enjoying the 
benefits. Expressed in other terms, these fees demand a greater internal-
ization of development costs, resulting in improvement in the economic 
efficiency in the provision of infrastructure. Some economic analysts 
have concurred with this view. Within an urban growth model, Jan K. 
Brueckner compared the traditional community cost sharing method of 
infrastructure financing with the approach taken by development impact 
fees. This research concluded that "the impact fee scheme ... [is] the 
infrastructure financing method that leads the efficient growth path be-
cause impact fees force developers to take into account the infrastructure 
costs imposed by new residents. Impact fees thus align private and social 
incentives."132 The research results suggest that even though impact fees 
only result in the recovery of part of new development-related costs, they 
do more closely align the housing consumer with the costs of providing 
new services. As a result, impact fees may be viewed as enhancing eco-
nomic efficiency. In addition, higher housing prices following the imposi-
tion of impact fees may actually reflect the fact that the housing consumer 
receives greater value in the property purchase through better infrastruc-
ture or reduced future local tax increases. 
132. Skidmore & Peddle, supra note 122, at 398 (describing Jan K. Brueckner, Infra· 
structure, Financing and Urban Development: The Economics of Impact Fees (Manuscript 
at the University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana)). 
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PART IV-JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF EXACTIONS 
AND IMPACT FEES 
A. STATE CouRTS IMPACT FEE Poucv DEvELOPMENT 
PRIOR TO THE NOLLANIDOLAN DECISIONS 
1. Early State Law on Cost Shifting 
As land use control techniques developed throughout the twentieth 
century, police power authority was increasingly used to shift the eco-
nomic costs of new residential growth to the land developer. Gradually, 
regulatory power was employed to require that land use projects con-
tained physical improvements that were functionally sound, integrated 
into community-wide systems, and sufficient to serve the needs of the 
new residents who would live in the area.B3 This early stage, however, 
focused on physical requirements of land improvements such as streets, 
gutters, sidewalks, and water and sewer lines within the area being devel-
oped. Later, in the post-World War II period, these subdivision rules ex-
panded requiring land dedication for schools, parks, and other public 
facilities. Since these land exactions were usually attached to the regula-
tion of large scale land development, courts analyzed them as police 
power-based rules, and they were often approved by the state judiciary 
and legislatures.134 By this time, the government approval of residential 
subdivisions had become dependent upon the land developer's agree-
ment to provide internal physical improvements and to dedicate land for 
public purposes. The key element satisfying court review of these land 
and capital improvements was their direct relationship to the land being 
developed at the actual site. It was not difficult for courts to consider 
these costs to be attributable to or caused by the new land development 
and, therefore, a proper subject for regulation. 
With this regulatory power firmly established in the local government's 
array of capital cost-shifting techniques, it did not take long for some of 
these land and physical improvement exactions to be converted into cash 
payments made to the local government. Consequently, required land 
dedications were often converted into a cash payment that was made "in 
lieu of" the otherwise inefficient land exaction. By the sixties, these "in 
lieu of" payments had been reviewed by numerous state courts and they 
had become common land use control techniques in the United States.135 
The acceptance of the "in lieu of" fees would set the stage for future cash 
impact fees that would provide for off-site system improvements that 
133. JuERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra noie 50, at 275. Even nineteenth century case 
law upheld the practice of charging new development for common improvements serving 
the buildings. See, e.g., City of Fergus Falls v. Boen, 80 N.W. 961, 961-62 (Minn. 1899) 
(upholding a per house connection charge offsetting costs of sewer pipes). 
134. See, e.g., Billings Props. Inc. v. Yellowstone County, 394 P.2d 182, 185 (Mont. 
1964) (recreational land); Blevens v. City of Manchester, 170 A.2d 121, 122 (N.H. 1961). 
135. THoMAS P. SNYDER & MicHAEL A. STEGMAN, PAYING FOR GRoWTH: UsiNG DE· 
VELOPMENT FEES TO FINANCE INFRASTRUcruRE 10, 17-18 (Washington: Urban Land Insti-
tute 1986). 
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would not be so closely tied to the actual parcel of land being developed. 
In reality, both of these techniques require cash transfers from the land 
developer to the local government to offset capital costs associated with 
new growth. Even at this early stage, both devices raised the concern of 
commentators that they could be abused and serve as illicit "entrance 
taxes" on new residents if not properly administered.136 
The period of 1960-1980 resulted in tremendous population growth and 
land development in the United States. The "growth mandate" of the 
earlier part of this period was followed by a time when pro-growth atti-
tudes of local government met intense citizen resistance. One of the 
more serious arguments raised against continued development was the 
increasing concern about the inadequacy of local public infrastructure. 
Overcrowded schools and overburdened sewer and water systems were 
viewed as the result of poorly planned, excessive community growth. Lo-
calities turned to development impact fees to shore up the financial 
shortages they were experiencing with higher costs to service ever-in-
creasing levels of growth. Local governments first sought to impose these 
fees as modern extensions of the traditional, special assessments or fol-
lowing public utility models of municipal finance. 137 This view of financ-
ing capital improvements connected a specific physical improvement such 
as a sidewalk, curb and gutter, or sewer or water pipe connection to an 
exact parcel which was both benefited by the investment and burdened 
with a financial charge to liquidate its cost. This linear burden and bene-
fit relationship had legally reinforced a wide range of financial special 
assessments over the years.138 During this modern growth period, how-
ever, land use impact fees began to expand in their range of purposes 
until they reached physical improvements that spread well beyond the 
boundaries of the building lots subject to the fees. With possible spillover 
effects accruing to the community at large, some critics believed that the 
increasingly popular impact fees were actually stealth taxation devices re-
distributing wealth rather than preventing negative impacts caused by the 
new development.U9 Not surprisingly, the state courts were asked by 
136. See, e.g., Ira M. Heyman & Thomas K. Gilhool, The Constitutionality of Imposing 
Increased Community Costs on New Subdivision Residents Through Subdivision Exactions, 
73 YALE L.J. 1119; John D. Johnston, Jr., Constitutionality of Subdivision Exactions: The 
Quest for a Rationale, 52 CoRNELL L.Q. 871 (1967). 
137. Some localities in California have adapted this traditional technique to provide 
funding for a proportionate share of public improvements such as fire stations by using a 
"facilities benefit assessment" to obtain funds from developers. This practice has been up-
held in California in J. W. Jones Cos. v. City of San Diego, 157 Cal. App. 3d 745, 758 (1984). 
Arizona courts have allowed similar devices to be used to fund sewer line extensions under 
"special taxing district" authorities. See Est. of Crain v. City of Williams, 965 P.2d 76, 81 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1998). 
138. Special assessments have a long history in the United States reaching back to the 
seventeenth century. See People ex ref. Griffen v. Mayor of Brooklyn, 4 N.Y. 419, 438 
(1851). See also OsBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LocAL GoVERNMENT LAw 349-54 (2d ed. 
2001). 
139. See Frank Bosselman & Nancy Stroud, Pariah to Paragon: Developer Exactions in 
Florida 1975-85, 14 STETSON L. REv. 527, 529 (1985); John W. Reps & Jerry L. Smith, 
Control of Urban Land Subdivision, 14 SYRACUSE L. REv. 405 (1963); Benjamin J. 
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land developers and other pro-growth interests to restrict this emerging 
funding device found to be so attractive by local governments around the 
nation. 
In this three decade period before United States Supreme Court inter-
vention in the Nollan and Dolan decisions, state law was required to sort 
out the claims against impact fees and to determine their lawfulness. 
During this time, state courts frequently addressed three central ques-
tions regarding the legality of development fees. Even though cases con-
tained a number of overlapping issues and were decided largely under a 
particular state's law, not federal law, they were principally concerned 
with the following inquiries: 1) were they police power-based regulatory 
actions or impermissible forms of local taxation; 2) were these charges 
properly authorized local government actions under statutory or constitu-
tional law; and 3) even if authorized, were these fees "reasonable" exer-
cises of the police power under state law constitutional law tests? Since 
the courts were evaluating local practices that grew from indigenous 
sources and followed no national pattern, it is not surprising that their 
decisions followed no consensus of opinion. The following patterns 
emerged through this formative period, and they reflect state judiciaries' 
attempt to balance competing claims to the legitimacy of a popular, yet 
contested, method of public finance. 
a. The "Regulation" or "Taxation" Inquiry 
A surprisingly large number of cases during this time period addressed 
the question of whether the cash charge was to be categorized as a police 
power regulation or as a form of taxation. While appearing as a rather 
formalistic objection to the local government's action, the regulation/tax-
ation classification held great potency for challengers to impact fee prac-
tices. In Regulation for Revenue, Altschuler and Gomez-Ibanez noted a 
fundamental difference between these two financial techniques, 
Governments may regulate and impose fees on the basis of their po-
lice power, but they may not impose taxes. A tax can be used for any 
purpose; no connection, in principle, need exist between the source 
of revenue and the purposes for which it is used. Fees, on the other 
hand, must be justified with reference to the cost of providing ser-
vices to the payers or of mitigating harm to others that would other-
wise be caused by the payers' activities. 140 
This distinction emphasizes the fact that taxes may be imposed following 
criteria unrelated to service costs or harm mitigation. Income and prop-
erty taxes provide common examples of this phenomenon where the obli-
gatory charges are set solely with reference to income or wealth levels. 
More importantly, the regulatory fee/tax dichotomy relates more directly 
to identifying proper sources of authority for each form of action. In 
Trichelo, Subdivision Exactions: Virginia Constitutional Problems, 11 U. RicH. L. REv. 21 
(1976). 
140. ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 17, at 51. 
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practice, state legislatures carefully limit the power of local governments 
to impose taxes much more restrictively than they do the allocation of 
planning and land use control power.141 They also impose more onerous 
procedural demands such as super majority voting or citizen referendum 
requirements on the adoption of new taxes. Courts also have the ten-
dency to interpret taxing authority in a narrower fashion, as well.142 
Discerning the differences between invalid taxes and permissible regu-
latory fees has been difficult for courts to do with any defining principle 
or consistency. It has been even harder for them to articulate a coherent 
rationale for the distinctions they have drawn. Some cases like S & P 
Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Memphis143 claim to examine the purpose for 
which the monies have been required by the local government. As com-
monly explained in cases such as this, if the objective of the fee was to 
raise general revenue for the community rather than to accomplish a po-
lice power regulatory purpose, the charge would be considered a tax.144 
For example, in the 1961 case of Western Heights Land Corp. v. City of 
Fort Collins, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that levying a charge for 
water and sewer service on a square foot basis was not a "tax," because it 
was not a revenue measure intended to defray general municipal ex-
penses.145 In other cases during this period, courts found that a regulatory 
141. See REYNOLDS, supra note 26, at 335-37 ("[T]he power [to tax] must be derived 
from the state, and a grant of it will be strictly construed, with doubts resolved against the 
existence of any particular aspect of the power."). However, it should be noted that some 
jurisdictions accord local governments broad authority to impose certain kinds of taxes 
and, in addition, specifically exempt such taxes from the restrictive policies embodied by 
state impact fee legislation. See, e.g., Centex Real Est. Corp. v. City of Vallejo, 24 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 48, 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding Property Development Excise Tax as a 
valid tax "on the privilege of developing property" and not a development fee subject to 
state law on development fees); Westfield-Palos Verdes Co. v. City of Rancho Palos 
Verdes, 141 Cal. Rptr. 36, 44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (upheld a $500 tax per bedroom); Asso-
ciated Home Builders v. City of Newark, 95 Cal. Rptr. 648, 648-50 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971) 
(upheld a business licensing tax at building permit stage in development process). 
142. In Daniels v. Borough of Point Pleasant, 129 A.2d 265 (N.J. 1957), the court struck 
down a local ordinance substantially increasing (by 700%) the building permit fee on resi-
dential home construction. /d. at 267. The New Jersey Supreme Court struck down the fee 
ruling that without clear statutory power, a locality may not impose fees that exceed the 
cost of running the regulatory program as that would constitute use of the police power to 
defray the costs of government. /d. at 268. This rule has been extremely persuasive and it 
continues with modern cases. See, e.g., Idaho Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City of Coeur 
D'Alene, 890 P.2d 326 (Idaho 1995). 
143. 672 S.W.2d 213 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983). 
144. /d. at 215. Not all taxes are held to be void. If the requisite municipal authority 
exists, a local government may lawfully impose a revenue-raising measure similar to an 
impact fee or other financial development charge. See, e.g., Cherry Hills Farms, Inc. v. City 
of Cherry Hills, 670 P.2d 778, 783 (Colo. 1983) (finding service fee to be a valid excise tax); 
Towne Props., Inc. v. City of Fairfield, 364 N.E.2d 289, 290 & 292 (Ohio 1977) (upholding a 
$50 per unit recreation tax levied on dwelling units not requiring building permits); PaulL. 
Smith, Inc. v. S. York County Sch. Dist., 403 A.2d 1034, 1937 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1979) 
(upholding school privilege tax upheld). See William H. Ethier & Howard J. Weiss, Devel-
opment Excise Taxes: An Exercise in Cleverness and Imagination, 42 LAND UsE L. & ZoN-
ING DIG. 3 (1990). 
145. See, e.g., W. Heights Land Corp. v. City of Fort Collins, 362 P.2d 155, 158 (Colo. 
1961); Contractors and Builders Ass'n of Pinellas County v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 
314, 318 (Fla. 1976); Haugen v. Gleason, 359 P.2d 108, 111 (Or. 1961) (in lieu of fees were 
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fee was present in instances when the local government classified the 
charge as such, when the fee was not in excess of the regulatory costs and 
when it segregated and spent the collected funds for a specific regulatory 
purpose.146 Courts have struggled with this classification question, and 
they have looked for clear indicators pointing to circumstances when de-
velopment fees were actually taxing devices serving to augment the gen-
eral local governmental treasury. 
b. Was There Lawful Authority to Impose Financial Charges on 
Development? 
A central tenet of local government law states that these units of gov-
ernment may only act when they possess lawful authority to do so. This 
represents a serious restraint on local government initiative and a power-
ful means of attacking legally unjustified action. In addition, local units 
of government are traditionally considered to have no inherent govern-
mental power. Therefore, when they act, they must be able to identify a 
legitimate source of their governing authority-usually in specific ena-
bling statutes or the provisions of constitutional or statutory home rule 
law. Not surprisingly, early attempts to impose development impact fees 
were met with this kind of challenge-that they were unauthorized and, 
therefore, illegal government action. A few state courts struck down the 
new fees for lacking proper authorization.147 At this juncture, few states 
had enacted legislation that explicitly allowed for impact fees, and there-
fore, local governments sought to identify less direct, implied sources of 
power from other statutory language and law. In a surprisingly large 
number of cases, the courts reinforced local efforts to charge impact fees 
by holding that the authority to do so was implied within other express 
powers such as local charters,l48 utility operation statutes,149 home rule 
powers,150 planning and zoning authority, or even generally within the 
held to be an unauthorized tax because they were not earmarked to benefit the subdivision 
providing them). 
146. Teter v. Clark County, 704 P.2d 1171, 1180-81 (Wash. 1985). 
147. Home Builders Ass'n v. Riddel, 510 P.2d 376, 379 (Ariz. 1973) (finding building 
permit fee found to be unauthorized by the state's constitution, statutes, or the local char-
ter); Hylton Enters. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 258 S.E.2d 577, 581 (Va. 1979) (holding dedica-
tion and in-lieu of fees were not authorized by state law); Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish 
County, 650 P.2d 193, 196 (Wash. 1982) (holding that development fees were taxes and 
invalid for lack of statutory authority). But see N.J. Builders Ass'n v. Bernards Twp., 528 
A.2d 555, 562 (N.J. 1987) (striking down a road impact fee because it exceeded state 
granted authority). Some modern cases continue this tradition and strike down impact fee 
ordinances as unauthorized under state enabling legislation. See, e.g., Idaho Bldg. Contrac-
tors Ass'n v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 890 P.2d 326 (Idaho 1995). 
148. See, e.g., City of Mesa v. Home Builders Ass'n, 523 P.2d 57,59 (Ariz. 1974) (decid-
ing city's charter implies the authority to charge residential development tax). 
149. See, e.g., Home Builders Ass'n v. Provo City, 503 P.2d 451, 452 (Utah 1972) (au-
thorizing $100 sewer connection charge by statute); Coulter v. City of Rawlins, 662 P.2d 
888, 899 (Wyo. 1983) (finding sewer impact fee authority in power to construct and operate 
a sewer system). 
150. Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 369 N.E.2d 892, 895 (Ill. 1977) (upholding school 
and park land and/or fee requirement as within city's home rule power); Amherst Builders 
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police power. 151 This general permissiveness actually led to the adoption 
of state statutes in more than a third of the states by the time the Su-
preme Court issued its ruling in the Dolan case.152 
c. Determining the "Reasonableness" of Impact Fees 
Once an impact fee was found to be authorized by state law and not to 
be a form of illegal taxation, state courts in the pre-Nollan/Dolan era ap-
plied another level of analysis to determine the legality of a charge-they 
examined its "reasonableness." The courts' pursuit of reasonableness re-
flected a range of concerns that were described in equitable, constitu-
tional, or common law terms. At base, each of these early court decisions 
attempted to express a formula to fairly apportion land and infrastructure 
costs to new development when the benefits were not to be solely en-
joyed by those paying the fees. In addition, when exactions and impact 
fees began to be used in a way that would combine contributions from 
numerous development projects to fund the capital cost of off-site, large-
scale public facilities, courts were pressed to find a "reasonableness" 
limit.l53 Not surprisingly, the state courts reached widely varying posi-
tions on this question, some only requiring a weak correlation to the new 
building while others demanding a strict, nearly-linear connection. These 
judicial standards spanned a range of views, but they could be categorized 
into three central concepts: 1) the "specifically and uniquely attributable" 
test; 2) the "rational nexus" test; and 3) the "reasonable relationship" 
test.154 In different ways, these three judicial formulations measured the 
connection between new land development and local government capital 
needs related to it. As always, the courts' challenge was to devise a 
method for determining when excessive burdens were being imposed on 
new development. In this quest to identify a fair and lawful standard, 
state courts fashioned a sophisticated body of law that mediated the com-
peting claims of the contending interest groups. 
i. The Specifically and Uniquely Attributable Test 
During the sixties, some state courts took a highly restrictive view con-
cerning the legality of land use exactions. In Pioneer Trust & Savings 
Ass'n v. City of Amherst, 402 N.E.2d 1181, 1184 (Ohio 1980) (providing home rule author-
ity the power to charge an impact fee). 
151. Terry D. Morgan, State Impact Fee Legislation: Guidelines for Analysis (pts. 1 & 2), 
LAND UsE L. & ZoNING DIG. 3 (Mar. 1990), LAND UsE L. & ZoNING DIG. 3 (Apr. 1990). 
152. Martin L. Leitner & Susan P. Schoettle, A Survey of State Impact Fee Enabling 
Legislation, 25 URB. LAw. 491, 492 n.6 (1993) (noting that in 1986 only three states had 
passed specific impact fee legislation while by 1993 the number had grown to seventeen). 
153. Heymann and Gilhool recognized this "new" problem in 1964 and proposed a cost 
accounting methodology to fairly distribute the costs of financing new public facilities 
when there were a number of new development projects all contributing to the need for 
the common infrastructure. See generally, Heymann & Gilhool, supra note 91, at 1119-57. 
154. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Dolan v. City of Tigard outlined this 
three-part typology and, ultimately, selected the "reasonable relationship" test to be 
"closer to the federal constitutional norm than either of those [two other tests]." 512 U.S. 
374, 389-91 (1994). 
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Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect,155 the Supreme Court of Illinois an-
nounced the most exacting test when it struck down a local ordinance 
requiring developers to dedicate one acre of land for each sixty residen-
tial units for schools, parks and other public purposes. In this case, the 
land owner was required to provide the village with 6.7 acres for a school 
site.156 Relying on the analytical framework provided in its 1960 decision 
in Rosen v. Village of Downers Grove,157 the court announced that unless 
the local government could establish that the demand for the new public 
facilities was "specifically and uniquely attributable" to the proposed land 
development, the exaction would not only be "unreasonable" but would 
also "amount to a confiscation of private property."158 In this case, the 
Illinois Supreme Court was convinced that while the developers would 
worsen school crowding; the developers were being asked to bear dispro-
portionate costs of remedying an already overfilled public school system 
in the village and that the need for the new school site was not "specifi-
cally and uniquely attributable" to the new residential project. By its ex-
plicit terms, the Illinois test demanded a rigorous review of land use 
exactions and a near-linear cause and effect relationship between growth 
and public infrastructure.159 Any failure in demonstrating this direct pro-
portionality to specifically created need would be met with 
invalida tion.160 
Immediately following the Pioneer Trust decision, several other state 
courts issued rulings of an equally limiting nature most often in cases re-
quiring land dedications as a condition of development approval.161 Most 
notably, in Gulest Associates, Inc. v. Newburgh, the New York intermedi-
ate appeals court struck down as an unreasonable police power regula-
tion a recreational "in lieu of" fee that could not be shown to be tied to 
capital improvements that would directly benefit the residents of the resi-
dential subdivision who paid the fee. 162 This restrictive "direct benefit" 
rule would last only four years when the New York Court of Appeals 
overruled it in Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale163 and replaced it with a 
155. 176 N.E.2d 799 (Ill. 1961). 
156. /d. at 800. 
157. 167 N.E.2d 230 (Ill. 1960) (finding land dedication or $325 per lot in lieu of fee for 
schools unrelated to the proposed development). 
158. /d. at 802. 
159. /d. 
160. /d. 
161. See, e.g., Aunt Hack Ridge Estates, Inc. v. Planning Comm'n, 273 A.2d 880 (Conn. 
1970); Gulest Assocs., Inc. v. Newburgh, 209 N.Y.S.2d 729 (Sup. Ct. 1960), affd, 225 
N.Y.S.2d 538 (1962); McKain v. Toledo City Planning Comm'n, 270 N.E.2d 370, 374 (Ohio 
1971); Frank Ansuini, Inc. v. Cranston, 264 A.2d 910, 913 (R.I. 1970). While not explicitly 
adopting the language of the Pioneer Trust decision, the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire subject both on-site and off-site land exactions to be unconstitutional. See J.E.D. 
Assocs. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 13 (N.H. 1981) (terming dedication requirement 
as an "an out and out plan of extortion"); Robbins Auto Parts, Inc. v. City of Laconia, 371 
A.2d 1167, 1169 (N.H. 1977). 
162. Gulest Assocs., Inc., 209 N.Y.S.2d at 799. 
163. 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966). 
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new test that would impose the least demand possible. 164 While the Pio-
neer Trust rule received a small following in the sixties and seventies, its 
inflexibility in the face of ever-expanding suburban growth and related 
public facility needs doomed it to the status of an historical exception. Its 
current vitality even in Illinois is unclear.165 
ii. Reasonable Relationship Test 
At the other end of the spectrum from Pioneer Trust was the reasona-
ble relationship test which required that the needs created by the new 
land development merely have some "reasonable relationship" to the 
charge or the exaction which has been imposed. Not surprisingly, this 
test has been considered extremely deferential to local government exac-
tion policy and has been associated with state court decisions approving 
of exactions with little direct cause and effect nexus shown. The earliest 
example of the reasonable relationship test can be found in the 1949 Ay-
res v. City Council decision of the California Supreme Court which up-
held an off-site land dedication requirement for a street expansion as a 
condition of plat approval.166 The court dismissed all suggestions that the 
land dedication would have community-wide benefits both at present and 
in the future, and it expansively ruled that the conditions that the city had 
imposed were both reasonable and necessary responses to the post-World 
War II growth problems.167 This case provided the foundation for later 
rulings in California that upheld land dedication or in lieu of cash pay-
ment requirements even if the exaction did not solely benefit the new 
164. This test was characterized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Dolan v. City of Tigard 
as only requiring "very generalized statements as to the necessary connection between the 
required dedication and the proposed development .... "The Court found this standard to 
be "too lax to adequately protect [landowner's] right to just compensation if her property 
is taken for a public purpose." 512 U.S. 374, 389 (1994). 
165. FRED P. BossELMAN & NANCY STROUD, LEGAL AsPECTS OF DEVELOPMENT Ex-
ACTIONS IN DEVELOPMENT ExACTIONs 74 (James E. Frank & Robert M. Rhodes eds., 
1987) (noting that no state still follows the Pioneer Trust "specifically and uniquely attribu-
table" test and that it "is now of historical interest only"); DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND 
UsE LAw 9-21 (5th ed. 2003) ("[L]ater Illinois cases upheld in-lieu fees for parks and 
schools in cases that either distinguished or claimed to apply the Pioneer test"). But seeN. 
Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. DuPage County, 649 N.E.2d 384, 388-91 (Ill. 1995) (showing a 
rigorous review of local exactions under state statute which codifies the Pioneer Trust test). 
Some have argued that the statute actually establishes a more relaxed test similar than 
required by the Illinois Supreme Court in Krughoff v. City of Naperville, 369 N.E.2d 892 
(Ill. 1977) and Bd. of Educ. v. Sur. Devs., Inc., 347 N.E.2d 149 (Ill. 1975). See Mark W. 
Cordes, Legal Limits on Development Exactions: Responding to Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. 
ILL. L. REv. 513, 519 n.40 (1995). 
166. 207 P.2d 1, 8 (1949). 
167. ld. at 8. The California Supreme Court made numerous references to Euclid v. 
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), in this case, and it did so in order to echo the 
deferential standard of review to be given to zoning as a form of police power regulation. 
Also, at this time some state courts held a view that land subdivision was a "privilege" and 
not a right. Consequently, under the "privilege" theory, local government held great power 
in deciding when and whether to recognize that privilege to develop land. See, e.g., 
Ridgefield Land Co. v. City of Detroit, 217 N.W. 58 (Mich. 1928); Brous v. Smith, 106 
N.E.2d 503,506-07 (N.Y. 1952). See also Thomas M. Pavelko, Comment, Subdivision Exac-
tions: A Review of Judicial Standards, 25 WASH. U. J. URB. & CoNTEMP. L. 269,283 (1983) 
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land development.168 Most important to the court was the fact that the 
municipality was using its police powers to combat serious local 
problems.169 Furthermore, in Associated Home Builders v. City of Wal-
nut Creek, 170 the California high court also held that it was not necessary 
for the local government to establish that the need for the new public 
facilities was attributable to the proposed development.171 An "inciden-
tal" benefit to the city as a whole would not make the exaction 
"improper. "172 
The reasonable relationship test, with its undemanding features and its 
strong support for the achievement of community objectives, had been 
followed in a small number of other jurisdictions including New York, 
Minnesota, and Montana.173 Clearly rejecting the Pioneer Trust doctrine's 
demand for precision and proof of the nexus between new development 
and new community facilities, the "reasonable relationship" theory ap-
plied a considerably more relaxed approach to the question of a neces-
sary connection, echoing the presumption of validity usually accorded to 
general zoning measures. If there was some relationship between a 
mandatory exaction and development effects or if the development con-
tributed to the worsening of a public facilities problem, the required asso-
ciation had been shown.174 Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez have described 
this as the "anything goes" rule,l15 and in Dolan, the United States Su-
preme Court specifically rejected it as a model for establishing federal 
constitutional rights. Where Pioneer Trust sought to rein in exaction 
practice with the tight fitting collar of its "specifically and uniquely attrib-
utable" test, the very generalized nexus requirements in the "reasonable 
relationship" jurisdictions allowed the possibility of local governments 
shifting too much of the general community growth costs to specific new 
development projects. As might be expected, most states avoided both of 
the extremes in policy and gravitated towards a more sophisticated and 
sensitive middle ground-the "rational nexus" test announced by the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court in 1965 in Jordan v. Village of Menomonee 
Falls176 and elaborated in a number of other state court opinions. 
168. See supra note 167. 
169. !d. 
170. 484 P.2d 606 (Cal. 1971). 
171. !d. at 610. 
172. !d. 
173. See generally Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 19 (Minn. 1976); Billings 
Props., Inc. v. Yellowstone County. 394 P.2d 182 (Mont. 1964) (exemplifying legislative 
judgment that subdivisions of over twenty acres created the need for a park without indi-
vidualized assessment); Jenad, Inc. v. Scarsdale, 218 N.E.2d 673 (N.Y. 1966). It was also 
applied to development impact fees in California in Builders Ass'n of Santa Clara v. Sup. 
Ct., 529 P.2d 582, 584-85 (Cal. 1974). 
174. Grupe v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985); Holmes v. 
Planning Bd. of New Castle, 433 N.Y.S.2d 587, 598 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980). 
175. ALTSHULER & GOMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 17, at 52. 
176. 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965). 
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iii. The Rational Nexus Test 
During this period of substantial residential growth and sharply rising 
public infrastructure costs, the state courts represented the first line of 
challenge to development exactions and impact fees. Addressing ques-
tions of legality, these courts approached the problem of devising a "fair" 
or equitable limit to land use exactions from the many different perspec-
tives affected by their own unique statutory, constitutional, and common 
law histories and traditions. Not surprisingly, a variety of legal ap-
proaches were employed by the many state courts dealing with the prob-
lem. Eventually, a centrist view-one not obviously favoring either land 
developers or local governments-became the benchmark and most 
states adopted it during the pre-Dolan period. This intermediate scrutiny 
analysis has been termed the "rational nexus" or, in some jurisdictions, 
the "dual rational nexus" test, and it requires that exactions "bear a ra-
tional nexus to the needs created by, and benefits conferred upon, the 
subdivision."177 The application of these two reinforcing elements varies 
from state to state, making it difficult to generalize about the nature of 
the test employed. 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Jordan v. Village of 
Menomonee Falls has been heralded as the origin of this test.178 In Jor-
dan, the court considered the legality of an ordinance imposing a $200 per 
lot in lieu of payment for schools, parks, and recreational facilitiesP9 The 
developer paid the fee rather than dedicating land and then challenged 
both the local government's authority to impose such fees and the consti-
tutionality of the ordinance itself. The Wisconsin court first analyzed the 
practice and rejected Pioneer Trust's demanding "specifically and 
uniquely attributable" doctrine as being unworkable and largely impossi-
ble to satisfy.180 It then announced a rule of decision that contained two 
components intended to circumscribe exaction practice and make it con-
form to state constitutional law principle.181 The first inquiry would be to 
determine whether there was a reasonable connection between the need 
for additional capital facilities and the population growth generated by 
177. Langridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 245 A.2d 336, 337 (N.J. 1969). There has 
been no agreement among writers or courts over whether these are two distinct tests or are 
one. See Cordes, supra note 33, at 520 n.41. Even the United States Supreme Court used 
the term "reasonable relationship" in its Dolan opinion when it referred to this test. 512 
u.s. 374, 389 (1994). 
178. 137 N.W.2d 442 (Wis. 1965). The term "rational nexus" was not actually used in 
the Jordan decision, but rather, it was expressed by the New Jersey Supreme Court four 
years later in Langridge Builders, 245 A.2d at 337. Since that time, the "rational nexus" 
label has been employed in several other state decisions. See, e.g., Hollywood, Inc. v. Brow-
ard County, 431 So. 2d 606 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Howard County v. JJM, Inc., 482 
A.2d 908, 920-21 (Md. 1984); Arrowhead Dev. Co. v. Livingston County Road Comm'n, 
283 N.W.2d 865, 869 (Mich. 1979); Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 376 S.E.2d 22, 31 (N.C. 
1989). 
179. 137 N.W.2d 442, 448-49 (Wis. 1965). 
180. /d. 
181. /d. 
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the new project.182 The second element required the local government to 
show that there was a rational nexus between the spending of the fees 
and the benefits accruing to the residential subdivision.183 These two 
components were intended to be mutually reinforcing as a means of 
drawing the line between excessive cost shifting to developers and proper 
cost internalization.184 
The rational nexus test soon found support in the high growth state of 
Florida where, in 1976, its supreme court upheld the imposition of impact 
fees for the expansion of water and sewer facilities. This opinion strug-
gled with the essential definition of the lawful rational nexus.I85 As sev-
eral years passed, the Florida courts specifically adopted the two-
pronged, Wisconsin test that they would later describe as the "dual ra-
tional nexus test." This test was explained in Hollywood, Inc. v. Broward 
County as follows: 
In order to satisfy these requirements, the local government must 
demonstrate a reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the 
need for additional capital facilities and the growth in population 
generated by the subdivision. In addition, the government must 
show a reasonable connection, or rational nexus, between the ex-
penditures of the funds collected and the benefits accruing to the 
subdivision. In order to satisfy this latter requirement, the ordinance 
must specifically earmark the funds collected for use in acquiring 
capital facilities to benefit the new residents. 186 
This rational nexus or dual nexus judicial test was hardly uniform in its 
application from state to state.l87 However, this approach represented a 
more sophisticated attempt to verbalize a judicially-administrable stan-
dard that was sensitive to the needs of local governments, as well as the 
land development industry. 
The rational nexus test has been adopted as the mainstream American 
test for land use exactions. In most states, the test contained the follow-
ing common themes. First, a cost accounting element was required which 
correlated the fee charged with service needs attributable to the new de-
velopment. This provision would protect new projects from being 
182. !d. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Attempting to provide a verbal formulation for the required relationship, the court 
stated that "raising expansion capital by setting connection charges, which do not exceed a 
pro rata share of reasonably anticipated costs of expansion, is permissible where expansion 
is reasonably required, if use of the money collected is limited to meeting the costs of 
expansion." Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d :114, 320 (Fla. 
1976). 
186. Hollywood, Inc., 431 So. 2d at 611-12. With the articulation of a two-pronged stan-
dard in Dunedin, the Florida appellate court rejected the more flexible "reasonable rela-
tionship" approach taken in California concluding that it could no longer be used in 
Florida. Id. 
187. For descriptions of the evolution of the "rational nexus" test, see Lawrence Fried-
man & Eric W. Wodlinger, Municipal Impact Fees in Massachusetts, 88 MAss. L. REv. 131, 
136-37 (2004) (advocating the dual rational test); R. Marlin Smith, supra note 189, at 5-30. 
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"taxed" for community needs that they did not create or to which they 
did not contribute. While it was also true that the linkage between cause 
and effect was expressed in differing terms,188 all state courts sought to 
achieve the consistent goal of fashioning a test of proportionality which 
would limit development exactions to offset the burdens that the building 
would impose on the community. The Supreme Court of Utah in 
Banberry Development Corp. v. South Jordan provided relatively clear 
guidance on how an "equitable share" of capital costs should be evalu-
ated when it identified five factors for judicial consideration.l89 These ele-
ments have been widely followed in other states. Recognizing the 
difficulty that local governments might have satisfying this demand, most 
courts did not require a mathematically-precise correlation in the appor-
tionment of costs. 
Second, the payment of impact fees must also have provided a benefit 
to the development paying the charge that is "reasonable" in relation to 
the fees paid. This element was designed to prevent impact fees from 
imposing substantial cross subsidies between a new development and 
other future building. Concerned that new construction causing the need 
for a small amount of community infrastructure would be required to 
contribute capital funds far in excess of the development's impact, the 
courts fashioned a second "reasonable nexus" to examine the benefit re-
ceived by this project. It was believed that the "benefit" requirement 
could prevent one new project from being forced to fund large capital 
improvements that would provide services to many users. As such, this 
feature demands a correlation between the benefits received and the 
amount charged. 
Third, courts often required that the capital improvements funded by 
impact fees be a part of a comprehensive plan or planning process. This 
element connected the impact fee to pre-existing plans for community 
development and provided judges the ability to assess whether the fees 
were fairly priced and whether they reasonably related to the actual 
needs of the jurisdiction. As localities employed more detailed capital 
planning and budgeting techniques, reviewing courts had more confi-
dence that impact fees and other exactions were actually correlated in a 
coherent way to the impact of new development. Such a procedure has 
even been held to satisfy the more exacting demands of the Illinois "spe-
188. See generally St. Johns County v. N.E. Fla. Builders Ass'n, Inc., 583 So. 2d 635, 637 
(Fla. 1991) (is there a "reasonable connection"); Collis v. City of Bloomington, 246 N.W.2d 
19, 24-26 (Minn. 1976) ("reasonable portion"); Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Kansas 
City, 555 S.W.2d 832,835 (Mo. 1977) (exactions "to the extent" they create need); Simpson 
v. City of N. Platte, 292 N.W.2d 297, 301 (Neb. 1980) (rational nexus means "substantial" 
nexus); LandNest Props., Inc. v. Town of Plainfield, 379 A.2d 200, 204-05 (N.H. 1977) 
("proportionality test"); Langridge Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 245 A.2d 336 (N.J. 1968) 
("apportionment"); Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 376 S.E.2d 22, 32 (N.C. 1989) ("prorated 
portion"); Banberry Dev. Corp. v. S. Jordan, 631 P.2d 899, 903 (Utah 1981) ("their equita-
ble share of the capital costs"). 
189. 631 P.2d at 903-04. 
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cifically and uniquely attributable" test.l9° Consequently, the linkage of 
impact fees to coherent plans or impact assessment methods has worked 
to restrict the likelihood that development exactions will be imposed in 
an excessive and opportunistic manner. 
Fourth, courts often required that impact fees be handled with special 
accounting practices. This resulted in these monies being kept segregated 
from other funds held by the local government in order to ensure that 
they would be used for the particular capital construction purposes for 
which they were collected. Such an earmarking of impact fees served to 
prevent their use as a source of generC:ll. revenue for the locality. Further-
more, many states required that the impact fee funds be held for a finite 
period of time, and if not used in a timely fashion, they were to be re-
funded to the payor sometimes with interest. These financial manage-
ment requirements imposed restrictions on impact fee practices in the 
states with the result being that these monies would actually be disbursed 
correctly or they would be given back to the land developer who had paid 
them. 
As the prior discussion indicates, when the Supreme Court announced 
the Nolan decision in 1987 and the Dolan opinion later in 1994, it did so 
against a backdrop of nearly three decades of state court adjudication 
which had considered the lawfulness of emerging impact fee and exaction 
practices under state law principles. While some of these decisions rested 
upon state constitutional law ideas, it is noteworthy that federal constitu-
tional protection of property rights was rarely mentioned in any of the 
decisions. Soon, the adequacy of these state law rules would be chal-
lenged under developing federal constitutional principles. 
B. A '!TEMPTING TO EMPLOY FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
NORMS TO LIMIT IMPACT FEE PRACTICE 
1. Bringing Conditional Land Use Control Practices under 
Reinvigorated Federal Takings Analysis 
The use of land use exactions including cash impact fees became com-
mon during the eighties as many areas in the United States experienced 
significant growth pressures. Local governments, the providers of most 
of the fundamental public services needed by new residents, were con-
fronted with an expanding and increasingly costly obligation to fund the 
construction of new roads, schools, recreational facilities, and libraries. 
This occurred at a time when shortages in the quantity and quality of 
basic infrastructure was predicted to reach crisis proportions by the year 
2000.191 Acting independently and without a uniform set of local govern-
190. N. Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 621 N.E.2d 1012, 1020 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1993) (using Chicago Area Transit, or CAT, model and other models to estimate 
future travel demand attributable to new development). 
191. See NAT'L lNFRASTRucruRE AoviSORY CoMM., JOINT EcoN. CoMMITTEE, 98TH 
CONG., HARD CHOICES: SUMMARY REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE STUDY 
(1984) (showing shortfall in infrastructure funding from 1984 to 2000 estimated to be $400 
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mental authority, these governments increasingly sought to shift these 
mounting capital expenses from the community at large to the land devel-
opers who were building the new homes and other buildings. The pay-
ment of these growth-related capital costs which previously had been 
borne as a community-wide development expense increasingly was paid 
with cash charges that focused on or targeted the builders of new residen-
tial units.192 This shift took many forms including upgraded subdivision 
development requirements, buffer rules, and offsite improvement de-
mands. However, the requirement of an up-front, cash payment to local 
governments to offset community-wide infrastructure costs became in-
creasingly common. At first, these costs were described as "tap fees" or 
connection charges, but by the end of the eighties, cash impact fees were 
being imposed to land developers by a growing number of localities. 
Impact fees represented not only a change in the method of financing 
local public facilities, but also a subtle effort by local governments to 
combine their police power-based regulatory powers with a device that 
would have a fiscal, revenue raising purpose. Described as "regulation 
for revenue" by Altshuler and Gomez-Ibanez,193 the emergence of land 
development impact fees represented yet another form of land use exac-
tion that would be challenged by developers and land owners in numer-
ous court cases. While the impact fee was viewed as being financially 
necessary and as desirable policy by many local governments and their 
existing residents, the emerging cash exaction practice was simultane-
ously condemned by critics as a distortion of legitimate land use regula-
tion.194 This combining of revenue raising within land use regulation was 
resisted and criticized by the development community and property rights 
advocates as a blurring of governmental functions, an abuse of regulatory 
billion); see also RANDALL W. EBERTS, NAT'L CouNCIL ON Pus. WoRKS IMPROVEMENT, 
AN AsSESSMENT OF THE LINKAGE BETWEEN PUBLIC INFRASTRUCfURE AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT (1987) (recommending a way of financing needed improvements including 
development exactions). 
192. Similar focused cash payments have been imposed as non-tax, special assessments 
on a range of other land users including local businesses. See Richard Briffault, A Govern-
ment for Our Time: Business Improvement Districts and Urban Governance, 99 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 365, 389-90 (1999). In theory, these special assessments are not considered to be taxes 
under state law and, as such, they are free from a number of constraints applicable to 
"taxes" under state constitutional and statutory law. See WILLIAM D. VALENTE ET AL., 
STATE AND LoCAL GoVERNMENT LAw 552 (5th ed. 2001). 
193. See generally ALSHULER & GoMEZ-IBANEZ, supra note 17. 
194. Some property rights advocates have asserted that the significant expansion of 
land use and environmental regulation during the last century has unfairly and excessively 
subordinated property ownership rights to the will of legislatures and government agen-
cies. One scholarly critic has written that: 
Government has misused the eminent domain power to take property from 
some for the benefit others. On a far vaster scale, it has misused the police 
power that was intended to protect individual rights, using it instead to vio-
late rights. Claiming to be acting under that power, government regularly 
subordinates rights in the name of public goods and public benefits. 
Steven J. Eagle, The Birth of the Property Rights Movement, 14 (Cato Institute, Policy 
Analysis No. 404 2001). 
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authority and an imposition of an illegal tax. 195 Arising at a time of 
heightened anti-government sentiment, these opponents of impact fee 
practice feared that granting local governments a wide latitude to impose 
such fees would actually encourage regulation as a pretext that would 
result in a smokescreen concealing the true revenue-enhancing objectives 
of government. Regulating for revenue, in this view, would actually con-
vert zoning and land development regulation from being a harm-prevent-
ing enterprise to one that would confer financial benefits to the existing 
community by imposing common costs on the shoulders of the few. 
This opposition to the charging of impact fees through land use exac-
tions was characterized by these opponents as not only being unfair as a 
selective and illegal land development tax but, more importantly, as being 
an unconstitutional taking of the developer's property.196 While some ad-
vocates chose to contest the use of impact fees in state court, employing 
state constitutional and statutory theories, others chose to rein in the 
emerging practice in federal court using federal constitutional ideas. 
During the eighties, when impact fees began to gain greater acceptance as 
a local government technique, property owner advocates found an in-
creasingly sympathetic United States Supreme Court that was willing to 
reinterpret the contours of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment to 
bolster property owner rights. While the main focus of this constitutional 
law approach was to restrict excessive regulation that made property less 
useful and less valuable in the private market, a related theme was the 
narrowing of conditional regulation, where governmental permission 
would be granted as long as the applicant transferred something of value 
to the local government. Advocates of this view argued that if excessive 
and devaluing regulation could work a "taking" of private property, then 
land use regulation that would impose a fee or charge as a condition of 
development approval would also violate the Fifth Amendment as well. 
The eighties and nineties witnessed an attempt to revive the Takings 
195. The illegal tax characterization is a significant legal issue because state law often 
restricts available methods of taxation, imposes super-majority requirements for adoption 
and requires uniformity of taxes across similar taxpayers. This fee/tax distinction is often 
difficult to discern and must be litigated in order to obtain resolution. See, e.g. Sinclair 
Paint Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 937 P.2d 1350, 1358 (Cal. 1997) (upholding fees on 
manufacturers contributing to lead contamination to combat lead poisoning); City of Gary 
v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 732 N.E.2d 149, 156 (Ind. 2000) (upholding telecommunications prov-
iders right of way fee upheld as a valid charge for the private, commercial use of municipal-
ity's real estate); President Riverboat Casino-Mo., Inc. v. Mo. Gaming Comm'n, 13 S.W.3d 
635, 640 (Mo. 2000) (finding admission fee on riverboat gambling to be a tax since they 
substantially exceeded administrative costs of collection for several years). 
196. Similar devices were developed by local governments to deal with other serious 
local government problems. Employing the special assessment model where a defined cate-
gory of properties within a jurisdiction would be subject to special charges earmarked for a 
fund that would be used to combat an important local condition such as a decaying down-
town or business district. These assessments were challenged in state court using arguments 
that they represented illegal taxes or that they violated the uniformity principles found in 
most state constitutions. See, e.g., 2d ROC-Jersey Assocs. v. Town of Morristown, 731 A.2d 
1, 12-13 (N.J. 1999) (upholding a Special Improvement District charge as a special assess-
ment under New Jersey law). 
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Clause and to give modern meaning to Justice Holmes's obscure admoni-
tion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that when government regulation 
had gone "too far" it would constitute an unconstitutional taking of prop-
erty .197 (Constitution in Exile cite) 
2. Sympathy for the Developer-Giving the Takings Clause New Life 
While the Pennsylvania Coal decision may today be considered an icon 
of an enhanced regulatory takings doctrine, by the late seventies the Fifth 
Amendment did not present much of an inhibition to local government 
land use control activities. These forms of regulation had drastically 
grown since the Supreme Court's 1926 Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. deci-
sion validated the general practice of zoning against a due process at-
tack.198 In 1978, the Supreme Court decided the well known Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York case that considered 
whether that city's landmarks preservation ordinance affected a taking of 
the railroad's property.199 Penn Central had been thwarted in its attempt 
to secure permission to build a fifty-story office building above the ex-
isting edifice of the Grand Central Station in midtown Manhattan due to 
its landmark status under New York City law. Justice Brennan's majority 
opinion set forth the principal analytical framework for assessing regula-
tory taking claims that remains in place as the constitutional law standard 
today.200 Within the context of the case, Justice Brennan established a 
flexible, multi-factor test for judging whether a government regulation 
had crossed the line and had become a taking of private property thereby 
requiring that "just compensation" be paid. This test required a consider-
ation and balancing of three factors: 1) the nature of the government ac-
tion at issue; 2) the degree of interference that the regulation imposed on 
the property owner's reasonable investment-backed expectations; and 3) 
the adverse economic impact of the rule.zot 
Applying this test to the facts at hand, the Court held in a six to three 
decision that the New York City landmark law did not take Penn Cen-
197. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Justice Stevens commented in 
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'! Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 
(2002), that "it was Justice Holmes' opinion in [Pennsylvania Coal] that gave birth to our 
regulatory takings jurisprudence." /d. at 325. Even though the Pennsylvania Coal case has 
been identified as the origin of the modern regulatory takings doctrine, academic commen-
tators have viewed it as part of the substantive due process tradition of the early twentieth 
century. See Robert Brauneis, The Foundation of Our Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence: 
The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 
106 YALE L.J. 613 (1996); Ronald H. Rosenberg & Nancy Stroud, When Lochner Met 
Dolan: The Attempted Transformation of American Land Use-Law by Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 33 URB. LAw. 663, 667 (2001). 
198. 272 u.s. 365, 396-97 (1926). 
199. 438 u.s. 104, 138 (1978). 
200. The recent holding in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. reaffirms the central impor-
tance of the Penn Central holding to regulatory takings theory. See 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2081-82 
(2005) (identifying four Fifth Amendment takings categories and characterizing Penn Cen-
tral as a "principal guideline."). 
201. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. 
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tral's property rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment.202 Beyond the 
particular facts of the case, the Penn Central majority opinion was signifi-
cant in that it announced a "soft" constitutional takings rule allowing 
judges to evaluate the legitimacy of regulations in a contextual, non-spe-
cific fashion allowing for a maximum amount of discretion in reaching 
judgment. Clearly, the Penn Central test did not mandate finding a taking 
of property in any specific situation, and the legacy of the case is that it 
has not been used to invalidate very many cases of regulatory overkill. In 
particular, the Penn Central holding merely provided general guidance 
for the consideration of those cases when a governmental regulator had 
gone "too far" and had imposed excessive losses on private owners.203 
However, with the ad hoc nature of the analysis and the flexible approach 
described in the majority opinion, Penn Central continued the longstand-
ing tradition of subjecting social and economic regulation to a rather def-
erential form of judicial review.204 With this case, the Supreme Court 
signaled its rekindled interest in the general field of land use control, as 
well as an emerging conflict between two competing points of view on the 
regulatory taking question.205 Importantly, the decision had little to say 
about the phenomena of conditional regulation or municipal exactions. 
Those topics would be treated in later cases. 
Following the Penn Central decision, regulatory taking claims contin-
ued to reach the United States Supreme Court and they would increas-
ingly find a greater sympathy for the plight of the unfairly regulated 
landowner. In 1980, in Agins v. City of Tiburon, a California property 
owner, whose valuable five-acre parcel had been down-zoned to reduce 
substantially the permissible density for residential new home construc-
tion, petitioned the Court to consider a remedial issue related to a taking 
202. /d. at 104. 
203. Penn Central continues as the essential Supreme Court regulatory taking formula 
in the absence of actual physical acquisition in total value or use obliteration. See Lingle, 
125 S. Ct. at 2082. 
204. Following the Supreme Court's decision in Euclid, the Court largely withdrew 
from zoning cases leaving the work of developing the law of zoning to the state courts. By 
the fifties and sixties, local government zoning decisions would be accorded considerable 
deference When challenged. See NORMAN WILLIAMS JR. & JOHN M. TAYLOR, AMERICAN 
LAND PLANNING LAw § 5.04 (1988). The low level due process scrutiny applied in Euclid 
had been applied in numerous state cases using principles presuming the constitutional 
validity of zoning regulation and applying the "fairly debatable" test for analyzing much 
decision making. While each state's law bore unique characteristics, they all relied on a 
generally permissive federal constitutional foundation. 
205. In his dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed a considerably different view on 
the constitutionality of the Ne\x: York City la\v. He believed that the Fifth i\mendment's 
Takings Clause should operate to prevent certain severe regulatory burdens from being 
imposed on a limited number of property owners for the benefit of society in general. 
Expressing this idea, Rehnquist wrote that the "Fifth Amendment ... was designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness 
and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 
148 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 
(1960)). This outlook would find further expression in the Nollan and Dolan cases that 
would follow. 
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claim.206 The California Supreme Court had ruled that a regulatory tak-
ings case could not be brought as an inverse condemnation case for com-
pensation under the Fifth Amendment but that the exclusive remedy in 
such a case would be judicial invalidation of the offending regulation.207 
By ruling in this way, the California court treated the takings argument as 
a due process violation, and it denied a property owner the right to argue 
that an excessive police power regulation was actually an act of eminent 
domain. 
Oddly, the United States Supreme Court ignored the certified question 
of constitutional remedy and framed the issue at hand as being whether 
the local zoning ordinance took Agins' property without paying just com-
pensation-a pure regulatory takings claim. The remedial question 
would wait until another day for resolution.208 However, the Court's 
treatment of the case took a more unusual turn when Justice Powell ruled 
that judicial review of the regulatory taking claim was premature since 
Agins had not sought a definitive statement or ruling as to the number of 
residential units that would be allowed under the revised Tiburon zoning 
ordinance.20 9 He found that under these circumstances there was no 
"concrete controversy regarding the application of the specific zoning 
provisions."210 With this finding of a lack of ripeness on the taking claim, 
it would seem as though the matter would have ended there, but it did 
not. Even though it did not need to do so, the Supreme Court's opinion 
then inexplicably announced a new two-pronged, substantive takings test 
that significantly differed from the standard set out just two years before 
in the Penn Central decision. Justice Powell wrote, "The application of a 
general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance 
does not substantially advance legitimate state interests ... or denies an 
owner economically viable use of his land."211 This new test established 
two alternative grounds for finding unconstitutional land use regulation 
violating the Fifth Amendment. The Court then applied both prongs of 
this new test to the facts in Agins and concluded that the Tiburon ordi-
nance had actually satisfied both elements.212 
Although largely unheralded at the time, the Agins decision represents 
a significant step in the modern evolution of takings doctrine because it 
was considered to have transformed what had previously been considered 
a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process argument into a Fifth 
Amendment takings violation. Justice Powell's opinion had introduced a 
novel "substantially advance legitimate state interests" prong as a judicial 
206. 447 u.s. 255, 257 (1980). 
207. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 29 (Cal. 1979). 
208. Seven years later in 1987, the United States Supreme Court would reach this issue 
and agree with the petitioner in Agins that compensation is a required remedy when a 
taking of property occurs. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. 
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 322 (1987). 
209. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. 
210. /d. 
211. /d. (citing Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36 (1978)). 
212. /d. at 262-63. 
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decisional principle in takings cases,213 and by so doing, it added impor-
tant doctrinal support for a wider and more sweeping taking clause analy-
sis. With the Supreme Court's growing interest in protecting landowner's 
rights in the eighties and nineties, this language from Agins soon had de-
veloped into a frequently-cited, shorthand definition of a regulatory tak-
ing: one focusing upon the legitimacy and rationality of the regulation at 
issue and not exclusively on the degree of its adverse economic impact.214 
In 2005, in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., the Supreme Court recognized 
the doctrinal confusion that it had created in Agins, and it reversed 
course by ruling that its "substantially advances" inquiry "was derived 
from due process, not takings, precedents."215 The Court effectively en-
ded its use in pure regulatory takings cases. Curiously, the Lingle ruling 
continued the constitutional vitality of the Agins "substantially advances" 
test in limiting regulations imposing land use exactions.216 
During the eighties, the Supreme Court changed personnel and began 
what Justice Stevens termed a "philosophical shift" in the Court that 
made it clear that "property owners have surely found a new friend."217 
The Court expressed greater receptivity to constitutional arguments 
against excessive land regulation and a striking sensitivity to the interests 
of property owners rather than regulators. In fact, in 1981, the call for a 
stricter form of constitutional review of land use control was made by an 
unlikely advocate in Justice William Brennan. In a case raising regulatory 
taking issues, Justice Brennan wrote that local regulators must observe 
the Fifth Amendment's limits of his or her authority. He said, " [a ]fter all, 
if a policeman must know the Constitution, then why not a planner?"218 
Foreshadowing the Court's shift to a more conservative position on the 
taking issue, Justice Brennan's comment heralded a view that the Consti-
tution's Just Compensation requirement was needed to control or disci-
213. The first prong of Justice Powell's takings test cites the 1928 case of Nectow v. City 
of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928), as its exclusive supporting precedent. A careful reading 
of Nectow reveals that it is a substantive due process "invalidation" decision-not a takings 
case. The Court in Nectow merely affirmed the lower court decision that the city's zoning 
district boundary was drawn at an irrational and illogical location and remanded it to the 
municipality for correction. /d. at 188-89. Justice Powell's opinion in Agins had the effect 
of elevating Nectow's due process conclusion into a violation of the Fifth Amendment's 
taking clause-all done without explanation or support. 
214. The Agins two-prong takings test has been consistently restated, without much 
analysis, in the line of Supreme Court decisions during the eighties and nineties. See City 
of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 704 (1999); Lucas v. S.C. 
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. 
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 
(1987). It has found its way into modern land use cases culminating with the Del Monte 
Dunes decision, where it was centra! to the jury's verdict thllt the city had taken the plain-
tiff's property. Academic writers have severely criticized this inclusion of a substantive due 
process element. See, e.g., RoGER A. CuNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAw OF PROPERTY 519 
(2d ed. 1993); JuERGENSMEYER & RoBERTs, supra note 50, at 405-06. 
215. 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2005). 
216. /d. at 2082-87. 
217. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 405 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
218. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 661 n.26 (1981). 
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pline "overzealous regulatory attempts. "219 While the principal focus of 
this trend was on extreme forms of regulation limiting the range of eco-
nomically-beneficial land uses and reducing the economic value of land, it 
would later shift to encompass development exactions as well. Consider-
ing local governments to have "monopoly" power over land regulation, 
property rights advocates would argue that the Taking Clause was needed 
to ensure that government would not achieve eminent domain goals 
through an abuse of the police power. Under this view, legitimate regula-
tory authority could be distorted by overbearing governmental conduct 
that would convert regulation into unfair "taxation" by bundling regula-
tory approval with expansive exactions that were unrelated to the 
projects under consideration. Throughout the remainder of the eighties, 
the Supreme Court would decide an expanding number of Fifth Amend-
ment takings law cases refining the procedure and substance of this form 
of constitutionallitigation.220 And, in 1987, it would deal with the issue of 
the constitutionality of land use exactions in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission. 
3. Regulating for Revenue and Property: Constitutionalizing Land Use 
Exaction Practice 
Over the course of the twentieth century, land use control had become 
a significantly more complex regulatory enterprise than that described in 
the early zoning case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty.221 Change has 
manifested itself in many ways including increases in the number of gov-
ernmental entities imposing restrictions on land development and an ex-
pansion in the purposes to be achieved. Beyond that, the form of 
regulation has changed as well, moving away from the purely prescriptive 
rules of Euclid to a more sophisticated regulatory regime seeking to cus-
tomize regulatory burdens with obligatory conditions. This modern form 
of land use regulation imposed conditions containing exactions demand-
ing that land developers convey something of value to the local govern-
ment in order to obtain permission to proceed with their projects. While 
state legislation and constitutional law principles generally defined the 
parameters of acceptable land use exaction practice, an effort was made 
in the late eighties and early nineties to set federal constitutional limits to 
the regulatory activity taking place throughout the nation. As part of the 
attempt to have property rights accorded a higher level of constitutional 
law protection under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause, advocates 
found a responsive Supreme Court in two cases: Nollan v. California 
219. /d. 
220. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 
482 U.S. 304 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 
(1987); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986); Williamson 
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
221. 272 u.s. 365 (1926). 
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Coastal Commission222 and Dolan v. City of Tigard.223 In both of these 
five to four decisions, the Court ruled for the property owner and articu-
lated federal constitutional doctrine in a way that would, in theory, re-
strict land use exaction practices by establishing constitutionally-
mandated norms.224 Speaking in constitutional terms, these cases force-
fully advanced the idea that regulatory conditions requiring private own-
ers to give property to government as part of the land use control process 
would be carefully scrutinized under elevated standards of constitutional 
review. In addition, a reinvigorated Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 
would be employed in a prophylactic fashion to prevent local govern-
ments from using regulatory power in an extortionate fashion. 
a. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) 
The Nollan case presented a straightforward fact pattern of a family 
seeking to replace an extremely small and dilapidated beachfront cottage 
with a new, larger oceanfront home. The Nollans purchased a beachfront 
lot in Ventura County, California on condition that they would demolish 
an existing, 504-square foot dilapidated bungalow and replace it with a 
new structure.225 In the usual case, the Nollans would only have had to 
comply with the local government's zoning or building ordinances in or-
der to proceed with this reconstruction. However, this lot was located in 
California's coastal zone, and state law required that they apply for and 
obtain a coastal development permit from the California Coastal Com-
mission.226 The Nollans permit request proceeded smoothly at first, and 
they were granted the permit. The grant of the permit was subject to a 
condition that they grant an easement allowing the public to pass along 
the portion of their property bounded by the mean high-tide line on one 
side and their backyard seawall on the other.227 In effect, this condition 
required that the Nollans convey a lateral easement to the state on the 
ocean side of their lot and behind their planned home.228 This easement 
would make it easier for the public to walk across the beach and reach 
two state parks that were situated approximately a quarter of a mile 
away.229 At this point in the controversy, the state coastal agency was 
attempting to impose the easement as a development exaction and mak-
ing approval of the coastal development permit contingent on the Nol-
lans' compliance.230 The Nollans believed this state requirement to be 
unlawful and unfair.231 
222. 483 u.s. 825 (1987). 
223. 512 u.s. 374 (1994). 
224. /d.; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825. 
225. 483 U.S. at 827-28. 
226. /d. at 828. 
227. /d. 
228. /d. at 829. 
229. /d. 
230. /d. 
231. /d. 
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They unsuccessfully protested the easement dedication requirement 
before the Coastal Commission and later sued in California Superior 
Court, which ruled in their favor based upon non-constitutional, statutory 
grounds.232 However, the Nollans' victory was short-lived. The California 
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court ruling, that (1) the Coastal Act 
required a "conditioned" permit for a building replacement proposal; (2) 
the requirement was constitutional as long as the project contributed, 
even indirectly, to the need for public beach access; and (3) there had not 
been an unconstitutional taking in the case since the condition merely 
diminished the value of the Nollans' lot, but it did not deprive them of all 
reasonable use of their property.233 Dissatisfied with this result, the Nol-
lans took their case to the U.S. Supreme Court raising only the unconsti-
tutional taking issue. 
In a five to four majority opinion, Justice Scalia ruled that the Coastal 
Commission's permit condition requiring the transfer of a lateral ease-
ment across the beach constituted a violation of the Fifth Amendment's 
ban on the taking of private property without just compensation.234 To 
reach this conclusion, the Court employed the two-pronged takings test 
expressed in the Agins v. City of Tiburon decision.235 Focusing on the 
substantive due process prong of this test, Justice Scalia held that a land 
use regulation violates the Fifth Amendment if it does not "substantially 
advance legitimate state interests."236 California had advanced three jus-
tifications237 as the state's purposes for the beachfront regulation.238 
However, the Nollan majority concluded that, although all three of these 
policy rationales were "legitimate state interests," the state's permit con-
dition requiring the Nollans to donate a beachfront easement to the pub-
lic failed to demonstrate even a reasonable relationship to the 
achievement of these purposes.239 In the Court's estimate, the reasons 
given by the State of California justifying the exaction appeared to be 
232. !d. The Superior Court ruled that there was insufficient evidence in the adminis-
trative record for concluding that the proposed bungalow replacement would create a di-
rect or a cumulative burden on public access to the ocean. !d. 
233. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 223 Cal. Rptr. 28, 30-31 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
234. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841-42. 
235. /d. at 834. 
236. /d. 
237. The majority opinion suggested that the permit requirement would be unconstitu-
tional if the condition "utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the 
prohibition." /d. at 837. This was the Court's conclusion in the Nollan case, making the 
regulatory exaction appear to be an opportunistic property grab by the State of California. 
238. The Coastal Commission suggested three main purposes behind its coastal regula-
tory scheme: (1) protection of the public's ability to see the beach; (2) assisting the public 
in overcoming the "psychological barrier" to seeing the beach created by a developed 
shore front; and (3) preventing congestion on the public beaches. /d. at 835. 
239. The Court found that the state failed to establish this fundamental relationship or 
"essential nexus." Justice Scalia found that the justifications given were sorely lacking. He 
wrote, 
[i]t is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already 
on the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces 
any obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house. It is also impos-
sible to understand how it lowers any "psychological barrier" to using the 
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completely disconnected to the harm to be mitigated by the beachfront 
management scheme: it "utterly fails to further the end advanced as the 
justification for the prohibition."240 In this first land use exaction case, 
the Court demanded that such development conditions would require a 
heightened level of judicial review that would need to find an "essential 
nexus" or connection between the exacted property and the govern-
ment's regulatory purpose. Exaction cases would henceforth be treated 
as a different species of regulatory actions and the relaxed, rational basis 
scrutiny would not be sufficient to test their constitutionality.241 
The Nollan opinion reflected a deep skepticism of state and local gov-
ernment land use regulation and for the regulators themselves. In the 
majority's view, the exercise of legitimate police power authority, ap-
proved with great deference in the Euclid opinion, was now being mis-
used as a pretext for the government's forced acquisition of privately-
owned easements and other property interests.242 Under this view, regu-
latory misbehavior in the land use exaction context demanded a constitu-
tional law response-careful judicial review under the hybrid substantive 
due process/takings standard announced in the Agins decision. Nollan 
announced a more searching form of judicial oversight that proposed to 
test the relationship between governmental means and ends with a 
heightened form of scrutiny. This new level of constitutional analysis 
would not only result in the invalidation of defective land use regulation, 
but it would impose the financial consequences of "just compensation" 
upon government when it violated these constitutional norms. Justice 
Scalia and his majority colleagues apparently believed that the doctrine 
set forth in Nollan would impose a federal constitutional barrier that 
would discipline this unfair form of regulatory taxation.243 Left open for 
public beaches, or how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on them 
caused by construction of the Nollans' new house. 
483 U.S. at 838-39. In his estimation, demanding the exaction as part of the beachfront 
management process actually demonstrated an example of "out and out ... extortion." /d. 
at 837. 
240. /d. at 838. 
241. As Juergensmeyer and Roberts note, 
Nollan's revision or articulation of the Agins-Nectow "substantially ad-
vances" test insists that when the state conditions development permission 
on the owner dedicating property to public use it may only do so without 
paying compensation if the dedicated land is "reasonably necessary" to pre-
vent or counteract anticipated adverse public effects of the proposed devel-
opment. The word "substantially" is given emphasis by the Court to make it 
clear that low-level, rational basis scrutiny is insufficient to test the strength 
of the nexus. 
JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 50, at 407. 
242. Numerous arguments were made calling for a heightened scrutiny of conditional 
land use regulation. At base, the most persuasive claims asked that local governments not 
overreach or abuse their monopolies over land use control. See Christopher J. St. Jeanos, 
Dolan v. Tigard and the Rough Proportionality Test: Roughly Speaking, Why Isn't a Nexus 
Enough?, 63 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1883, 1896 (1995). 
243. Even after striking down the Agins "substantially advance" test in regulatory tak-
ings cases, the Supreme Court preserved this relational analysis in the land use exaction 
context. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2087 (2005). 
2006] Paying for Growth With Impact Fees 239 
another day was the question of how strong the "essential nexus" be-
tween the regulatory objective and the exaction would have to be. That 
opportunity came seven years later in the case of Dolan v. City of 
Tigard.Z44 
b. Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) 
Land use exaction practices received further constitutional scrutiny in 
the case of Dolan v. City of Tigard. In Dolan, the landowner planned to 
expand her small hardware store into a larger business on the same build-
ing site.245 This otherwise ordinary business project would never have 
come to the Supreme Court's attention but for the fact that the City of 
Tigard had adopted two city policies concerning floodplain and transpor-
tation management.246 Tigard's planning commission had approved re-
construction of the hardware store, but it added mandatory conditions 
requiring the Dolans to dedicate public easements for a greenway near 
the adjacent floodplain and for a pedestrian/bicycle path.247 The land 
dedication requirement totaled about 7,000 square-feet of the 1.67 acre 
parcel or about ten percent of its area.248 Believing this development con-
dition to be unwarranted and unjustified, the Dolans began their appeal 
that would eventually take their case to the United States Supreme 
Court. 
They first appealed the planning commission's decision to the Oregon 
Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA). This approach was not successful. 
The LUBA upheld the two dedication requirements by finding that a 
"reasonable relationship" existed between the impact of the proposed de-
velopment and both land contributions.249 The Oregon Court of Appeals 
affirmed the LUBA decision, finding that body had applied the correct 
test in analyzing the case.250 The Oregon Supreme Court agreed, conclud-
ing that the "reasonable relationship" test had not been abandoned by 
the United States Supreme Court in the Nollan decision and that the con-
ditions imposed upon the Dolans bore an essential nexus to the site and 
to the proposed building.251 Undaunted, the Dolans filed a petition for 
certiorari which was granted, with the argument to occur during the 1993 
to 1994 term. 
Once again, a five to four decision of the Supreme Court considered 
the development exactions and ruled that the city's practice violated the 
244. 512 u.s. 374 (1994). 
245. /d. at 379. 
246. /d. at 377-79. 
247. /d. at 380. 
248. /d. at 379-80. 
249. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 20 Or. LUBA 411 (1991); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 22 Or. 
LUBA 617 (1992). 
250. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 832 P.2d 853, 855 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). 
251. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 854 P.2d 437, 443 (Or. 1993), rev'd, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
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Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause.252 Writing for the majority,253 Chief 
Justice Rehnquist held that since an "essential nexus" existed between 
the city's development exaction and legitimate state interests of flood 
control and the reduction of traffic congestion, the basic relational re-
quirement of Nollan had been satisfied.254 However, satisfying that rela-
tionship requirement was not enough. The major significance of the 
Dolan opinion was its discussion of the intensity of the required relation-
ship between the city's development exactions and the impact of the pro-
posed redevelopment project.255 As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, 
[T]he second part of our analysis requires us to determine whether 
the degree of the exactions demanded by the city's permit conditions 
bear the required relationship to the projected impact of petitioner's 
proposed development.256 
With this analysis, the Court refined its Fifth Amendment takings law to 
require a correlation between the land use exaction and the impact of the 
proposed project. This change remains the law today.257 But how tight a 
fit did this have to be? This relationship, Chief Justice Rehnquist insisted, 
was merely to be one of "rough proportionality" and not one reflecting a 
mathematical, cause and effect precision. The rough proportionality test, 
drawn as it was from state land use law,258 suggested limits to the amount 
of property exaction that could be constitutionally demanded in the de-
velopment process. This new Dolan standard was intended to have a 
checking or restraining effect on state and local governments. The re-
quired measure of "nexus" was structured so as to prevent local govern-
ment land use exactions from becoming de facto opportunities for taxing 
newcomers for the benefit of existing residents. The implicit meaning of 
this relational test was that any exaction or dedication requirement that 
did not bear such a "rough proportionality" would violate the Takings 
Clause and, consequently, would be unconstitutional. 
c. The Impact of Nollan and Dolan on the Constitutional Law 
Theory of Land Use Exactions 
With the decisions in Nollan and Dolan, the Supreme Court's majority 
attempted to bring the nationally-expanding practice of conditional land 
252. Dolan, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
253. The majority in Dolan was composed of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Ken-
nedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas. ld. at 375. 
254. ld. at 386. 
255. ld. at 388. 
256. Jd. 
257. See, e.g., Hallmark Inns & Resorts, Inc. v. City of Lake Oswego, 88 P.3d 284, 290 
(Or. Ct. App. 2004). 
258. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388-91. Surveying the range of state practices, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist decided that a "reasonable relationship" test employed by a majority of the 
states would be adopted by the Court. In a summary fashion, he stated that this test "is 
closer to the federal constitutional norm than [other state positions]." ld. at 391. Because 
the term "reasonable relationship" sounded "confusingly similar" to the due process/equal 
protection standard, Rehnquist chose the label "rough proportionality" to describe the 
new federal standard. ld. at 325. 
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use regulation within the bounds of federal constitutional doctrine. It did 
so in ways that both set substantive legal standards and established proce-
dures for government regulation. These decisions changed federal consti-
tutional doctrine in ways that their supporters believed would restrict the 
exaction process by using federal supremacy as the means of achieving 
the result.259 In imposing the new "rough proportionality" constraint 
upon exaction practices, the Dolan court managed to change, in a subtle 
way, the constitutional presumption of validity that police power-based 
land use regulation had enjoyed since the Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty decision. Imbedded in a footnote, this reversal of traditional judi-
cial deference to local government land use decisions was justified as be-
ing necessary to monitor difficult-to-monitor adjudicative decisions.260 
Local governments would now have to defend challenges to their exac-
tion practices in the first instance by demonstrating that the Dolan test 
had been met. No longer would a regulatory measure that was found to 
be illogical, irrational, or excessive be merely struck as down as a denial 
of property without due process of law. Punishment for unlawful land 
use exactions would now be elevated to a higher plane of constitutional 
offense-a taking of property for which compensation must be paid. An-
other important implication sprang from this alteration of the traditional 
presumption of constitutionality; the burden of proving the required 
"rough proportionality" relationship was shifted from the challenging 
landowner to the defending municipality.261 This change had practical as 
well as psychological impacts. An exaction lacking this required degree 
of nexus would be stricken as well as being found to be an unconstitu-
tional taking. Furthermore, Dolan imposed procedural demands as well. 
Chief Justice Rehnquist insisted that in order to impose such exactions, 
municipalities must make "some sort of individualized determination that 
the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact 
of the proposed development."262 At the very least, this part of the Do-
lan opinion required new governmental procedures designed to measure 
more accurately individual development impacts and to assign more pro-
portional landowner burdens. 
The Nollan and Dolan decisions stand as icons of federal court 
supremacy over state and local government under constitutional theory. 
Justified as a necessary counter-weight to what it considered to be abu-
259. The Supreme Court's opinion in Dolan triggered exaggerated responses from 
some commentators who expected the decision to devastate local government power to 
condition development in a way which that mitigate adverse impacts. See Matthew J. 
Cholewa & Helen L. Edmonds, Federalism and Land Use after Dolan: Has the Supreme 
Court Taken Takings from the States?, 28 URB. LAW. 401, 419 n.104 (1996). 
260. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 n.S (citing Euclid and Nollan). But see id. at 405 (Stevens, 
J ., dissenting) (arguing that the Court "stumbled badly" by making this "serious error [of] 
abandoning the traditional presumption of constitutionality and imposing a novel burden 
of proof on a city implementing an admittedly valid land use plan"). 
261. /d. at 395-96. 
262. /d. at 391. The mechanisms employed by the city and the information relied upon 
to set the land exactions were found to be inadequate under this new approach. 
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sive and extortionate uses of the police power, the Rehnquist Court em-
ployed evolving Fifth Amendment norms to set new ground rules for a 
wide range of land use and environmental regulation. These "new rules" 
would require a higher level of precision and justification in governmen-
tal regulatory behavior.263 This constitutional line-drawing, as it related 
to the features of conditional regulation, was clearly intended to stress 
the primacy of federal constitutional norms limiting state and local land 
use regulation. Implicitly, it also suggested the inadequacy of state law to 
deal effectively and fairly with the subject. Federal law was, therefore, 
believed to be necessary to serve as the benchmark of lawful regulatory 
practices, the ultimate legal standard needed to police "runaway" 
governments.264 
With these two opinions, the Court also apparently believed that it was 
sending a message to state courts regarding the minimum standards they 
should demand of state and local government exactions. In 1994, the Su-
preme Court appeared ready to embark upon an expansionist course of 
supervising and managing state land use control law to assure compliance 
with federal constitutional doctrine. As the prior section has demon-
strated, by that time, state courts and legislatures had already fashioned 
land use exaction law for nearly three decades. In the decade following 
Dolan, state court decisions considering impact fees would reflect the two 
conclusions: 1) state law was more than adequate in setting legal limits to 
development exaction; and 2) states were largely satisfied with the results 
of their own law, not needing the encouragement of the U.S. Supreme 
Court. Today, state law remains as the main source of policy and legal 
guidance for impact fee practices. It has evolved at the sub-federal level 
through a familiar process of public policy development. In the end, the 
Supreme Court's venture into the area of conditional regulation would 
263. Later litigation would attempt to extend the Dolan principal of "rough proportion-
ality" to pure forms of regulation that did not have connections to development exactions. 
See Spinell Homes, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 78 P.3d 692, 702-03 (Alaska 2003) 
(rejecting application in attack on subdivision requirements);Wonders v. Pima City, 89 P.3d 
810, 815-16 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004) (native plant preservation law not an exaction); Hensler 
v. City of Glendale, 876 P.2d 1043 (Cal. 1994) (rejecting application in rent control con-
text); Manocherian v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 643 N.E.2d 479, 479-80 (N.Y. 1994) (rent control 
application). Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court expressed no interest in ex-
tending Nollan/Dolan analysis to "mere regulations" with Justice Kennedy's dicta in City 
of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 703 (1999) (showing 
rough proportionality test of Dolan is "inapposite" to a case involving a permit denial). 
264. The use of Fifth Amendment Takings Clause doctrine as an interventionist device 
limiting government regulation may have actually peaked with the Dolan decision. See 
Parking Ass'n of Ga., Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 515 U.S. 1116 (1995), cert. denied, 515 U.S. 
1178 (1995) (denying certiorari despite dissent by Justices Thomas and O'Connor); Eastern 
Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 540 (1998) (questioning the continued vitality of the Agins 
"substantially advance" prong of the Takings test and whether the Takings Clause is impli-
cated in a requirement to pay money by Justice Kennedy); City of Monterey v. Del Monte 
Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 
2074, 2084 (2005) (stating that the Agins "substantially advance" test "is not a valid 
method discerning whether private property has been taken for purposes of the Fifth 
Amendment."). 
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generally be seen as a symbolic gesture with the states remaining in con-
trol of their own policy. 
C. IMPACT FEE LITIGATION FoLLOWING THE SuPREME CouRT's 
RuLINGS IN NoLLAN AND DoLAN 
1. The Effect of the U.S. Supreme Court's Nollan/Dolan Rulings 
With the announcement of the Dolan v. City of Tigard decision in June 
of 1994, property rights advocates had reason to believe that the Supreme 
Court had taken an interest in the plight of the land developer and had 
chosen to express federal constitutional norms that would rein in what 
they believed were extremely burdensome development exactions. 
Speaking with the force of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment in 
its ruling, the Court's majority had articulated a new federal constitu-
tional standard for conditional regulation that possessed substantive as-
pects as well as procedural ones. A "rough proportionality" standard, 
derived from the state law "rational nexus" principle, was defined as a 
mandatory, substantive constitutional benchmark while an individualized 
determination of each exaction was required to satisfy the necessary pro-
cedural demand. By pulling conditional land use regulation within the 
confines of the Takings Clause, the Court sought to assume a hierarchical 
control over state and local regulation-policing the police power with 
federal constitutional norms. Casting aside any possible federalism con-
cerns that might respect state legislative policy choices,265 the Dolan ma-
jority chose to express itself with an agitated rhetoric aimed at 
extortionate regulation.266 
The immediate effect of the decision was to place a degree of doubt 
into the minds of local government officials and a dash of hope into the 
hearts of property rights advocates.267 However, in the end, the Nollan! 
Dolan principles did not override and dominate a well-developed body of 
state statutory and constitutional law, and federal litigation did not be-
come the crucible for determining the legality of impact fee practices.268 
265. Cholewa & Edmonds, supra note 243, at 402-03. 
266. There are extreme cases like Walz v. Town of Smithtown, 46 F.3d 162 (2d Cir. 
1995), where a local government demanded a fifteen-foot easement across private property 
for a roadway expansion project in exchange for connecting a house to public water supply. 
In that case, the Second Circuit upheld a jury award of $102,000 that was granted to rem-
edy the locality's action. /d. 
267. See, e.g., Mark W. Cordes, Legal Limits on Development Exactions: Responding to 
Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. ILL U. L. REv. 513, 514-15 (1995); Craig R. Habicht, Dolan v. 
City of Tigard: Taking a Closer Look at Regulatory Takings, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 221. 231 
(1995); Sam D. Starritt & John H. McClanahan, Land Use Planning and Takings: the Via-
bility of Conditional Exactions to Conserve Open Space in the Rocky Mountain West after 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 30 LAND & WATER L. REv. 415, 420 (1995); Kim I. Stollar, How 
Much is Enough Assessing the Impact of Dolan v. City of Tigard, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 
193, 194 (1995); Jonathan M. Block, Note, Limiting the Use of Heightened Scrutiny to Land 
Use Exactions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1021, 1030-31 (1996). 
268. The federal courts have not been frequently used as the venue for impact fee liti-
gation either before or after the Dolan decision in 1994. See Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., 
Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1011-13 (5th Cir. 1998) (reasoning impact fees were 
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State courts continued to play their traditional role of judging the lawful-
ness of land use controls, and state legislatures increasingly acted to pass 
legislation permitting impact fees. The review of the decade of state case 
law decisions following the Dolan ruling reflects the nature of the judicial 
review that met the expanding and increasingly prevalent practice of mu-
nicipal development impact fees. 269 
2. Overview of a Decade of Litigation 
With two major decisions of the nation's highest court announcing a 
new and increasingly demanding level of constitutional review of local 
government land use and environmental exactions, it is worthwhile to de-
termine how the state courts responded to the rules and the rhetoric used 
by the Supreme Court. How did these two holdings in the Nollan and 
Dolan cases affect the ways that state courts viewed the legality of devel-
opment impact fees? Was the Fifth Amendment constitutional mandate 
expressed in this decade of cases a driving force in state law development 
concerning exactions? Did these two cases convince state courts in impact 
fee challenge cases to shift the traditional burden of proof obligations to 
local governments and away from the contesting landowner? Did the 
heightened "rough proportionality" scrutiny and individualized assess-
ment become the norm in state litigation? Examining the ten years fol-
lowing the 1994 Dolan decision, an analysis of state cases reveals a 
number of surprising patterns. 
In the period under review, state courts issued a total of 106 opinions 
directly considering the lawfulness of cash fees required as a condition of 
development approval.270 This number considered reported case deci-
sions from all levels of the state judiciary-from trial courts to state su-
"taxes" under state law and the Tax Injunction Act bars federal court subject matter juris-
diction); Blanche Road Corp. v. Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253, 263 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding in 
a § 1983 action, impact fees imposed on commercial development were properly required 
and were not "in fact motivated by bias, bad faith or improper motive"); Shell Island Inv. 
v. Town of Wrightsville Beach, 900 F.2d 255 (4th Cir. 1990) (upholding decision that water 
and sewer tap fees were not arbitrarily or unreasonably imposed, did not violate equal 
protection, and were not unlawful taxes under state law); Nat'! Ass'n of Homebuilders v. 
Chesterfield County, 907 F. Supp. 166, 168 (E.D. Va. 1995) (validating cash proffer policy 
validated without applying Dolan test); Garneau v. City of Seattle, 897 F. Supp. 1318, 1325-
26 (W.D. Wash. 1995) (holding Nollan/Dolan should not be applied to cash exactions in an 
ordinance requiring landlords to provide displaced tenants relocation assistance because 
the law did not demand real property). 
269. Perhaps it is not surprising to discover that impact fee ordinances are prevalent in 
some of the jurisdictions experiencing the greatest level of state court litigation. For in-
stance, in the state of Washington, as of November, 2004, seventy-seven cities, towns and 
counties had adopted at least one form of development impact fee. In some locales, as 
many as one general impact fee and four specialized fees are imposed simultaneously. See 
Municipal Research & Services Center of Washington, List of Jurisdictions with Impact 
Fee Provisions, at http://www.mrsc.org/Subjects/Planning/impact.aspx (last modified Nov. 
2004). 
270. Identifying impact fee cases is a complex task since local governments employ va-
rying terminology for their cash exactions. (Footnote listing all of the case decisions con-
sidered.) The actual period under consideration spanned from January 1, 1994 through 
September 30, 2004-a bit more than ten years. 
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preme courts. This number of reported cases reflected an average of 
approximately ten case decisions per year since 1994. Additional re-
search indicates that the annual rate of case decisions did not increase 
during the three years prior to 1994, when the average annual number of 
cases was eleven, suggesting that the Dolan holding did not trigger an 
avalanche of litigation challenging impact fees, but rather that case deci-
sions followed a stable long term pattern. During the study period, at 
least one decision was registered in thirty-five states or 70% of the nation, 
and these were found in all parts of the nation. However, the national 
distribution of the reported cases revealed a clustering of cases in a small 
number of high-growth states: California (16, or 15% ), Washington (13, 
or 12%), New Jersey (6, or 5.6%), Florida (5, or 4.7%), and Texas (5, or 
4.7% ). These five states produced over 42% of all of the decisions under 
review. This appears to reflect a pattern of the coexistence of high 
growth demands, the imposition of impact fees and the use of litigation to 
challenge the authority to use the fees or their administration. The ma-
jority of the remaining states in this group had either one or two reported 
cases during this ten year period, indicating a much less frequent resort to 
court suit as a means of resolving conflicts. Not surprisingly, the fifteen 
states not reporting any cases during this period were those with rela-
tively small populations and, for the most part, below average rates of 
growth.271 It is noteworthy that the total of 106 cases represented opin-
ions of all levels of state court adjudication. However, over 43% of the 
opinions in the sample were produced by the state's highest court, indi-
cating that impact fee litigation has been highly contested by well-fi-
nanced parties willing to frequently appeal "up the chain," ultimately 
receiving the decision of the state supreme court. 
3. Assessing State Jurisprudence on Impact Fees Since Dolan v. City of 
Tigard 
Analyzing impact fee cases presents difficulties in classification. Local 
governments employ a wide variety of terms to describe financial charges 
or fees imposed upon land development, including in lieu of fees,272 
271. These states were: Alabama, Arkansas, Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming. All of these states, except Arkansas and New Mexico, experienced 
population growth during the 1990-2000 period below the average growth rate for the 
United States (13.1 %). See U.S. Census 2000-State & County Quickfacts, at http://www. 
census.gov/main/www/cen2000.html. 
272. San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87,91 (Cal. 2002) 
(upholding large in lieu of payment for demolition of single room occupancy low cost hous-
ing); Twin Lakes Dev. Corp. v. Town of Monroe, 801 N.E.2d 821, 822 (N.Y. 2003) (uphold-
ing recreation in lieu of fee). 
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mitigation fees,Z73 water and sewer connection charges,274 excise taxes,275 
privilege tax,276 low income housing replacement fees,Z77 linkage fees,278 
standby fees,279 and transportation utility fees.280 However, focusing on 
those cases where government imposes charges to offset the fixed capital 
costs of public facilities attributable to new residential and non-residen-
tial development, a number of legal issues have frequently been litigated. 
The review of these cases reflects the wide variety of issues arising under 
the laws of the different states. 
a. Authority to Charge Impact Fees 
Early attempts to impose development impact fees were often chal-
lenged as being ultra vires or beyond the authority of the local govern-
ment charging them. This traditional form of attack on local government 
authority was to be expected since most states did not explicitly delegate 
the power to charge impact fees to their localities through specific ena-
bling acts.281 While courts found creative ways to identify sources of im-
plied authority,282 the clear modern trend has been to look to state 
273. Castle Homes & Dev., Inc. v. City of Brier, 882 P.2d 1172, 1173 (Wash. Ct. App. 
1994) (traffic impact mitigation fees); see also Thomas W. Ledman, Local Government En-
vironmental Mitigation Fees: Development Exactions, The Next Generation, 45 FLA. L. REv. 
835 (1993). 
274. Ford v. Georgetown County Water & Sewer Dist., 532 S.E.2d 873, 875 (S.C. 2000). 
275. Centex Real Est. Corp. v. City of Vallejo, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 48, 51 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1993); Cherry Hill Farms, Inc. v. City of Cherry Hills Viii., 670 P.2d 779, 782 (Colo. 1983); 
Waters Landing L.P. v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 712, 716 (Md. 1994). 
276. Home Builders Ass'n of Middle Tenn. v. Maury County, No. M1999-0238-COA-
KK3-CT, 2000 WL 1231374, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 2000) (holding that develop-
ment can be taxed as a privilege and for revenue raising purposes). 
277. Town of Coventry Zoning Bd. of Review v. Omni Dev. Corp., 814 A.2d 889, 899 
(R.I. 2003): San Telmo Assoc. v. City of Seattle, 735 P.2d 673 (Wash. 1987) (holding an 
unauthorized tax). But see Holmdel Builders Ass'n v. Twp. of Holmdel, 583 A.2d 277, 279-
80 (N.J. 1990) (upholding fees on new construction satisfying low income housing responsi-
bilities under Mt. Laurel principle). 
278. Commercial Builders v. City of Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1991) (up-
holding low income housing linkage fee if it pays for a social cost reasonably related to new 
construction); San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 
2002) (upholding linkage payment for demolition of low cost housing); Blue Jeans Equities 
W. v. City & County of San Francisco, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 114 (Cal Ct. App. 1992) (upholding 
transit fee to offset the higher costs of peak period ridership valid charge and not a regula-
tory taking); Russ Bldg. P'ship v. City & County of San Francisco, 246 Cal. Rptr. 21 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1987); Sintra Inc. v. City of Seattle, 829 P.2d 765, 773 n.7 (Wash. 1992) (holding 
demolition fee for low income housing not subject to Nollan essential nexus test because 
fee is cash and not land). See generally Jane E. Schukoske, Housing Linkage: Regulating 
Development Impact on Housing Costs, 76 IowA L. REv. 1011 (1991). 
279. McMillan v. N.W. Harris County Mun. Util. Dist. No. 24, 988 S.W.2d 337, 338 
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1999); Samis Land Co. v. City of Soap Lake, 23 P.3d 477, 
488 (Wash. 2000). 
280. State v. City of Port Orange, 650 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1994). 
281. Authority was sometimes lacking to impose exactions for land or for in lieu of 
payments as part of the land subdivision process. See, e.g., Hylton Enters. v. Bd. of Super-
visors, 258 S.E.2d 577, 581 (Va. 1979). But see Divan Builders, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 334 
A.2d 30, 40-41 (N.J. 1975) (upholding fee for off-site improvements). 
282. Multiple sources of implied powers have been identified. Professors Juergen-
smeyer and Roberts note that 
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impact fee statutes for the power and for the framework for implement-
ing an impact fee policy. Nearly half of the states have enacted some 
fom1 of impact fee legislation or law that has been held to permit the 
charging of impact fees. 283 While these statutes vary widely in terms of 
their geographic coverage and the purposes for which fees may be 
charged, they frequently provide highly specific guidance for the imple-
mentation of an impact fee program including capital planning and 
budgeting requirements, financial accounting, and refund provisions, as 
well as a codified rational nexus element.284 
Since the ultra vires attack holds a traditional basis for striking down a 
local government effort to impose fees, numerous litigants have used it 
with mixed results. When this critique has been successful, courts have 
found that local government programs have been inconsistent with state 
enabling statutes. A prime example can be found in Southern Nevada 
Homebuilders Association v. City of North Las Vegas where the Nevada 
Supreme Court ruled that a local ordinance requiring a fee for fire and 
emergency medical services (EMS) was not an authorized impact fee. 285 
The Nevada impact fee statute was interpreted to allow only fees for a list 
of five kinds of public services which did not include fire and EMS.286 
Sometimes localities have the authority to impose impact fees but only 
within a circumscribed geographical base. For example, in Nolte v. City 
of Olympia, the Washington Court of Appeals held that while a city could 
impose water and sewer impact fees within its boundaries, it lacked the 
power to charge them in extraterritorial locations under its regulatory au-
Of those states without authorization or enabling statutes which have consid-
ered the issue, most have found authority in home rule power, planning and 
consistency requirements, or on the theory that impact fees are land use reg-
ulations and that a local government with general land use regulatory author-
ity may enact them as part of that power. 
JuERGENSMEYER & RoBERTS, supra note 50, at 359. Sometimes this power is found in the 
authority to operate a utility system or as part of plat approval responsibility. See, e.g., 
Burke v. Town of Schererville, 739 N.E.2d 1086, 1092-93 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); 
Homebuilders Ass'n of Charlotte v. City of Charlotte, 442 S.E.2d 45, 50 (N.C. 1994). See 
Morgan, supra note 151, at pts. 1 & 2, LAND UsE L. & ZoNING DIG. 3 (Mar. 1990), LAND 
UsE L. & ZoNING DIG. 3 (Apr. 1990). 
283. See Stuart Meek ed., GROWING SMART LEGISLATIVE GuiDEBOOK (Stuart Meek 
ed., 2002). The following list identifies the states with Impact Fee Enabling Acts and the 
year of their initial adoption: Texas (1987), Maine (1988), California (1989), Vermont 
(1989), Nevada (1989), New Jersey (1989), Illinois (1989), Virginia (1990), West Virginia 
(1990), Washington (1990), Georgia (1990), Pennsylvania (1991), Oregon(1991), Arizona 
(1991), New Hampshire (1991), Indiana (1991), Maryland (1992), Rhode Island (1992), 
Idaho (1992), New Mexico (1993), Wisconsin (1994), and Colorado (2001). ARTHUR C. 
NELSON & MITCH MOODY, PAYING FOR PROSPERITY: IMPACT FEES AND JoB GROWTH 2 
(Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metropolitan Policy, June 2003). 
284. See, e.g., Homebuilder's Ass'n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 
998 (Ariz. 1997); Cherokee County v. Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass'n, 566 S.E.2d 
470, 472 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (considering only state impact fee statute); Larson v. City of 
Sullivan, 92 S.W.3d 128, 134 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (finding authority found for sewer tap fee 
in statute authorizing sewer systems). 
285. 913 P.2d 1276, 1278-79 (Nev. 1996) (statutory language defining "capital improve-
ment" limited to drainage, sanitary sewers, storm sewers, streets, and water projects only). 
286. /d. at 1278-80. 
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thority.287 The state's impact fee statute was read as the exclusive source 
of power and it was interpreted narrowly.288 Other courts have ruled that 
when a state impact fee statute exists, it is the sole source of local govern-
ment authority, thereby negating any theory of implied powers. As a 
consequence, any fees enacted outside of the unique authority are 
void.289 
Some courts determine that there is an absence of local government 
power after undertaking a conventional Dillon's Rule analysis of author-
ity and refusing to find implied powers. The case of Home Builders Asso-
ciation of Central Arizona v. City of Apache Junction290 is one example 
where the Arizona appeals court struck down the city's attempt to charge 
school impact fees as not being permitted under the state's development 
fee statute, which allowed fees for "necessary public services. "291 The 
court reasoned that since cities did not have authority over or responsibil-
ity for public school matters "necessary public services" did not include 
funding public schools.292 School impact fees have been particularly con-
troversial and courts have been unwilling to stray beyond the precise per-
mission accorded by state legislation.293 Road improvement charges do 
not fare much better without clear legislative authority. In Country Joe, 
Inc. v. City of Eagan,294 the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that a 
city's road unit connection charge was not valid as an implied authority 
under the state's municipal planning law and that it was not a valid im-
pact fee due to the disproportionate cost assigned by the city to the 
builder.295 System development charges for water have also been struck 
under Dillon's Rule analysis in New Hampshire when the supreme court 
found the charge not to be a "toll" which was permissible under state 
law.296 Also, when fees have been imposed for forbidden purposes or for 
services that are generally enjoyed by all citizens, the charge may be 
voided.297 While other authority challenges have resulted in decisions af-
firming local government power, the absence of a clear source of munici-
287. 982 P.2d 659, 665-60 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). 
288. ld. 
289. See, e.g., Simonsen v. Town of Derry, 765 A.2d 1033, 1036 (N.H. 2000). 
290. 11 P.3d 1032 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000). 
291. ld. at 1038-39. 
292. ld. at 1039. 
293. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Bainbridge, Inc., 929 P.2d 691, 695 (Colo. 
1996) (addressing a statute fixing the time and holding the amount of lawful school fees 
and the county cannot add a second fee later in the development process). 
294. 560 N.W.2d 681, 688-87 (Minn. 1997). 
295. ld. at 685-86 (reserving the issue of whether impact fees were authorized under 
state law but concluding that even if they were, the amount assessed was unlawful and an 
unauthorized "tax"). 
296. Bd. of Water Comm'rs of Laconia Water Works v. Mooney, 660 A.2d 1121, 1125 
(N.H. 1995) ("a fee imposed to offset the cost of improvements designed to meet the needs 
occasioned by present and future growth does not fit within this definition [of a toll]"). 
297. Richmond v. Shasta Comty. Servs. Dist., 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d 343, 350 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2002) (holding fire suppression charge violates state constitutional provision forbidding 
fees for general services to citizens); Hydropress Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Twp. of Upper Mt. 
Bethel, 836 A.2d 912, 919-20 (Pa. 2003) (holding wastehauler fees for repair of roads struck 
as not within impact fee authority or any other power). 
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pal authority makes impact fee programs susceptible to an invalidating 
attack.298 
b. Classification as a Tax or a Regulatory Fee 
In the litigation surrounding municipal impact fees, the exact terms 
used to define the fee charged can mean the difference between uphold-
ing a local program and striking it down as being unauthorized. This kind 
of challenge appears to be the most common form of attack that is lev-
eled against impact fees. Since impact fees require the payment of money 
from a land developer to the local government, they have been frequently 
characterized as "taxes" by litigants. The use of this approach is ex-
plained by the fact that local government taxation power is often highly 
limited or regulated under state statutory or constitutional law. Often the 
assertion that a charge should be classified as a tax really seeks to void 
the fee because under state law the locality does not possess this form of 
taxing power.299 Alternatively, if the municipality does possess taxation 
authority, arguments can be raised that certain procedural formalities 
have not been followed in their adoption.300 Most commonly, the adop-
tion of new taxes requires voter approval or passage of a local ordinance 
by a super majority while impact fee programs have only been instituted 
by simple ordinance change or by administrative action only. Impact fee 
challengers have also attacked local policy based on alleged deficiencies 
grounded on the state constitutional law principles of 1) taxation based 
on land value301 and 2) uniformity in taxation-a form of equal protec-
tion complaint.302 Ironically, if a fee is found to be a lawfully imposed tax, 
298. N. Ill. Home Builders Ass'n v. County of Du Page, 649 N.E.2d 384, 892-93 (Ill. 
1995); Burke v. Town of Schererville, 739 N.E.2d 1086, 1091-92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000). 
299. Collier County v. State, 733 So. 2d 1012, 1018-19 (Fla. 1999) (finding interim gov-
ernmental services fee was unauthorized tax and must be authorized by general law). 
"Under Massachusetts law, towns do not have the power to tax," but they can impose 
impact fees. In Greater Franklin Developers Association, Inc. v. Town of Franklin, 730 
N.E.2d 900, 901-02 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000), the appeals court struck down a town's school 
impact fees by finding that it was an impermissible or forbidden tax rather than a valid 
municipal fee. In other states, a locality may not have the authority to impose an impact 
fee but may lawfully charge a cost-based fee. See City of N. Las Vegas v. Pardee Contr. 
Co., 21 P.3d 8, 10-11 (Nev. 2001). 
300. Grunow v. Twp. of Frankenmuth, No. 226094, 2002 WL 31376376, at *1 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2002) (finding voter approval under Headlee Amendment); Larson v. City of Sulli-
van, 92 S.W.3d 128, 131 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (finding a voter requirement for new taxes 
under Hancock Amendment). But see, Home Builders Ass'n of Middle Tenn. v. Maury 
County, No. M1999-C2383-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 1231374, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 31, 
2000) (imposing privilege tax on new construction and not an impact fee); City of Hunting-
ton v. Bacon, 473 S.E.2d 743, 751 n.7 (W. Va. 1996) (noting that the Board of Education 
argued that a municipal service fee was a tax and not a use fee since it was insulated by 
state statute from paying taxes). 
301. McMillan v. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 983 S.W.2d 359, 364-65 
(Tex. App.-Austin 1998, pet denied) (holding that standby fee alleged to violate sections 
1 & 20 of Article VIII of Texas Constitution requiring that ad valorem taxes on real prop-
erty must be "in proportion to ... value" and not "greater than ... fair cash market 
value"). 
302. N. Ill. Home Builders Ass'n, 649 N.E.2d at 394-95 (holding transportation fee does 
not violate the uniformity clause of the Illinois Constitution); Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Cleve-
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it will not be subject to any Takings Clause analysis, and it may be 
charged in all parts of the jurisdiction without proof of any special benefit 
to particular parcels.303 
In the cases under review, the "taxation" critique was made in a sur-
prisingly large number of reported cases. This continued the trend identi-
fied in the pre-Dolan period. However, the decisions did not indicate any 
clear pattern in results, with half of the impact fees being classified as 
regulatory devices304 while the other half were characterized as 
"taxes."305 However, making the regulatory fee/tax determination is a 
difficult task, and courts have not used a uniform framework for making 
this important decision. The most uncomplicated approach focuses on 
determining what is the "primary purpose" of the impact fee scheme-
regulation or revenue raising.306 In Trimen Development Co. v. King 
County,307 the Washington Supreme Court applied this test and ruled that 
a park development fee imposed upon plat approval was not a tax by 
concluding that the primary purpose of the fee payment was regulatory. 
Although it undoubtedly provided funds to the locality, the court found 
that the fee's true purpose was to carry out the legitimate regulatory pur-
pose of the local subdivision ordinance-the provision of open space and 
recreation for new residents.308 Other courts look to the distribution of 
the benefits provided by the fees finding taxes to exist when those bene-
land v. City of Westlake, 660 N.E.2d 501, 504,506 (Ohio App. 1995) (applying non-uniform 
tax on real property only to new construction violating Section 2, Article XII of the Ohio 
Constitution). 
303. See Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 135 (Fla. 
2000). 
304. Home Builders Ass'n of Cent. Ariz., 902 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); 
City of Zephyrhills v. Wood, 831 So. 2d 223, 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002); Joy Mgmt. Co. 
v. Oakland County, No. 203060, 1998 WL 1988945, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998); Larson v. 
City of Sullivan, 92 S.W.3d 128, 131-33 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Ford v. Georgetown County 
Water & Sewer Dist., 532 S.E.2d 873, 875 (S.C. 2000); J.K. Constr., Inc. v. W. Carolina 
Reg'! Sewer Auth., 519 S.E. 561, 564 (S.C. 1999); McMillan, 983 S.W.2d at 364; Trimen 
Dev. Co. v. King County, 877 P.2d 187, 182 (Wash. 1994); Bacon, 473 S.E.2d at 751-53. 
305. Collier County v. State, 733 So. 2d 1012, 1018 (Fla. 1999); Idaho Bldg. Contractors 
Ass'n v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 890 P.2d 326, 329 (Idaho 1995); Greater Franklin Dev. 
Ass'n v. Town of Franklin, 730 N.E.2d 900, 903 (Mass. App. Ct. 2000); Grunow, 2002 WL 
31376376, at *1, *3; City of Billings v. State Dep't of Revenue, 891 P.2d 1149, 1153-54 
(Mont. 1995); Phillips v. Town of Clifton Park Water Auth., 730 N.Y.S.2d 565, 567 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 2001); Douglas County Contractors Ass'n v. Douglas County, 929 P.2d 253,257-
58 (Nev. 1996); Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Cleveland, 660 N.E.2d at 504; Henderson Homes, Inc. 
v. City of Bothell, 877 P.2d 176, 179-80 (Wash. 1994). 
306. The primary purpose label has been used for many years but often in an unreveal-
ing fashion. In State v. Jackman, the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressed this view in the 
following fashion. It said, "[T]he primary purpose of a tax is to obtain revenue for the 
government, while the primary purpose of a fee is to cover the expense of providing a 
service or of regulation and supervision of certain activities." 211 N.W.2d 480, 485 (Wis. 
1973). See also Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 650 P.2d 193, 195 (Wash. 1982) 
("If the fees are merely tools in the regulation of land subdivision, they are not taxes. If, on 
the other hand, the primary purpose of the fees is to raise money, the fees are not regula-
tory, but fiscal, and they are taxes"). 
307. 877 P.2d 187, 192 (Wash. 1994) (citing Hillis Homes for this rule). 
308. /d. 
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fits spill over to enhance other land and people who do not pay them.309 
The transfer of impact fee revenues to improve existing recreational fa-
cilities for the general public has proved fatal in some instances where 
courts have termed such a cross subsidy to be a tax.310 The Ohio Appeals 
Court in the Building Industry Association case stated that 
While it is laudable to seek such a recreational program for the city 
and its residents, costs associated with that program should be borne 
by all residents, not merely those purchasing new construction, for 
the benefits of such a program run to all residents.311 
The principle concern in these cases has been the prevention of the finan-
cial abuse of newcomers to a community. The New York Supreme Court 
expressed this concern by flatly stating that 
... [T]he law does not permit a municipality to charge "newcomers" 
an impact fee to cover expansion costs of an existing water facility 
absent a demonstration that such a fee is necessitated by the particu-
lar project (as opposed to future growth and development in that 
municipality generally) or a demonstration that such a newcomer 
would be primarily or proportionately benefited by the 
expansion."312 
This court was particularly motivated by the desire to stop a municipal 
"welcome stranger" philosophy that would result in the imposition of the 
burden of capital improvements upon a discrete group of residents in 
spite of the fact that benefits would be enjoyed by alJ.313 
Some state courts have developed multi-factor tests to assist them in 
the separation of taxes from regulatory fees.314 One such approach uses 
the concepts derived from traditional special assessments law focused on 
costs and benefits.315 Other state courts employ far more complex 
schemes that ultimately search for the same "special benefit" aspect of 
309. See Home Builders Ass'n of Cen. Ariz., 902 P.2d at 1360. This case noted that 
Development fees are generally considered regulatory fees if they are rea-
sonably related to the needs created by the new development and are used to 
benefit the land on which they are imposed. On the other hand, they are 
considered taxes if the fees are not related to the new development and are 
used to benefit other property. 
/d. at 1350. 
310. Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Cleveland, 660 N.E.2d at 504. 
311. /d. at 505. 
312. Philips v. Town of Clifton Park Water Auth., 730 N.Y.S.2d 565, 567 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2001). 
313. /d. at 568. 
314. See Collier Cty v. State, 733 So.2d 1012, 1017 (Fla. 1999). 
315. /d. (citing Lake County v. Water Oak Management Corp., 695 So. 2d 667,669 (Fla. 
1997)). Collier County recited a two-pronged test that considered: 1) was the property bur-
dened by the assessment deriving a "special benefit" from the service provided by the fee; 
and 2) was the assessment for the services properly apportioned. For a similar analogy to 
special assessments, see Ford v. Georgetown City Water & Sewer District, 532 S.E.2d 873, 
875 (S.C. 2000) ("taxes are imposed on all property for the maintenance of government 
while assessments are placed only on the property to be benefited"). 
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special assessment law.316 The South Carolina Supreme Court an-
nounced such a five-part test in J.K. Construction, Inc. v. Western Caro-
lina Regional Sewer Authority that sought to ensure that the fee would be 
used to primarily benefit those who paid it in a system that could not 
easily be a camouflaged general taxation program.317 The Missouri 
courts follow another .five-part test which considers the timing, the inci-
dence, and the amount of the fee, as well as the nature of the service 
provided by the charge.318 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
stated a three-part test that also places emphasis on the whether the fee 
provides focused, special benefits for "particular services" funded by the 
payment and also whether the fee is paid by choice as a voluntary act.319 
In the end, this inquiry of determining whether an impact fee is actually a 
tax has the potential of disciplining the use of the device in much the 
same way as the Nollan/Dolan tests of "essential nexus" and "rough pro-
portionality."320 This point demonstrates that the state courts have de-
veloped a number of judicial tools to sort out the acceptable from the 
unacceptable local government financial tactics. 
c. The Administration of an Impact Fee Program 
With impact fees being widely authorized under the state enabling stat-
ute and judicial opinions, a number of cases have considered questions 
relating to the administration of the impact fee program at the local level 
of government. A few cases have examined the methodology that locali-
ties must use to design and implement an impact fee system that would 
satisfy constitutional demands. This is most true in the area of road or 
transportation impact fees where the amount of money at issue is large 
and where many existing drivers, in addition to the new residents, will use 
the roadway improvements. In F&W Associates v. County of Somerset, 
the New Jersey court noted that the rational nexus test could only be 
satisfied for a traffic impact fee "only after a comprehensive study ... of 
such factors as existing road facilities, current zoning, projected popula-
tion growth, and existing commercial uses in the area."321 As occurs in 
many such situations, the locality hired a transportation consultant to 
316. See J.K. Constr., Inc. v. W. Carolina Reg'l Sewer Auth., 519 S.E.2d 561, 564-65 
(S.C. 1999). 
317. !d. The test approved in J.K. Construction required that: 1) the fee primarily bene-
fits those paying it with a special benefit or service provided by the fee; 2) the fee's pro-
ceeds be dedicated solely to capital projects; 3) the fee revenue generated will not exceed 
the cost of the improvement; 4) uniform collection of the fee upon those subject to it; and 
5) the government intended the fee to be a charge, not a tax. !d. 
31R. L:-mon v. City of Sullivan, 92 S.W.3d 128,131-32 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (citing Kel-
ler v. Marion County Ambulance Dist. 820 S.W.2d 301, 304 (Mo. 1991)). 
319. Greater Franklin Developers Ass'n v. Town of Franklin, 730 N.E.2d 900, 902-03 
(Mass. App. Ct. 2000) (citing test from Emerson College v. Boston, 462 N.E.2d 1095, 1105 
(Mass. 1984)); see also Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d 264,269 (Mich. 1998) (similar to 
Emerson College test). 
320. Compare Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 829, 837 (1987), with Dolan v. 
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994). 
321. 648 A.2d 482, 487 (N.J. Super. 1994). 
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conduct the study, which was adopted by its planning commission as part 
of the town's master plan.322 Using this "exacting study," the court found 
that the causal nexus between the new development and the needed road 
improvements had been measured with precision as part of a "rigorous 
process designed to achieve a fair allocation of increased traffic costs."323 
Holding the methodology and the computation of the fee up to an "arbi-
trary and capricious standard," the court approved the system supported 
with such a well developed basis.324 
Other cases reflect approval of the use of outside transportation con-
sultants and detailed modeling techniques, and some state impact fee 
statutes expressly require that the need for improvements "shall be based 
upon generally accepted traffic engineering practices."325 Oddly, in most 
cases there is little discussion of the methods used to design and assign 
other kinds of impact fees.326 Often they are the product of planning staff 
recommendations. When the impact fee program is well organized and 
carefully explained, some courts appear reluctant to get closely involved 
in second guessing technical judgments.327 For example, the Ohio Su-
preme Court had the opportunity to review the methodology for roadway 
improvements in Home Builders Ass'n of Dayton and the Miami Valley v. 
City of Beavercreek yet it chose to announce a rule limiting judicial recon-
sideration of the analytical methods.328 Perhaps wishing to avoid review 
of contested methodological choices, the Ohio court stated that it must 
only determine whether the chosen methodology is "reasonable based on 
the evidence presented. "329 It then found such a decision to be factual in 
nature, thereby affirming the trial court's determination that the roadway 
assessment methodology was reasonable.330 The Utah Supreme Court 
refused to force elected officials to explain how they determined the "rea-
sonableness" of impact fees after staff had disclosed the basis for 
calculations. 331 
322. Id. at 484. The study recommended the establishment of a transportation improve-
ment district in order to fund road improvements on a comprehensive basis. It also pro-
vided a formula for calculating each development's pro-rata share of the cost of the roads 
based on the number of trips generated by that new development each day. 
323. Id. at 488. 
324. ld. 
325. See N. Ill. Home Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. County of DuPage, 649 N.E.2d 384, 391 
(Ill. 1995) (discussing Road Improvement Impact Fee statute); Castle Homes & Dev., Inc. 
v. City of Brier, 882 P.2d 1172, 1173 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994). 
326. Some cases just describe in narrative form this methodology perhaps as a way of 
demonstrating its non-arbitrary character. See, e.g., Homebuilders Ass'n of Metro. Port-
land v. Tualatin Hill Park & Recreation Dist., 62 P.3d 404, 412-13 (Or. Ct. App. 2003). 
327. Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 694-95 (Colo. 2001) (discuss-
ing while a municipal charge must be reasonably related to the overall cost of the service, 
mathematical exactitude is not required and the particular mode adopted to assess the fee 
is generally a matter of legislative discretion); Everett Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Mastro, 1999 WL 
674782, *6 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 30, 1999) (using averages for determining number of 
school children from apartments is acceptable under state statute). 
328. 729 N.E.2d 349, 357-58 (Ohio 2000). 
329. Id. at 357. 
330. ld. at 352. 
331. Home Builders Ass'n v. City of N. Logan, 983 P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1999). 
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A significant number of cases discuss procedural issues related to the 
adoption and operation of an impact fees as well as to litigation challeng-
ing such a program.332 These cases reflect the fact that these fees are 
regularly being charged throughout the United States and numerous op-
erational and legal questions arise.333 The range of issues that have been 
litigated relate to filing challenges to the setting of fees,334 the establish-
ment of vested rights to be exempt from new impact fees,335 application 
of impact fees to a project after receiving preliminary plat approval,336 
burden of proof that adopted school impact fees do not exceed the cost of 
the facility to be built,337 waiver of right to challenge calculation of im-
pact fees,338 determining whether state land use vesting statute applies to 
transportation impact fees after preliminary plat approval,339 waiver of 
right to appeal school impact fees "agreed to" by failing to exhaust ad-
ministrative remedies,340 statute of limitations for state law,341 section 
1983 claims,342 whether city council members can rely on staff expertise 
for the calculation of impact fees343 and are not required to do the basic 
fact gathering and analysis in setting impact fees,344 standing rules for 
challenging validity of impact fee ordinance and seeking refund of fees 
already paid,345eligibility for refund of unlawful,346 rescinded347 impact 
fees, application of service fees to government land348 and homeowner's 
recovery of impact fees that have been paid by a developer.349 Civil pro-
cedure and impact fee statutes do not anticipate all of these practical and 
332. See, e.g., Uti!. Cost Mgm't v. Indian Wells Valley Water Dist., 36 P.3d 2, 4 (Cal. 
2001). 
333. KMSC, LLC. v. County of Ada, 67 P.3d 56, 63 (Idaho 2003). 
334. Uti!. Cost Mgmt., 36 P.3d at 4 (showing statute of limitations for filing challenge to 
new water service fee). 
335. MBL Assocs. v. City of S. Burlington, 776 A.2d 432,433, 436 (Vt. 2001); Bohemia 
Mill Pond v. New Castle County Planning Bd., No. 01A-03-007 HLA, 2001 WL 1221685, at 
*12 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 2001). 
336. Pavlina v. City of Vancouver, 94 P.3d 366, 367 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
337. Gomes v. Ukiah Unified Sch. Dist., No. 4104744, 2004 WL 2092022, at *1 (Cal. Ct. 
App. Sept. 20, 2004). 
338. KMST, LLC., 67 P.3d at 63. 
339. New Castle Invs. v. City of LaCenter, 989 P.2d 569, 570 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999). 
340. W. Coast, Inc. v. Snohomish County, 16 P.3d 30, 33-34 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000). 
341. Burke v. Town of Schererville, 739 N.E.2d 1086, 1093 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000); L.A. 
Dev. v. City of Sherwood, 977 P.2d 392, 394-95 (Or. Ct. App. 1999). 
342. Paul v. City of Woonsocket, 745 A.2d 169, 171 (R.I. 2000). 
343. Home Builders Ass'n v. City of N. Logan, 983 P.2d 561, 564 (Utah 1999). 
344. Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Am. Fork, 973 P.2d 425, 431 (Utah 1999). 
345. Raintree Homes, Inc. v. Viii. of Long Grove, 807 N.E.2d 439, 447-48 (Ill. 2004); 
Bldg. Indus. Ass'n of Lancaster County v. Manheim Twp., 710 A.2d 141, 144 (Pa. Commw. 
Ct. 1998); Metro. Builders Ass'n of Greater Milwaukee v. Town of Pewaukee, 524 N.W.2d 
648 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994). 
346. Imperial Gardens, Inc. v. Town of Wallkill, 644 N.Y.S.2d 528, 530 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1996). 
347. Cardillo v. Fla. Keys Aqueduct Auth., 654 So. 2d 1062, 1063 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1995). 
348. Bd. of Educ. v. Sandy City Corp., 94 P.3d 234, 239-40 (Utah 2004). 
349. City of Billings v. State, 891 P.2d 1149, 1150 (Mont. 1995); Michaud v. City of 
Woonsocket, 657 A.2d 1072 (R.I. 1995). 
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consequential questions, thereby making it highly likely that similar cases 
will be filed and decided in the future. 
d. Adoption of Nollan/Dolan Principles 
Probably the most interesting questions to be answered from a review 
of post-Dolan state court litigation are: 1) how has the federal constitu-
tional law of Nollan and Dolan been incorporated by state courts; and 2) 
how does the state rational nexus test actually work in practice? These 
questions lie at the heart of the analysis of impact fee law since they ask 
fundamental questions concerning the level of "connectedness" between 
new development and specific capital facilities costs. They present the 
crucial inquiry of determining in what circumstances the individual can be 
treated separately from the community. In reverse, impact fee policy ac-
tually reflects the degree to which a community collectively assumes the 
financial responsibilities for building public infrastructure. 
i. Consideration of Nollan and Dolan Decisions 
In the Nollan and Dolan opinions, the Supreme Court took aim at the 
growing practice of conditional land use regulation requiring the land de-
veloper to transfer property interests to the government as a requirement 
for obtaining project approval.350 In the Nollan case, the Court con-
fronted what it considered an egregious misuse of public power, which 
transformed normally legitimate police power exercises into extortionate 
demands from a government unit that would use its regulatory authority 
in place of compensation.351 To remedy the perceived problem of regula-
tory leveraging, the Nollan Court ruled that an "essential nexus" must be 
established between a permit condition and the public reason for the con-
dition.352 Also, the decision eschewed judicial deference to these kinds of 
land use decisions.353 Henceforth, courts would be required to closely 
and carefully examine the government regulation to determine if it "sub-
stantially" advanced a legitimate government interest.354 Burdens of 
proof would be shifted as wel1.355 In the field of conditional land use 
control which demands that the applicant contribute property interests to 
the public, Nollan appeared to call for a "heightened scrutiny" into the 
relationship between regulatory means and ends-a more rigorous test 
into real motives for regulating.356 This case directed reviewing courts to 
350. Nollan v. Ca. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 829, 827 (1987); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 
512 u.s. 374, 386 (1994). 
351. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37. 
352. !d. at 837. 
353. !d. at 838. 
354. !d. at 836 n.3. 
355. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 n.8. 
356. !d. at 836 n.3 ("substantially advance[s] 'legitimate state interests."'). Justice Bren-
nan did not agree with the Fifth Amendment-based heightened scrutiny view expressed in 
footnote 3 and thought that a "minimum rationality" principle of substantive due process 
analysis was both traditional and the superior approach. Just how high the level of scrutiny 
and when it must be applied has remained a topic of scholarly speculation. See Jonathan M. 
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view land use exaction cases more critically and to question superficial 
justifications. 
Dolan took this matter one step further by delving into the degree of 
the "essential nexus," which Justice Rehnquist defined as "rough propor-
tionality," as being necessary to validate a land exaction.357 Once again, 
the Supreme Court was concerned with abusive practices being under-
taken in the name of public improvement and a distorted use of the local 
government's police power.358 Importantly, the Court placed the burden 
of proving this level of connection on the regulating government by way 
of "some sort of individualized determination that the required dedica-
tion is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed 
development."359 This procedural element emphasized the Court's belief 
that governments needed to explicitly justify their regulatory demands-
especially when a land exaction was involved.360 
Following the Dolan decision in 1994, state courts were confronted 
with litigation testing the federal constitutionality of impact fees.361 One 
of the first questions that they confronted was the determination of the 
full reach or extent of the Supreme Court's ruling.362 This decision pos-
sessed great potential to reorganize local government practices. Major 
interpretive questions loomed. Was the Dolan case to be considered a 
broadly sweeping opinion dealing with all kinds of development exactions 
or did it have a narrow focus extending only to the easement exaction 
demanded under the specific facts of the case? The state courts ad-
dressed this fundamental question in several ways. Several decisions fo-
cused on the character of the property being exacted and determined that 
Dolan's demands only applied to forced dedications of land, considering 
these to be the equivalent of literal government occupation.363 These 
courts read the case in the narrowest way possible, intending to limit its 
effect to nearly identical fact patterns.364 The Kansas Supreme Court 
took this position in McCarthy v. City of Leawood where it summarily 
concluded that there was nothing in Dolan suggesting that its rule would 
apply to conditional regulation based on payment of money.365 The Ma-
ryland Court of Appeals reached the same result with little discussion of 
Block, Limiting the Use of Heightened Scrutiny to Land-Use Exactions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 
1021, 1044 n.154 (1996). 
357. 512 U.S. at 386, 391. The Court considered this to be the "outer limits" of what the 
local government could achieve through the use of regulatory land use control devices. 
358. /d. at 385. 
359. /d. at 395. 
360. /d. at 391. 
361. See, e.g., McCarthy v. City of Leawood, 894 P.2d 836, 844 (Kan. 1995); Waters 
Landing Ltd. P'ship v. Montgomery County, 650 A.2d 712, 713 (Md. 1994). 
362. See Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 698 (Colo. 2001); McCar-
thy, 894 P.2d at 845. 
363. See McCarthy, 894 P.2d at 845. 
364. See Waters Landing Ltd. P'ship, 650 A.2d at 724. 
365. 894 P.2d 836, 845 (Kan. 1995) ("The landowners cite no authority for the critical 
leap which must be made from a fee to a taking of property."). 
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the significance of the difference between land and money.366 
Other courts took the position that broadly applicable development 
fees would be subject "to a lesser standard of judicial scrutiny" than re-
quired by Nollan and Dolan because they believed fees to be less objec-
tionable.367 Finally, in 1999 the Supreme Court decided City of Monterey 
v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd.,368 and the reach of the Dolan requirements 
received some clarification. In addressing the question of whether Do-
lan's "rough proportionality" test should be applied to evaluate the con-
stitutionality of a regulatory denial, the Court said, "we have not 
extended the rough-proportionality test of Dolan beyond the special con-
text of exactions-land-use decisions conditioning approval of develop-
ment on the dedication of property to public use"(emphasis added).369 
This reference from Del Monte Dunes would suggest that the Dolan rules 
only apply to exactions requiring the actual dedication of land. Some 
state courts have cautiously read this to partially limit the scope of Dolan 
to the cash exaction context.37° However, this question is as much a mat-
ter of debate as it is a legal fact.371 
Although the cash/land dichotomy has had a modest effect in restrict-
ing the impact of Dolan's constitutional directive, another aspect of the 
case has been more important and limiting. When viewed as a case evalu-
ating the legality of an individually-designed and negotiated development 
condition, Dolan can be seen as an attempt to harness constitutional law 
to stop local governments from exercising monopoly control power over 
development approval when the applicant must "contribute" property or 
money to the regulator.372 Under this approach, Dolan's procedural and 
substantive requirements were aimed at restraining extortionate govern-
mental deal making when government could impose its will in individual, 
ad hoc transactions occurring in low visibility situations. Under this view, 
restraining the excessive and unchecked exercise of government power 
was the policy core of the ruling. 
One case to characterize Dolan in this fashion was the Supreme Court 
of California's 1996 decision in Ehrlich v. City of Culver City.373 In Ehr-
366. Waters Landing Ltd. P'ship, 650 A.2d at 724. The Maryland high court ruled that, 
"In contrast [to Dolan], .. . [the county] imposed the development impact tax by legislative 
enactment ... and furthermore, the tax does not require landowners to deed portions of 
their property to the County." /d. 
367. Home Builders Ass'n of Cen. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 (Ariz. 
1997) (stating that fees are "a considerably more benign form of regulation"); Loyola 
Marymount Univ. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424, 434 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1996). 
368. 526 u.s. 687 (1999). 
369. /d. at 702 (emphasis added). 
370. Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 698 (Colo. 2001). 
371. See JuERGENSMEYER & RoBERTS, supra note 50, at 368 (noting four schools of 
thought among commentators). A number of states treat land and money exactions in the 
same way. See, e.g., Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P'ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 
633 (Tex. 2004); Benchmark Land Co. v. City of Battle Ground, 14 P.3d 172, 173, 175 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2000). 
372. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 439 (Cal. 1996). 
373. /d. at 439. 
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lich, the owner of a private tennis club closed the club and applied for a 
rezoning of his site that would accommodate condominiums.374 The city 
granted a development permit on condition that the owner pay a "recrea-
tion fee" to mitigate the loss of the tennis facility and also pay a fee to 
install art in public places.375 The California court rejected the idea that 
the Nolan/Dolan rules were only to apply to land exactions since the 
harm from regulatory leveraging would occur with cash payments as 
well.376 Ehrlich typified this situation as one in which a locality can im-
pose "land use conditions in individual cases, authorized by a permit 
scheme, which by its nature allows for both the discretionary deployment 
of the police power and an enhanced potential for its abuse."377 The up-
shot of the Ehrlich decision was that if a monetary charge were to be 
classified as ad hoc or discretionary, it would be subject to the searching 
constitutional review required by Dolan while uniform, legislatively man-
dated fees would only be evaluated by a weaker "reasonable relation-
ship" test.378 Later California cases379 have followed this position as have 
a number of decisions from several other states.380 
A clear pattern in the case decisions following Dolan has been that 
legislatively designed impact fees will not be subjected to the rigors of the 
United States Supreme Court's heightened scrutiny regime.381 Usually 
expressed in a comparative form with adjudicatory fees, the legislatively 
imposed, standardized fee is marked by an absence of administrative dis-
cretion in its application or computation.382 The Oregon appeals court 
has defined it as "a generally applicable development fee imposed on a 
broad range of specific, legislatively determined subcategories of prop-
erty through a scheme that leaves no meaningful discretion either in the 
imposition or in the calculation of the fee."383 The basic assumption un-
derlying this preference for legislative programs is that such efforts will 
achieve significant public purposes in a uniform way and will distribute 
development costs in an open and fair fashion.384 Individual, one-sided 
374. /d. at 433-34. 
375. /d. at 435 (stating that the recreation fee was $280,000 and the art fee was $33,200). 
376. /d. 
377. /d. at 439. 
378. /d. at 441-42. 
379. San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 105-07 (Cal. 
2002) (applying only reasonable relationship analysis because the fee was applied through 
a generally applicable legislation and no Dolan heightened scrutiny); Krupp v. Brecken-
ridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 692 (Colo. 2001) (holding that mandatory plant invest-
ment fee imposed by sanitary district was "legislatively established" and not subject to 
Nollan/Dolan); Home Builders Ass'n of N. California v. City of Napa, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2s 60 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001). 
380. See, e.g., Waters Landing Lid. P'ship, 650 A.2d ai 723. 
381. See Home Builders Ass'n of Metro. Portland v. Tualarin Hills Park & Recreation 
Dist., 62 P.3d 404, 409 (Or. Ct. App. 2003). 
382. /d. 
383. /d. (citing Rogers Mach., Inc. v. Wash. County, 45 P.3d 966, 983 (Or. Ct. App. 
2002)). 
384. Juergensmeyer and Roberts explain this phenomenon in the following terms: 
Where a dedication requirement is a part of legislation generally applicable 
to all development, courts are reluctant to review the condition with de-
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"negotiation" would not be involved. 
Perhaps this view is aspirational or naive, but it is widely held by state 
courts.385 This formula for avoiding federal constitutional law mandates 
has been repeated by state courts in all parts of the nation including Ari-
zona,386 Colorado,387 Minnesota,388 Maryland, and California.389 The 
conclusion that may be drawn from this analysis is that the classification 
of an impact fee as either legislative or adjudicative is highly significant. 
This categorization will determine the nature of the constitutional analy-
sis that a court will perform upon judicial review. Adjudicative or discre-
tionarily imposed fees will be subjected to the full rigor of Nollan/Dolan 
analysis while legislative or non-discretionary fees will undergo state con-
stitutional review usually under a form of rational nexus evaluation. As 
Professor Mandelker correctly notes, courts have upheld impact fees 
under both kinds of review.390 
ii. Judicial Review of Impact Fees under State Constitutional 
Principles 
With most local governments adopting legislative impact fee policies or 
being able to conduct negotiated exaction programs without incurring the 
challenge of litigation, the number of cases analyzing such fees under fed-
eral constitutional principles is surprisingly small. During the ten years 
under review, however, there have been a slightly larger category of judi-
cial decisions arising under state law principles of fairness defined by im-
pact fee statutes or state constitutional doctrines. Increasingly, the 
impact fee statutes incorporate rational nexus tests for impact fee regimes 
that have the effect of codifying state constitutional norms making the 
statute the central focus of court's analysis.391 Also, reviewing courts ap-
pear to be satisfied with the legislature's work.392 In no case reviewed 
has a state court held that a state impact fee statute violates the state 
. manding scrutiny. If. for example, all residential development must convey 
an easement of five feet for sidewalk use or if all commercial property must 
pay a set transportation fee per square foot of development, the public can 
debate the propriety of the charge and the legislative process may be as-
sumed to protect persons from unfairness. 
JuERGENSMEYER & RoBERTS, supra note 50, at 409. Not surprisingly, some landowners 
complain about the unfairness of uniform, legislatively determined impact fees, and they 
demand an "individualized assessment." See, e.g., Twin Lakes Dev. Corp. v. Town of 
Monroe, 801 N.E.2d 821, 824 (N.Y. 2003) (unsuccessful demand). 
385. See Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 692 (Colo. 2001); 
Homebuilders Ass'n of Metro. Portland, 62 P.3d at 999-1000; . 
386. Home Builders Ass'n of Cen. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 999-1000 
(Ariz. 1997). 
387. Krupp, 19 P.3d at 692 (imposing mandatory plant investment fee by sanitary dis-
trict was "legislatively established" and not subject to Nollan/Dolan). 
388. Arcadia Dev. Corp. v. City of Bloomington, 552 N.W.2d 281, 286 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1996). 
389. Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 439 (Cal. 1996). 
390. DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND UsE LAw 9-26 (5th ed. 2003). 
391. Home Builders Ass'n of Cen. Ariz., 930 P.2d at 999 (applying reasonable relation-
ship test of Dolan already codified into Arizona statute). 
392. See id. at 999-1000; Krupp, 19 P.2d at 692. 
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constitutional requirements. In addition, very few decisions have struck 
down impact fees for constitutional, or any other, reasons.393 
Although the states express the rational nexus or dual rational nexus 
test in differing terms, it generally can be described with two statements: 
1) the impact fee cannot exceed government capital costs which are rea-
sonably related or attributable to the new building; and 2) the developer 
paying impact fees must receive a benefit from the infrastructure.394 
Most cases analyzing this test focus on the first element.395 Some cases 
give only the most superficial look to the question of cause and effect 
proportionality accepting only the most rudimentary justifications.396 
Others are tolerant of perceived good-faith efforts to respond to serious 
growth-induced deficiencies in public facilities even with little established 
connection to a particular parcel of land.397 A number of courts just ap-
pear to give the localities the benefit of the doubt in matters of impact fee 
program design, accepting the government's explanations even if they 
have modestly disparate irnpacts.398 
In California, the supreme court chose not to apply its "heightened 
scrutiny" review first announced in its 1996 Ehrlich case but rather a con-
siderably weaker "reasonable relationship" inquiry to uphold a low and 
moderate income housing linkage program enacted by San Francisco or-
dinance.399 The justification for this deferential form of review was the 
complete lack of discretion built into the ordinance.400 One curious side 
effect of attempts to avoid the rigors of Nollan/Dolan review appears to 
393. See, e.g., Vol usia Cty v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach, L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 137 (Fla. 
2000) (holding school impact fee unconstitutional as applied to age restricted mobile home 
park community with binding restrictive covenants); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford 
Estates Ltd. P'hip, 135 S.W.3d 620, 645 (Tex. 2004) (striking requirement to pay for street 
improvement not related to new development); City of Olympia v. Drebick, 83 P.3d 443, 
444 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (striking and remanding traffic impact fee for recalculation so as 
to be "reasonably related" to project impact); Vintage Constr. Co. v. City of Bothell, 922 
P.2d 828, 829 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) (striking park in lieu of fee struck due to no individu-
alized consideration). With an annual, national average of ten state case decisions raising 
any possible impact fee issue, the volume of litigation is extremely small considering the 
prevalence of impact fee practice. 
394. See SOLD, Inc. v. Town of Gorham, No. Civ.A. CV-02-362, 2003 WL 22250339, at 
*11-12 (Me. Super. Ct. Sept. 26, 2003); Twin Lakes Dev. Corp. v. Town of Monroe, 801 
N.E. 2d. 821, 825 (N.Y. 2003). 
395. See SOLD, Inc., 2003 WL 22250339, at *11-12. 
396. !d. 
397. Twin Lakes Dev. Corp., 801 N.E.2d at 825 (exhibiting extremely undemanding re-
view while supposedly applying Nollan/Dolan criteria). 
398. Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 695 (Colo. 2001) (holding that 
reasonable relationship test was satisfied when impact fees for triplex were 80% higher 
than the fee for the duplex); Wellington River Hollow, LLC v. King County, 54 P.3d 213, 
219-20 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (using county-wide averages from four of ten districts up-
held); Cherokee County v. Greater Atlanta Homebuilders Ass'n, 566 S.E.2d 470, 474 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the limited fee area/border benefited area); . 
399. San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & County of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 105-07 (Cal. 
2002) (applying only reasonable relationship analysis because the fee was applied through 
a generally applicable legislation and no Dolan heightened scrutiny); Loyola Marymount 
Univ. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding 
that development fees were not subject to Dolan heightened scrutiny). 
400. !d. at 104-05. 
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be a movement toward less flexible, context-considering regulatory 
programs. 
Some state supreme courts approach the subject of evaluating impact 
fee programs in a methodical way. In the City of Beavercreek case, the 
Ohio Supreme Court established a rule of decision and then applied it to 
review a roadway improvement impact fee ordinance.401 Not surprisingly, 
the court selected the dual rational nexus test approved by the United 
States Supreme Court in Dolan.402 Sounding like a referee standing be-
tween two boxers, the court explained that the appropriate test should be 
one that "balances the interests of the city and developers ... without 
unduly restricting local government."403 It defined the task of judicial 
review as determining whether a "reasonable relationship" existed to jus-
tify each of the two elements.404 The role for judicial review was de-
scribed as making factual findings about the two factors at issue.405 In 
rendering its own judgment, the Ohio Supreme Court relied to a great 
extent on evaluation of the evidence made at the trial court level and did 
not conduct its own appraisal of the information considered below.406 In 
Beavercreek, the "reasonable relationship" test resulted in rather defer-
ential appellate review.407 
Other state courts-such as Florida's-have more experience with ap-
plying the dual rational nexus review. A recent decision of the Florida 
Supreme Court demonstrates the effect of the two-prong test in a situa-
tion where the local government does not provide a particularly strong 
justification for a school impact fee.408 In Volusia City v. Aberdeen at 
Ormond Beach L.P., the developer paid a fee of approximately $1,000 
per lot for a new mobile home park that was to be lawfully age restricted, 
thereby prohibiting children.409 The court struck down the school fee, 
finding that it failed both parts of the rational nexus test: the mobile 
homes would not produce any children to be educated, and their owners 
would not receive any direct benefit from paying the fee.410 The city's 
justifications for the application of impact fees seemed particularly weak 
in comparison to the complete failure of each mobile home unit to gener-
ate children in need of education.411 Other states with long experience in 
401. Home Builders Ass'n of Dayton & the Miami Valley v. City of Beavercreek, 729 
N.E.2d 349, 397 (Ohio 2000). 
402. /d. at 356. 
403. /d. at 355. 
404. !d. at 357. 
405. /d. 
406. /d. at 356-58. 
407. !d. at 357-58. 
408. Volusia County v. Aberdeen at Ormond Beach L.P., 760 So. 2d 126, 130 (Fla. 
2000). 
409. !d. at 136. 
410. /d. 
411. The twin reasons given by the city were: Aberdeen benefits from school construc-
tion since they can serve as emergency shelters and they may serve as sites for adult educa-
tion. /d. The more tangential benefits of supporting high-quality education in a community 
was not seriously considered either by the city or the court. 
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considering impact fees use earlier case decisions as a referential guide 
for new litigation.412 
In summary, the state courts have become comfortable with the appli-
cation of their own impact fee enabling statutes and state constitutional 
provisions to render decisions in challenges to land development fees. 
Slowly, they are developing a jurisprudence that focuses inward on state 
law and policy. The impact of the Nollan/Dolan case line appears to have 
been confined to an extremely narrow set of circumstances-adjudicated 
or individually-negotiated impact fees-and these cases do not commonly 
occur. In addition, there is essentially no successful state litigation push-
ing for heightened scrutiny or upgraded impact fee procedures. The rhet-
oric of Nollan and Dolan suggesting rigorous judicial review under 
exacting constitutional standards has failed to materialize. The states 
have dominated this area of public policy, and they appear to be satisfied 
with the responsibility. 
CONCLUSION 
All evidence points to the rapid spread of land development impact 
fees throughout the nation making it a prevalent means of funding new 
growth. As local governments become pressed to provide an ever-in-
creasing list of costly services to their citizens while at the same finding 
their financial resources to be squeezed, impact fees will continue to be 
an attractive supplement for much-needed revenue. Systemwide infra-
structure needs are capital intensive, and they are continually expanding. 
Residents now urge their elected officials to adopt impact fees when the 
locality has not yet done so. Without having to face the opposition of 
future residents who do not currently live or vote in the locality, these 
officials find impact fees an irresistible policy option. With continuing 
political support, local governments are likely to continue funding their 
capital expansion with impact fees, and they will attempt to expand these 
targeted charges to a growing list of municipal services. Contrary to the 
complaint of opponents, the twin forces of economic need and political 
reality make impact fees likely to be a fixed element of modem land de-
velopment landscape in the future. 
American political culture has gradually changed, making the privitiz-
ing of previously public expenditures acceptable to the majority of subur-
ban residents. This shift, which makes mandatory private funding a 
substitute for public expenditure, further limits public or community re-
sponsibilities to citizens and eliminates the implicit public subsidy that 
has previously been given to less expensive housing. The privatization 
movement represents an important transition, raising profound questions 
about the nature of the social duty of local governments. It also raises 
412. Home Builders Ass'n v. City of Am. Fork, 973 P.2d 425, 427 (Utah 1999) (men-
tioning Banberry factors); Home Builders Ass'n v. City of N. Logan, 983 P.2d 561, 562 
(Utah 1999) (referencing to procedural and substantive guidelines established in Banberry 
Dev. Corp. v. S. Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899, 903-04 (Utah 1981)). 
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questions concerning social and economic exclusion from suburban 
America. As the impact fee practice expands, state and local government 
must carefully consider the economic and social impacts related to it. 
States must closely monitor the conduct of their localities and develop 
accurate research data evaluating the ramifications of this significant local 
government policy. Having solid baseline data as well as impact analysis 
would seem indispensable to any policy evaluation. Furthermore, legisla-
tures must fine-tune impact fee use to ensure that it is fair in its applica-
tion and that it properly accomplishes state-wide housing and other 
development goals. All-in-all, states must be more active participants in 
establishing growth policies so that a broad range of values will be recog-
nized when important local policies are adopted. 
What role exists for the United States Supreme Court in this policy 
area? The Court has expressed its concern that local government exac-
tion practices will run afoul of developing constitutional Fifth Amend-
ment values. Through the Nollan, Dolan, and other Takings Clause 
decisions, it has enunciated a strong legal policy against extortionate reg-
ulatory demands in the name of land use control. These decisions have 
espoused a view that regulation should not "go too far" so as to destroy 
property utility and value and that regulatory conditions not impose cost 
burdens that should not be imposed on the individual owner. These are 
laudable policy goals in the abstract. However, they have little usefulness 
or relevance in designing sophisticated growth policy. In the end, the Su-
preme Court has not really "led" the state and local governments to new 
standards of constitutional behavior, but rather it has used elevated rhet-
oric to reign in particularly oppressive municipal behavior. The states 
have dominated the development of programatic rules and constitutional 
norms in the area of land use impact fees, and this pattern will likely 
continue. Time will tell whether the United States Supreme Court will 
attempt to "reconstitutionalize" this debate. 
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